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ABSTRACT
Knowledge Asset Value and Network Safeguards: Impacts and Outcomes
Karen R. Nicholas

Knowledge is a key resource for firms, capable of providing a firm-level competitive
advantage. Interfirm networks are a valuable source of knowledge for firms, as both breadth and
depth of knowledge can be developed via interfirm relationships. However, for firms that have
acquired and developed valuable knowledge assets, they may view their interfirm network as
providing an opportunity for knowledge loss via knowledge spillovers. Knowledge spillovers
allow the recipient to gain knowledge without compensation to the knowledge-originating firm.
Spillovers lead to a loss of present and future value to the knowledge-originating firm. Indeed,
firms with valuable knowledge asset may implement network safeguards to limit potential
knowledge spillovers via their network size, intensity, structure, and position within the network.
While extant research has examined the effect of networks on knowledge outcomes, limited
attention has been paid to how firms may adapt their networks to safeguard their knowledge once
they have created significant value in their knowledge assets. Furthermore, as networks are a key
knowledge resource, it is unknown if these network safeguards will harm the future value of the
firm’s knowledge asset due to the restriction of available knowledge. This dissertation seeks to
explore these issues by examining how firms with knowledge assets of high value may safeguard
their knowledge via their network size, intensity, structure, and position, and ultimately how
these efforts may impact the value of their future knowledge assets.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

A number of theoretical perspectives, including the knowledge-based view of the firm
(Grant, 1996a, 1996b: Spender, 1996), social capital (Burt, 1992, 2000; Coleman, 1988; Lin,
1999, 2002), organization learning (Levitt and March, 1988; March, 1991), and absorptive
capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989, 1990) perspectives, suggest knowledge acquired within
interfirm networks is often shared among network members (Appleyard, 1996; Dyer & Nobeoka,
2000; Lipparini, Lorenzoni & Ferriani, 2014; Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004). Indeed, firms that
have already accumulated substantial value in their knowledge assets may view the risk of
knowledge spillovers (i.e., unintentionally spilling valuable knowledge to partners) to be greater
than the benefits gained by acquiring new knowledge. Network safeguards, such as restricting
network size, intensity, structure, and position, may, therefore, support firm goals of reducing the
potential for knowledge spillovers. However, these safeguards may, over time, hamper the ability
of firms to gather new knowledge, depending on the magnitude in which they are implemented.
Thus, network safeguards at one point in time may negatively affect the future value of the
firm’s knowledge assets. These potential outcomes indicate that research examining these issues
over the long-run can clarify our understanding of how network safeguards, designed to protect
the value of firms’ knowledge assets at one point in time, may ultimately have a negative impact
on the future value of knowledge assets.
The knowledge-based view (KBV) of the firm (Grant, 1996a, 1996b; Spender, 1996), in
particular, conceptualizes the firm’s principal function as ensuring that accumulated knowledge
generates a return equal to the value of the knowledge, thereby recouping, or appropriating, all
possible returns from the knowledge asset (Coff, 1999). In addition to knowledge accumulated
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via internal research and development activities, external sources of knowledge are also viewed
as fundamental in developing value in a firm’s knowledge asset, leading to new opportunities
(Levitt & March, 1988; March, 1991). However, when knowledge is exchanged between parties
without compensation to the knowledge originator, this is considered a knowledge spillover
(Agarwal, Audretsch, & Sarkar, 2010), potentially reducing both present and future value of a
firm’s knowledge assets. Gaining access to knowledge is a prime motivator for firms to enter in
interorganizational relationships (Kogut, 2000), regardless of whether all parties involved in the
relationship desired the knowledge to be transferred (Martinez-Noya, Garcia-Canal & Guillen,
2013). While interfirm relationships can be formed with the primary goal of knowledge transfer
or creation, whereby the relationship includes compensation to the knowledge-originating firm,
interfirm relationships afford the potential for all parties to accumulate knowledge from each
other (Shu, Liu, Gao, & Shanley, 2014). Thus, while KBV is focused on gathering knowledge
from all sources to increase the value of a firm’s knowledge assets and thereby its competitive
advantage, firms already in possession of valuable knowledge assets may be seeking safeguards
from knowledge spillovers in order to protect the value of their knowledge assets.
As interorganizational relationships can reap knowledge rewards, networks of firms have
the ability to extend knowledge opportunities via the transference of knowledge across extended
interorganizational ties. The volume and variety of ties found in an interorganizational network
affects the breadth of available knowledge, expanding the potential benefits (Love, Roper, &
Vahter, 2014). Network ties allow knowledge to transfer throughout the network, resulting in
firms gaining knowledge from indirect links, not necessitating a direct linkage to the knowledge
originator (Wagner, Hoisl, & Thoma, 2014). Furthermore, the ability to gain knowledge from
relationships is found in all relationships, including those between knowledge originating firms
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and their suppliers and customers (Alcacer & Oxley, 2014). Indeed, firm networks can be viewed
as an origin for value-creating resources as well as a valuable resource in and of itself (Gulati,
Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000), with both direct and indirect linkages contributing to the network’s
value.
Nonetheless, a firm’s knowledge can also be unintentionally dispersed via firm networks.
Networks have been identified as a valuable source of knowledge, enabling firms engaged in
networks to increase their knowledge (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000; Fjeldstad & Sasson, 2010).
However, the opportunity of accumulating knowledge from interfirm relationships, whether
intended or otherwise, is also afforded to partnering firms (Giarratana & Mariani, 2014;
Hernandez et al., 2015). Knowledge spillovers, whereby knowledge accrues to other firms
without compensation to the creating firm (Mayer, 2006; Uzzi & Gillespie, 2002), are prevalent
in networks. Knowledge spillovers are considered a positive by many researchers; for example,
entrepreneurial opportunities can be generated via spillovers (i.e., Agarwal, Audretsch, & Sarkar,
2007; Agarwal et al., 2010; Shu et al., 2014), industry productivity can be increased (Motohashi
& Yuan, 2010), and firm innovation output can be enhanced (Operti & Carnabuci, 2014) as firms
opportunistically generate value from knowledge spillovers. However, even though firm
networks are viewed as an opportunity to accumulate knowledge (Phelps, Heidl, & Wadhwa,
2012), some firms may view the risk of their network accumulating their valuable knowledge
without consent as an avoidable risk and thus alter their network characteristics in order to
safeguard their knowledge asset value.
Indeed, while benefits to the recipients of knowledge spillovers are not questioned
(Agarwal et al., 2010), research examining the negative outcomes of knowledge spillovers on the
knowledge originating firm is limited. The awareness of the issue is long-standing; in the 1960s,
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Arrow (1962) recognized that firms may restrict knowledge development efforts if they cannot
recoup their costs or appropriate full value. Recent research has focused on whether firms can
manage their relationships to reduce spillovers (Mayer, 2006; Oxley & Sampson, 2004)
indicating an assumption that spillovers cannot be avoided, yet can be restricted. Other research
has focused on firms’ responses to knowledge spillovers, including the subsequent formation of
alliances (Phene & Tallman, 2014) and increases in competitive pressures (Pacheco-de-Almeida
& Zemsky, 2012). Furthermore, firms may select or avoid network partners based on their
connections to avoid potential spillovers to rivals (Hernandez, Sanders, & Tuschke, 2015).
However, while this research indicates that spillovers are prevalent and that above-noted
mechanisms are available to reduce the impact of spillovers, a gap still exists in our knowledge
of whether there is a relationship between firm knowledge asset value and network
characteristics such as their network size, structure, and firm position within the network. If this
relationship exists, it may be indicative of firms implementing network safeguards in order to
limit potential knowledge spillovers.

Gaps in Knowledge and Network Outcomes Research
With knowledge being considered a significant resource that contributes to a firm’s
competitive advantage (Grant, 1996a, 1996b; Spender, 1996) and firm networks providing a key
avenue for gathering knowledge (Lipparini, Lorenzoni, & Ferriani, 2014; Mahmood, Zhu, &
Zajac, 2011; Wagner et al., 2014), it is proposed that firms in possession of valuable knowledge
assets may attempt to safeguard their knowledge. Via interfirm networks, firms seeking
knowledge protection may have dissimilar network characteristics, such as network size,
structure, and firm position within the network, as compared to firms with limited knowledge
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asset value. Empirical research into this area has received scant attention, indicating a gap in our
knowledge and understanding of this phenomenon.
In contrast, the research examining the relationship from interfirm networks to
knowledge accumulation and development has accumulated a significant body of extant
research 1, while a gap exists in our understanding of the next phase in the process; specifically,
the impact of knowledge asset value on network characteristics such as size, intensity, structure,
and firm position within the network due to spillover concerns. Research proximal to this area
has been concerned with how firms respond to spillover threats. For example, attempts by firms
to safeguard knowledge within networks may be inadvertently signaling that the knowledge is
valuable, and therefore the knowledge may be pursued with greater vigor by networked firms
(Shu et al., 2014). Further research has examined how relationships may be terminated or
initiated depending on indirect connections to rivals (Hernandez et al., 2015), indicating firm
awareness of potential spillovers’ negative outcomes. More proximal to the current research
goals, a study was conducted that indicated that firms may choose to avoid external relationships
when concerned with knowledge spillovers (Giarratana & Mariani, 2014; Mayer, 2006).
However, the predominance of research (including the above-noted research) has been conducted
at the dyadic level, limiting our understanding on how potential knowledge spillovers may
induce firms to guard their knowledge via their network. While specific research examining the
threat of knowledge spillovers on networks is still a gap in our knowledge, the recent forays into
firm responses to spillovers indicates that knowledge protection efforts are of interest to strategy
researchers. Thus, a detailed examination of how the value of knowledge assets may impact
network characteristics is warranted.

1

See the literature review by Phelps et al., 2012, and examples of empirical research Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000;
Kogut, 2000; Laursen and Salter, 2006 as well as Chapter II)
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A second gap exists in our understanding of how industry and environmental factors may
affect firms’ knowledge protection practices. First, regarding industry factors, the essential
element in this argument is that the value or duration of the value of knowledge may not be
constant across industries (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997), thereby increasing (or decreasing) the
need for network safeguards. Recent research indicates that knowledge’s value may be reduced
in dynamic industries (Wang & Chen, 2010), suggesting that environmental effects may provide
a valuable source of explanatory power regarding knowledge protection efforts. High-technology
contexts are frequently chosen for research both in networks (i.e., Burt, 2000; Stuart, 1998;
Stuart & Podolny, 1996) and knowledge (i.e., Ciborra, 1996; Liu, Wright, Filatotchev, Dai, &
Lu, 2010; Mayer, 2006; Zhang, Soh, & Wong, 2010) due to the value of knowledge in this
industry, yet this focus reduces our understanding of how a firm’s industry may impact the value
of knowledge, and thereby impact the implementation of network safeguards. Secondly, while
extant research has examined geographical effects on knowledge accumulation and the potential
for spillovers (i.e., Coombs, Deeds, & Ireland, 2009; Frost, 2001; Funk, 2014; Phene & Tallman,
2014), our understanding of environmental effects has been neglected in theoretical arguments,
yet frequently employed as statistical controls and thus acknowledged as potential influences.
Environmental factors such as dynamism and munificence may impact choices available to
firms, broadening or restricting options (Boyd & Gove, 2006). Industry dynamism indicates the
instability or unpredictability in the environment (Dess & Beard, 1984), and may lead to
increased knowledge protection as firms seek to guard any current or future competitive
advantage in an uncertain environment. Munificence indicates an abundance of resources (Dess
& Beard, 1984) and may lead to decreased knowledge protection as firms will not need to protect
resources, including knowledge. However, to date, no research has been conducted including
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industry or environmental factors and how they may impact knowledge protection efforts and
ultimately firm networks.
Finally, a gap exists in our understanding of what the performance outcomes are for firms
that strategically manage their network size, intensity, structure, and position in order to protect
their knowledge asset value. While positive relationships have been found between knowledge
networks, and outcomes 2, it is unknown how firms’ attempts to restrict knowledge spillovers
from their network will eventually impact long-term performance. The rational goal of network
safeguards is to preserve the value of knowledge in order to maximally appropriate value.
However, if knowledge protection efforts lead to a reduction or restriction of a firm’s network,
this may impact the volume of the knowledge asset over time as opportunities for knowledge
generation and accumulation decrease (Levitt & March, 1991; Wagner et al., 2014), eventually
having a negative effect. For example, firms’ networks provide opportunities for learning via
intermediaries from resources not directly tied to the firm (Wagner et al., 2014), though these
intermediaries also provide a pathway to disseminate knowledge, increasing prospects for
spillovers (Hernandez et al., 2015). Accordingly, while the goal of network safeguards is to
protect the value of the knowledge asset, as network size, intensity, structure, and position are
increasingly restricted, the result may ultimately be a negative relationship with future
knowledge asset value. This potential outcome indicates that this research has the potential to
clarify our understanding of how the degree of network safeguards may impact knowledge value
over the short- and long-term.

2
Positive relationships have been found 1) for knowledge and firm performance – both financial outcomes
(Decarolis and Deeds, 1999; Uotila, Maula, Keil, and Zahra, 2009) and knowledge outcomes (Aces and Audretsch,
1988; Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Gay and Dousset, 2005) and 2) for networks and firm performance – both financial
outcomes (Hite and Hesterly, 2001; Goerzen, 2007; Riccaboni and Pammolli, 2002; Shipilov and Li, 2008) and
knowledge outcomes (Lipparini et al., 2014; Mahmood et al., 2011; Wagner et al., 2014).
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Research Questions
The first research question asks what are the effects of knowledge asset value on
subsequent firm network characteristics. An initial proposition is that firms may reduce their
overall network size to reduce the potential for knowledge spillovers. Protection of knowledge
assets may be necessary to maintain and recoup its value, as once knowledge is revealed via
interfirm networks, other firms can readily imitate (Kogut & Zander, 1992). Thus, as the value of
the knowledge asset increases, the perceived need to protect knowledge may intensify in order to
maintain a competitive advantage for as long as possible (Barney, 1991).
It is proposed that there are four main methods for firms to safeguard their knowledge
assets from their network partners; reducing network size, increasing the intensity of the
relationships, changing the structure of the network, and modifying the firm’s position within
their network. When a firm changes its objective from gaining knowledge via its network to an
objective of safeguarding knowledge from its network, what was once considered a positive
aspect of networks will now be viewed as a risk that arises from knowledge spillovers. First, a
firm may reduce their network size to reduce the absolute number of opportunities for knowledge
spillovers, both direct and indirect. By reducing the absolute number of direct relationships, two
avenues for reducing knowledge spillovers are presented 3. The number of direct network
partners that could gain from spillovers is restricted as the firm becomes more isolated (Lavie,
2006). Additionally, with fewer relationships, the management of these relationships can

3

While Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson, 1979, 1981) could be argued to be an alternative theoretical
explanation for this hypothesis, it must be noted that the question asked here is not whether the firm selects internal
or external resources, but rather whether the size of the network is reduced. In the situation proposed here, the
volume of work assigned to external resources may be the same but structured in such a way as to reduce the
number of interfirm relationships.
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increase, creating trust relationships whereby the opportunities for knowledge spillovers are
reduced and positive knowledge transfer may be increased (Ireland, Hitt, & Vaidyanath, 2002).
These trust relationships may furthermore result in reducing indirect spillovers (from the direct
network partner to their partners), thereby impacting both direct and indirect knowledge
spillovers.
Secondly, firms may choose to guard against knowledge spillovers by not only reducing
the size of the network but also by changing the intensity of their relationships and their network
structure. A firm’s network may be comprised of both strong ties, indicated by long-lasting,
repeated relationships (Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1973) and weak ties, which are less timeintensive. Strong ties are associated with relatively closed networks; that is, where most, if not all
firms, have strong tie relationships with each other. The development of a closed network
“facilitates the emergence of effective norms and maintains the trustworthiness of others, thereby
strengthening social capital” (Adler & Kwon, 2002, p. 24). As bonding forms of social capital
are developed within the network (Adler & Kwon, 2002), norms and trust operate as governance
mechanisms (Moore, Payne, Autry, & Griffis, 2016; Uzzi, 1996). Conversely, weak ties tend to
create bridges from one network to another, opening up new avenues for information that
increases the range of knowledge (Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1973) yet not creating the same
environment of trust as found between strong ties. While the attractiveness of new knowledge
may promote firms to seek weak ties to increase their knowledge asset value, the countervailing
force of a reduced or nonexistent expectation of trustworthiness may drive firms to safeguard
their knowledge asset value by maintaining a network comprised of strong ties (Ireland et al.,
2002).
Finally, high knowledge asset value may lead a firm to occupy a less central position in
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order to reduce the volume of indirect relationships. Centrality, in general, is viewed as the
prominence or importance of a firm (Borgatti & Everett, 2006). A firm will have a higher
centrality score to the extent it is connected to many firms who themselves are highly connected,
termed beta centrality (Bonacich, 1987). This indicates that not only does is a central firm
associated with multiple other firms, but that their direct partners are also associated with
multiple other firms, and so on, creating a broad network. Indeed, a highly central position has
been considered a sign of status and provides both tangible and intangible benefits (Devers,
Dewett, Mishina, & Belsito, 2009; Podolny & Phillips, 1996).
For firms with valuable knowledge asset, centrality can indicate that the firm is widely
connected, directly and indirectly, to other firms in their network (Borgatti, 2005) increasing the
potential for knowledge spillovers. While central firms are viewed as having higher levels of
influence (Borgatti, Everett, & Johnson, 2013), this influence may not extend to their partners’
partners and beyond. As the volume of indirect relationships increases due to their central
partners, the ability for the knowledge-generating firm to manage these indirect relationships
weakens. Thus, while a highly central firm may have increased access to network knowledge, the
firm is also placing their knowledge at risk of spillovers due to their central position and
subsequent high visibility. Consequently, when knowledge asset value is high, firms may
strategically adopt a less central position in their network by connecting to less central firms and
thus reduce knowledge spillover opportunities and their visibility. However, current research has
yet to examine how knowledge asset value may impact firm network characteristics such as
network size, intensity, structure, and firm position, and thus, the first research questions asks:

RQ1: How does the value of a firm’s knowledge assets relate to their subsequent network size,
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intensity, structure, and position?

The second research question focuses on whether industry and environmental
characteristics affect the perceived value of a firm’s knowledge asset, thereby altering how firms
respond to knowledge spillover threats. For example, high-technology industries frequently view
knowledge as a key resource leading to competitive advantages (Alnuaimi & George, 2016;
Appleyard, 1996; Mayer, 2006), indicating that this industry may place a higher emphasis on
knowledge asset value, and thereby network safeguards. While knowledge is not conceptualized
as being without value in low-technology industries (e.g. Koka & Prescott, 2008), hightechnology industries are viewed as placing a higher value on their knowledge assets (Mayer,
2006). This may be due to the rapid technological changes found in the high-technology
industries, whereby high-technology firms are under constant pressure to invest in and develop
new knowledge (Soh, 2010; Vanhaverbeke, Duysters, & Noorderhaven, 2002). Thus, in
industries where rapid technological changes are present, knowledge assets may be viewed as
more worthy of protection (Cruz-Gonzalez, Lopez-Saez, Navas-Lopez, & Delgado-Verde, 2015;
Tatarynowicz, Sytch, & Gulati, 2016). The ability to compare network safeguards in different
industries can increase our understanding and awareness of how firms in various industries value
and guard their knowledge assets via their networks.
In regards to environmental characteristics, levels of industry dynamism and munificence
can modify how firms view the value of their knowledge assets and thus influence whether firm
networks are altered in order to protect knowledge asset value. Dynamism refers to the
unpredictability found in a firm’s external environment while munificence indicates the
availability of resources (Aldrich, 1979; Boyd & Gove, 2006; Dess & Beard, 1984). These two
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factors may affect how firms seek to safeguard their knowledge asset value. For example, in
highly dynamic environments, uncertainty is high (Boyd & Gove, 2006) and the rate of change
may be increased, driving firms to maintain or increase their knowledge-based competitive
advantage (Fang, 2011). Thus, firms may seek to protect their knowledge asset value in order to
hedge against an unpredictable future. Conversely, in highly munificent environments, firms may
feel a reduced need to implement network safeguards, as resources are freely abundant. In
munificent environments, firms may not feel the need to appropriate all possible value from their
knowledge asset, as the level of competition is reduced (Decarolis & Deeds, 1999), diminishing
the need to safeguard knowledge asset value. However, research has yet to examine how specific
industry and environmental characteristics affect firm knowledge protection in regards to their
network size, intensity, structure, and position. Thus, the second research question asks:

RQ2: How do industry and environmental characteristics affect the relationship between a firm’s
knowledge asset value and subsequent network size, intensity, structure, and position?

While the first two research questions explore the relationship between knowledge asset
value and firm network characteristics, the final research question seeks to extend the previous
research questions by including future knowledge asset value. As noted earlier in this chapter,
positive relationships between networks and knowledge outcomes have been supported in extant
research (Lipparini et al., 2014; Mahmood et al., 2011; Wagner et al., 2014), indicating the
presence of a direct relationship between knowledge asset value and multiple performance
measures. Thus, research has indicated that firms with valuable knowledge assets will perform
strongly. Furthermore, extant research has also found positive relationships between networks
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and firm outcomes (e.g. Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Goerzen, 2007; Riccaboni & Pammolli, 2002;
Shipilov & Li, 2008). However, this research has been predominantly conducted using crosssectional data (for exceptions, see Ahuja & Katila, 2001 and Lipparini et al., 2014). Indeed,
qualitative research and case studies indicate that extensive time may be required to ascertain the
effect of networks on firm outcomes (Figueiredo, 2011; Pacheco-de-Almeida & Zemsky, 2012;
Yang et al., 2010). Specifically, two studies have examined how interfirm relationships impact
knowledge accumulation and knowledge value over a ten-year period, indicating that extensive
time periods may be necessary to include in research to determine outcomes (Figueiredo, 2011;
Yang, Phelps, & Steensma, 2010). Even though these studies indicate the long-term effects of
relationships on knowledge, specific network characteristics were not examined in this research,
indicating a gap in our understanding of the time effects of network characteristics on knowledge
asset value.
Thus, this dissertation intends to examine longitudinal relationships and seeks to increase
our understanding of how network safeguards focused on size, intensity, structure, and position
may ultimately affect firm knowledge asset value. In this regard, this research is not intending to
include firm network characteristics as mediators, but rather continue along the path taken by
research question one, which proposes that firms with high knowledge asset value may alter their
network characteristics in order to protect their knowledge. If firms with high knowledge asset
value implement network safeguards, how will this ultimately affect future knowledge asset
value? Indeed, while both knowledge and network factors have been shown to lead to positive
outcomes in the same or highly proximal time periods, it is unknown what outcomes will be seen
by a network modified to reduce knowledge spillovers over a longer time period. Though firms
alter their networks with the goal of maintaining or extending the value of their knowledge asset
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and thereby appropriating maximum rents (Coff, 1999), the ‘unintended consequences’ may be
in the opposite direction due to the restriction of flow of new knowledge required to develop
future valuable knowledge assets (Merton, 1936). Stated more formally, the third research
question is as follows:
RQ3: How do network safeguards impact subsequent knowledge asset value?

Organization of Dissertation
This dissertation is comprised of six (6) chapters. This introduction, which describes the
gaps of our current understanding of knowledge asset value and network safeguards and the
specific research questions, serves as Chapter I. As previously noted, the overall goal of this
research is to answer the following question; “How do firms adjust their network characteristics
based on their knowledge asset value?” A literature review follows in Chapter II. The literature
review provides an examination of the core perspectives employed in this research, the
Knowledge-Based View (KBV) of the firm (Grant, 1996a, 1996b, Spender, 1996), as well as
reviewing the current state of knowledge and network research. The purpose of the literature
review is to provide a review of research that not only includes the theoretical perspective of
interest, but also an assessment of the research utilizing the constructs of interest.
Chapter III draws on KBV and network perspectives to derive a set of hypotheses
specific to the three research questions presented in this chapter. The proposed methods for this
research study follows in Chapter IV of this dissertation, including the research design, sample,
sources of data, specific variables and their operationalization, and the data analysis techniques
used to test the hypotheses. Chapter IV contains the analysis results. Chapter V contains the
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discussion of the results of this dissertation and acknowledges and explores other possible
explanations for the findings. Limitations, contributions, and the conclusion are also incorporated
in Chapter V.
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW

The goal of this chapter is to review the literature that focuses on knowledge and
networks in order to evaluate existing research and identify research gaps that represent potential
for future study. Thus, a literature review was conducted on extant literature discussing
knowledge and networks. The structure of this review is as follows; first, the sampling criteria
will be described, with results and descriptives provided. Secondly, a brief section containing
definitions for key terms used in the literature review will be presented. Subsequently, the
research collected for this review will be examined based on the four core theories used in this
literature; the knowledge-based view (KBV) of the firm (Grant, 1996a, 1996b; Spender, 1996),
organizational learning (OL) (Levitt & March, 1988; March, 1991), absorptive capacity (AC)
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1989, 1990), and social capital perspectives (e.g., Adler & Kwon, 2002;
Burt, 1992, 2000, 2001; Coleman, 1988). Within each theory, an overview of the literature will
be provided, examining how each theory’s literature views knowledge and networks, and the key
findings. As the knowledge-based view of the theory most closely aligns with this dissertation’s
research objectives, a more in-depth view of KBV will be provided as a foundation for this
dissertation’s research questions and hypotheses.

Review on Knowledge and Networks Research in Mainstream Management Literature
To uncover existing gaps and identify possible opportunities for future research, the
empirical literature including the constructs of firm knowledge and networks was examined. No
time restriction was imposed on this search, thereby including the full breadth of the research in
the areas of interest. The major management journals, as well as key entrepreneurship journals,

17
were searched in an attempt to be inclusive. These journals include: the Academy of Management
Journal, Administrative Science Quarterly, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, the Journal
of Management, the Journal of Management Studies, Organization Science, the Strategic
Entrepreneurship Journal, and the Strategic Management Journal. Multiple searches were
conducted in order to gather all extant research. The first search using the ‘Web of Science Core
Collection’ included the terms “knowledge”, “network”, and “strateg*”, returning 166 articles 4.
A second search was focused on knowledge spillovers, and used the search terms “knowledge
spill*” and “strateg*” and returned 34 articles. While research on knowledge spillovers
frequently examines external relationships, the use of the word ‘network’ is not always included,
and when added to the search criteria, resulted in only seven articles being found; therefore, the
search was left broad in order to include all relevant literature. As the concept of knowledge
spillovers is central to this dissertation, this extra step to gather relevant research was deemed
necessary5. The returned articles were carefully examined to ensure the topic was focused on
interfirm networks and knowledge, with the final result being 56 articles (Table 2.1). These
articles ranged in time from 1993 to 2016, though the predominance of research occurred within
the last ten years (41 of 56 articles).
-------------------Insert Table 2.1 around here
-------------------Each article was coded in regards to the theoretical perspectives employed, how
knowledge and networks were conceptualized and operationalized, whether knowledge and

4

490 articles were returned without the “strateg*” keyword
An additional search was conducted using the term ‘knowledge protection’. Two articles were returned within the
focal journals, but neither was focused on organizational knowledge or networks.

5
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networks were included as antecedents or outcomes, if industry or environmental characteristics
were included, the presence of mediating and moderating variables, the level of analysis, and
what specific outcomes were of interest to the researchers. While other items were also
categorized, the above elements were considered particularly relevant for this literature review.
Based on this categorization, a distinction was noted in that the majority of the research focused
on four core theories; the knowledge-based view (KBV) of the firm (Grant, 1996), the social
capital perspective (Burt, 1992, 2000, 2001; Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1973), organizational
learning (OL) ((Levitt & March, 1988; March, 1991), and absorptive capacity (AC) (Cohen &
Levinthal, 1989, 1990). Furthermore, each of these theoretical perspectives views knowledge
from a unique perspective, and the role of networks or interfirm relationships is also distinctive.
Thus, this review will compare and contrast these four theoretical perspectives and the literature
found within each perspective. It should be noted that a large volume of research involving both
knowledge and networks is not aimed at providing a theoretical contribution, but rather focuses
on examining a particular phenomenon. While this form of research contributes to our
understanding of these phenomena and provides a basis for future research focused on theoretical
developments, the phenomenological research will not be a prime focus of this literature review.

Definitions for Key Terms
Before examining the literature in regards to knowledge and networks, this section will
provide key terms and their definitions that are included in this literature review as well as in
subsequent chapters. Table 2.2 displays the terms included in this section, along with key
definitions and their citations.
--------------------
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Insert Table 2.2 around here
-------------------Knowledge Asset
The first term to be explained is knowledge asset, defined as knowledge resident within a
firm that creates value due to its characteristics of transferability, capacity for aggregation, and
appropriability (Grant, 1996a). For knowledge to be considered a valuable asset, it must be
easily transferred within an organization yet difficult to imitate by other firms (Kogut & Zander,
1992). As knowledge is aggregated within a firm, organizational capabilities are developed,
“creating value through effecting the transformation of inputs into outputs” (Grant, 1996b, p.
377). Finally, appropriability refers to the ability of the firm to recoup returns equal to the value
of the knowledge (Grant, 1996a). Knowledge assets provide a firm with competitive advantage
and superior performance, and may include “information, know-how, and technologies that help
a firm improve its product effectiveness and process efficiency” (He & Wang, 2009, p. 920).
Knowledge assets are argued to be the focus for firm existence, with the ‘essence of the firm …
its ability to create, transfer, assemble, integrate, and exploit knowledge assets” (Teece, 1998, p.
75).
Network Safeguards
Network safeguards are defined as relational or structural mechanisms that limit
opportunism among an actor's set of relations. In this research, the opportunistic behavior of
interest is whether network partners seek to gain an advantage via knowledge spillovers.
Network safeguards can either be formal or informal, with formal safeguards defined as
“economic hostages created intentionally to control opportunism by aligning the economic
incentives of the transactors” (Dyer & Singh, 1998, p. 669). For example, the use of joint
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ventures is considered as a formal safeguard as all parties in the joint venture have a financial
investment that may deter opportunistic behaviors, for if the relationship is not successful there
will be significant negative consequences (Kang et al, 2009). In contrast, informal safeguards
involve social mechanisms, such as the trust developed between partners (Coleman, 1988;
Hernandez et al, 2015; Lavie, 2006).
Knowledge Spillover
The third term to be explained is knowledge spillover, defined as transfers of knowledge
that are unintended, and un- or under-compensated (Agarwal, Audretsch, & Sarkar, 2010).
“More specifically, knowledge spillover represents the flow of knowledge from one organization
to another and, unlike collaborative forms of knowledge sharing (i.e., knowledge transfer) that
involve cross-party compensation due to the exchange, the external benefits from the creation of
knowledge in knowledge spillover accrue to the knowledge receivers rather than to the creator”
(Ko & Liu, 2015, p. 265). While knowledge spillovers may be considered in a positive light by
recipient firms, the firms who developed the knowledge may wish to minimize spillovers and
protect their knowledge in order to recover their investment and appropriate all possible value
(Hernandez, Sanders, & Tuschke, 2015; Kale, Singh, & Perlmutter, 2000; Mayer, 2006). Thus,
knowledge spillovers indicate a loss of value of knowledge for the originator or creator of the
knowledge asset, while an opportunistic benefit for the recipient.
Network
Network boundaries must be specified by the researcher with the condition that network
members share the same type of relationship (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011). If the network
boundaries are not well defined or are too broadly considered, the size of the network may
increase to the extent that it makes empirical analysis difficult (Bae, Wezel, & Koo, 2011). Each
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member of a network is termed an actor or node, with each relationship between members
labeled a tie. Thus, a network is comprised of multiple actors and ties, with each tie representing
a similar form of relationship. In strategy research where the network typically includes other
firms, networks have frequently been defined by firms’ alliance partners within industries (i.e.,
Bae et al., 2011; Koka, Madhavan, & Prescott, 2006; Koka & Prescott, 2008; Madhavan, Koka,
& Prescott, 1998). In regards to interfirm networks, each actor is a firm, and each tie is an
alliance. By using the industry as a network boundary, it ensures that all firms within the network
have a valid possibility for engaging with other firms found in the network; that is, it would be
highly unlikely that an automobile manufacturing firm would have an opportunity or a need to
engage in a relationship with a biotechnology firm. If there is no potential for a relationship
between two firms, they should not be considered as being present in the same network.
Network ties: Direct and indirect relationships
Actors within networks will have direct and indirect relationships. Direct relationships
are those where the two actors have a relationship with no intermediary. In the case of an alliance
network, firms who agree to form an alliance will have a direct relationship with one another.
Indirect relationships will have at least one intermediary (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011). For
example, a firm may be engaged in two alliances, each with different partners. If these two
partners do not have a direct relationship between them, they will have an indirect relationship
via their common alliance partner. The number of indirect relationships an actor has will depend
not only on the volume of direct relationships but also on the number of direct relationships of
their direct partners. That is, a firm may be only engaged in one direct relationship, but if that
firm has 20 other alliance partners, then the focal firm is considered to have 20 indirect
relationships.
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Network structure: Strong and weak ties
Strong and weak ties indicate the strength, or intensity, of the relationship between actors.
Strong ties are considered frequent, repeated relationships that develop trust and norms of
behavior (Coleman, 1988). At the firm level, a strong tie may be developed by multiple
relationships over time between two firms or by a relationship initiated with the goal of a longterm association (Gulati, 1995), involving “close social connections, mutual trust, and reciprocity
between partner firms” (De Clercq & Dimov, 2008, p. 590). Strong ties are those that are longlasting, and in regards to interfirm relationships, those that are formed with long-term goals in
mind, such as joint ventures or equity partnerships. The benefit of strong ties is the emergence of
trust that occurs between firms, increasing predictability regarding firm behavior (Gulati, 1999).
Thus, strong ties can be a function of the form of the relationship, or by the presence of multiple
relationships over time between the firms. A network composed of primarily strong ties is likely
to tend towards a network of firms where most actors have relationships with each other (i.e.,
network closure) (Coleman, 1988), as firms introduce their strong ties to each other, creating
relationships that were previously absent (Granovetter, 1973), The distinction between a closed
network and strong ties is that the strength of a tie is viewed at the relationship level, not the
network level, and the strength of tie is determined by the relationship between the two firms, not
the composition of the firm network.
In contrast, a weak tie is not time intensive, and the actor connected by the weak tie may
be only marginally included in the network (Granovetter, 1973). These weak relationships can
provide ties between otherwise unconnected groups of actors, resulting in benefits via linkages to
far-reaching groups providing access to novel resources, information, and knowledge. Weaker
ties may be indicative of lower homogeneity between actors, as stronger ties are either the result
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of, or result in, similarities in actors (Granovetter, 1973). At the firm level, weak ties can be
similar to an arm’s-length market transaction depicted by Williamson (1979, 1981), whereby the
“identity of the parties to a transaction is treated as irrelevant” (Williamson, 1979, p. 236).
Network structure: Closed networks and structural holes
Interfirm networks can seek to create a cohesive and closed network whereby most actors
are engaged in relationships with each other (Coleman, 1988). Indeed, if firms choose to
associate with their partner’s partners due to awareness and knowledge of these potential
partners, a closed, cohesive network is created whereby most firms in the network have
relationships with each other. The benefits of a closed network include the ability to establish
norms of behavior and trust amongst members (Coleman, 1988). When firms within a network
are completely (or almost completely) intertwined via relationships, the awareness of firm
behavior is known throughout the network, limiting the opportunities for opportunistic behaviors
due to the development of norms and standards of behavior. Closure leads to trustworthiness and
trust, as firms become socially embedded in the relationships and trust is viewed “as an explicit
and primary feature of their embedded ties” (Uzzi, 1997, p. 43). As firms are increasingly
embedded in the network of relations, opportunistic behavior declines due to network
interdependence (Provan, 1993). Indeed, a closed network “may help ensure collaborative
continuity via high levels of trust and reputational lock-ins, both of which can help firms
preserve their existing resources” (Tatarynowicz, Sytch, & Gulati, 2016, p. 55). Thus, in a closed
network, firms develop behavioral expectations and norms, reducing motivation and
opportunities for engaging in deviant behavior. However, while the benefits of a closed network
are found in shared norms and increased trust, the disadvantages are the redundancy of resources,
knowledge, and information. In a closed network, information becomes redundant as it travels
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over the same paths multiple times, with eventually all firms having similar knowledge bases or
similar access to knowledge.
In contrast, when a firm develops a relationship with another firm that is not already
located in the network segment, this relationship spans a structural hole, in essence developing a
bridge to a new network segment that was previously unconnected (Burt, 1992). This affords the
firm the opportunity to gain performance advantages via access to heterogeneous resources,
knowledge, and information. While it has been proposed that bridging ties are necessarily weak
ties (Granovetter, 1973; Borgatti & Halgin, 2011), the main criteria for a bridging tie is that it
provides nonredundant information (Burt, 1992). A relationship that bridges a structural hole can
lead to increased firm performance, as a “competitive advantage comes from information access
and control; networks that span structural holes provide broad and early access to, and
entrepreneurial control over, information’ (Burt, 2000, p. 347). Thus, benefits can accrue to those
who span structural holes, as brokers have the ability to gain and link knowledge from disparate
sources. “Bridging emphasizes advantages derived from timely access to diverse information and
resources from nonredundant contacts, and opportunities to broker novel information and
resources between unconnected partners” (Baum, McEvily, & Rowley, 2012, p. 530).
Network position: Centrality
A firm’s position in their network can be described by the concept of centrality, which
can be loosely defined as “the contribution the [firm] makes to the structure of the network”
(Borgatti, Everett, & Johnson, 2013, p. 164). Having a position of prominence or importance has
been viewed as providing firms with multiple benefits, including increased status (Podolny,
1993), and increased access to information (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004; Podolny, 2001).
Indeed, centrality has multiple conceptions that have given rise to multiple measures (Borgatti et
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al., 2013.) Each centrality measure has implicit assumptions regarding how flows, whether it be
information or financial flows, move through the network (Borgatti, 2005). For example,
closeness measures focus on a firm’s proximity to others, indicating that central actors may be
able to locate or disperse information quicker than those with lower centrality (Wasserman &
Faust, 1994). In comparison, betweenness centrality (Freeman, 1979) identifies actors on paths
between other actors, placing the actor who occupies a position on a well-traveled path in a
position of power (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Eigenvector centrality can be viewed as
indicating an actor’s risk of both receiving and transmitting the flow of interest, as it measures
not only the volume of direct relationships but weighs each direct relationship by their own
centrality (Borgatti et al., 2013). Thus, when eigenvector centrality is measured, actors connected
to other central actors will have greater centrality than those connected to peripheral actors.
While this measure captures the potential connections an actor has, the measure itself does not
work well if networks contain disconnected sections or subgroups; as interfirm networks
frequently contain subgroups, this measure is not applicable.
A similar measure to eigenvector centrality can be observed in beta centrality, viewed “as
a measure of the total amount of potential influence a node can have on all others via direct and
indirect channels” (Borgatt et al., 2013, p. 171). Similar to eigenvector centrality, a firm will
have a higher beta centrality score to the extent it is connected to many firms who themselves are
highly connected (Bonacich, 1987), as it inversely weighs the value of indirect connections by
their length. Thus, a direct relationship with a well-connected actor will be weighed stronger than
if this popular actor could only be reached by first passing through three other actors. From the
perspective of interfirm networks, a central firm may have an increased ability to receive and
disseminate information via its network connections (Soh, 2010). For the remainder of this
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document, the term centrality will refer to beta centrality unless otherwise specifically noted.
To explain the concept beta centrality in more detail, Figure 2.1 depicts a network
containing twelve firms, including Firm A and Firm B. These two firms both have one direct
relationship; Firm A’s direct connection is X, while Firm B’s one direction is Y. However, these
direct connections are different in that X has 7 direct connections, while Y has only one direct
connection. In this network, Firm A is more central than Firm B as Firm A’s connections are
more connected than Firm B’s. While this example only examines relationships comprising two
steps from the focal firm, the measure of beta centrality continues through the actors’ distal
relationships while reducing the weighting of these variables as distance increases. Thus, firms
with high centrality scores are considered central in their network when they are directly or
indirectly connected to many others. Conversely, firms may have a lower centrality score,

A
B
X
Y

Figure 2.1 Adapted from Borgatti et al., 2013, Figure 10.3, p. 169
indicative of occupying a peripheral position, whereby they have fewer connections that are
connected to fewer others.
The network provided in the example above does not encapsulate the complexity required
to differentiate eigenvector centrality from beta centrality. When networks are large and more
complex, beta centrality allows for the weighting of the indirect relationships, as shown in the
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following equation:
𝑐𝑐 = (𝐼𝐼 − 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽)−1 𝐴𝐴1

If the weighting of 𝛽𝛽 in this equation is equal to 0, the result will be the count of

relationships, or degree centrality. The larger the value of 𝛽𝛽, the more it “reflects the global

structure” (Pollock et al., 2015, p. 493) of the network and the closer to eigenvector centrality.
For large and potentially disconnected networks, a value for β of three-quarters of the reciprocal
of the largest eigenvalue will be utilized, as is the norm in the networks literature (Podolny,
1993; Pollock et al, 2015).

Theoretical Examination of the Literature
This section of the literature review examines the four main approaches that were found
in the literature; organizational learning (OL) (Levitt & March, 1988; March, 1991), absorptive
capacity (AC) (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989, 1990), the social capital perspective (Burt, 1992, 2000,
2001; Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1973), and the knowledge-based view (KBV) of the firm
(Grant, 1996a, 1996b; Spender, 1996). This section of the literature review will be organized by
each perspective. Within each perspective, the first subsection will present an overview of the
approach and how each it informs the relationship between knowledge and networks. Secondly,
a discussion of identified themes will be discussed. As the knowledge-based view of the firm
most closely aligns with this dissertation’s research, a more in-depth view of KBV will be
provided as a foundation for this dissertation’s research questions and hypotheses. Table 2.3
identifies the literature that includes these core theoretical perspectives, while Table 2.4 provides
a brief comparison of how these perspectives view knowledge and interfirm networks, as well as
their key firm-level outcomes. The volume of literature that includes (at least) one of the four
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core perspectives is a subset of the literature found during the search.
-------------------Insert Table 2.3 around here
--------------------------------------Insert Table 2.4 around here
-------------------Knowledge Based View (KBV)
The first perspective to be examined is the Knowledge Based View (KBV) of the firm
(Grant, 1996a, 1996b; Spender, 1996). This perspective developed from the early roots of the
Resource Based View of the firm (e.g., Barney, 1991, Wernerfelt, 1984) which proposes that for
a firm to gain a competitive advantage over other firms, it must have valuable resources that
other firms do not have access to, and that these resources cannot be easily replicated, imitated,
or substituted. Grant (1996a) argues that knowledge is “the preeminent resource of the firm” (p.
384) as “first, knowledge accounts for the greater part of value added, second, barriers to the
transfer and replication of knowledge endow it with strategic importance” (p. 377). From KBV’s
perspective, the primary role of the firm is to integrate the knowledge found in individuals, as
markets are unable to perform this function due to the difficulties in transferring and sharing
knowledge between individuals. The firm can be viewed as “a dynamic, evolving, quasiautonomous system of knowledge production and application” (Spender, 1996, p. 59). Thus,
KBV emphasizes the processes involved in knowledge production while acknowledging the
value provided by knowledge via its application.
The barriers to transfer and replication of knowledge can be viewed as both a positive
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and negative function. While challenges with knowledge transfer between firms can sustain a
competitive advantage arising from a firm’s unique knowledge (Grant, 1996a, 1996b),
difficulties in transfer and replication within firms can reduce the opportunities to generate a
competitive advantage (Kogut & Zander, 1996). This difficulty is increased as frequently
valuable knowledge is often not made explicit, or codified, due to the increased risks of
transferring knowledge to external sources. Rather, valuable knowledge is often tacit, “deeply
rooted in action, commitment, and involvement in a specific context” (Nonaka, 1994, p. 16) and
therefore slower to transfer leading to a tendency to perform tacit transfers within firm
boundaries (Kogut & Zander, 1996). By keeping knowledge within firm boundaries, the costs of
communication and integration are lowered. Thus, it is proposed that “a firm be understood as a
social community specializing in the speed and efficiency in the creation and transfer of
knowledge” (Kogut & Zander, 1996, p. 503).
Given these conditions of knowledge, “the primary role of firms is in the application of
existing knowledge to the production of goods and services” (Grant, 1996b, p. 112). Key to KBV
is the proposal that a firm’s “potential for establishing and maintaining competitive advantage
increases with the span of knowledge integrated” (Grant, 1996a, p. 385), and therefore,
increasing the knowledge base of a firm is critical, insofar as to provide knowledge necessary for
integration and application. The competitive advantage of a firm is linked to the scope of
knowledge found in its capabilities (Grant, 1996a), indicating that a broad knowledge base is
necessary.
KBV assumptions. The core assumption within KBV is that knowledge is the “principal
productive resource of the firm” (Grant, 1996a, p. 385). Nonetheless, KBV is focused not only
on the accumulation of knowledge to develop a key firm asset, but also views the firm as a
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“knowledge-based activity system” (Spender, 1996, p. 59). As firms require an extensive range
of knowledge that requires continuous renewal, the knowledge process is perpetual, especially in
conditions of increased competition and technological change (Grant, 1996a).
The superior value of tacit knowledge over explicit is a further assumption of KBV
(Grant, 199a), due to its inimitability and limited transferability. Transferring tacit knowledge is
a slow process, necessitating interactions between individuals (Kogut & Zander, 1996).
Consequently, this process tends to occur within the firm boundaries, increasing the value of the
tacit knowledge as it becomes established within the firm’s routines yet remains challenging for
external firms to replicate or imitate. This results in firm boundaries defining not only knowledge
boundaries, but the establishment of a firm identity that captures the knowledge in its values,
rules, and learning processes (Kogut & Zander, 1996; Spender, 1996). Thus, “organizations learn
and have knowledge only to the extent that their members are malleable beings whose sense of
self is influenced by the organization's evolving social identity” (Spender, 1996, p. 53).
The final assumption of KBV is that the firm requires both breadth and depth of
knowledge (Grant, 1996a). However, as the volume of knowledge increases, the demands on
integrating and applying the knowledge increases (Grant, 1996b). This leads to managerial
implications as “if production (and decisions about production) require many types of
knowledge, if that knowledge is resident in many individuals, and if integration mechanisms can
involve only relatively small numbers of individuals-what organizational structures are
possible?” (Grant, 1996b, p. 118) Thus, firms can create an identity that supports the learning
processes and coordination activities required to transfer knowledge within the firm, developing
a competitive advantage not only through the resultant knowledge, but also within the firm’s
knowledge and learning capabilities (Kogut & Zander, 1996, Spender, 1996).
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KBV view of networks. The majority of theoretical discussions on KBV focus on the
integration of knowledge within firm boundaries, without explicitly identifying the originating
point of the knowledge (Grant, 1996b, Kogut & Zander, 1996, Spender, 1996). The exception is
Grant (1996a), which expressly includes the value of interfirm networks as a source of
knowledge, although knowledge integration is still viewed as occurring within firm boundaries.
While firms are viewed as more efficient in integrating knowledge as compared to interfirm
networks, the benefits of accessing new information can overcome the costs of inefficient
knowledge transfer (Grant, 1996a). Networks are especially valuable for increasing the speed of
access to new knowledge (Grant, 1996a), indicating that their value may not be comparable
across different industries, but rather dependent upon the frequency of knowledge change.
KBV outcomes. As KBV has its roots in RBV, the key outcome for this perspective is
the ability for a firm to obtain and sustain a competitive advantage via its knowledge (Grant,
1996a, 1996b). Additionally, theorists have tended to focus on how firms manage internal
knowledge processes (Kogut & Zander, 1996; Spender, 1996) as the objective of the firm is to
develop systems and structures that lead to knowledge-based returns (Spender & Grant, 1996).
Firm capabilities regarding the ability to integrate, transfer, and apply knowledge is a further
outcome of interest (Spender, 1996). The boundaries of the firm will include the capabilities and
the knowledge that the firm can manage to integrate and apply; as capabilities increase, so can
the breadth and depth of the knowledge contained within the firm (Grant, 199b). Thus, firms
seek to increase their span of knowledge, continuously improving their capabilities for
integrating and applying knowledge, with the ultimate outcome of achieving competitive
advantage (Grant, 1996b).
KBV Literature including knowledge and networks. While knowledge acquisition
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from external sources is acknowledged in KBV, only five articles focused on knowledge and
networks returned for this literature review included core discussions covering aspects of KBV.
Upon reading and coding these articles, two recurring themes were identified; knowledge sharing
and transferability amongst network members and the opportunities and challenges with
knowledge application. These two themes will now be discussed.
Theme 1: Knowledge sharing and transferability in networks. KBV identifies the
transfer and integration of knowledge as key firm objectives (Grant, 1996a, 1996b; Spender,
1996), though primarily as an intrafirm activity. However, networks provide a valuable source of
external information that can be applied internally (Grant, 1996a). Thus, research utilizing KBV
as a theoretical base and including interfirm networks as a main construct have identified
knowledge sharing and transferability as key relationships. While firms acknowledge the
requirement to access external information, interfirm relationships are not a guaranteed form for
the occurrence of the sharing and transfer of knowledge. Indeed, there is a potential cost if a firm
is only a recipient and does not share their own knowledge, leading to unequal benefits.
However, a case study of the Toyota production network identified that provisions can be made
so that all firms can benefit from knowledge sharing (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000). These provisions
include increased relationship building between and amongst the network of relationships,
developing norms and rules that complied with the view of knowledge as a network resource as
compared to a specific firm resource. This capability for firms to support knowledge sharing in
interfirm relationships can provide an alliance-level competitive advantage (Mesquita, Anand, &
Brush, 2008), broadening KBV’s view of knowledge providing a firm-level competitive
advantage to a view that includes an alliance-level advantage as well.
However, under conditions of greater uncertainty regarding partner behavior, firms may
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choose to avoid the use of external partners altogether (Mayer, 2006). Network relationships
provide all members with sources of knowledge, equally available to members. Indeed, where a
firm considers that the potential loss of its knowledge overrides the possible benefits of gaining
new knowledge, the firm may choose not to engage in a relationship. Consequently, a range of
options are available to firms as they complete interfirm relationships, from developing
knowledge-sharing capabilities that can lead to an alliance competitive advantage (Dyer &
Nobeoka, 2000; Mesquita et al., 2008) to avoiding relationships altogether when the risk of
losing knowledge is greater than the potential benefits (Mayer, 2006).
Theme 2: Opportunities and challenges with knowledge application. The second theme
located in the literature is the ability, as well as the lack thereof, of firms to apply internally the
new knowledge gained from their network. On the positive side, research has indicated that
while the maximum of benefits from new knowledge acquisition may be at the specific
relationship level, there is an improvement benefit that is transferred to all relationships
(Mesquita et al., 2008). That is, when firms acquire knowledge from a specific relationship, this
knowledge will be applied, to a lesser degree, to other relationships. Note that this view
examines how knowledge gained in one relationship is applied to other relationships, versus a
focus on how external knowledge is internalized within firm boundaries. This distinction
expands the potential benefits of external knowledge acquisition, as firms can achieve internal
and external benefits from external knowledge acquisition.
However, new knowledge is not always able to be successfully internalized and applied,
especially if that knowledge is not in alignment with the current stock of knowledge (Afuah,
2001). This relates to Grant’s (1996a) view that “integration across a wide scope of specialist
knowledge is important in sustaining competitive advantage” (p. 382); if firms become too
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specialized, there may be difficulties in modifying the existing knowledge base and therefore a
challenge in adapting to the new technology.
KBV Conclusion. The KBV of the firm (Grant, 1996a, 1996b; Spender, 1996) proposes
that knowledge is the key resource of the firm, capable of providing a firm with a competitive
advantage. The objective of the firm is to develop internal knowledge assets that are broad in
scope, allowing for increased assimilation of new knowledge. Knowledge’s value is increased
when it is kept in tacit form, indicating that it has not been codified, and thus is more easily
maintained within firm boundaries. Not only can a firm achieve a competitive advantage via its
knowledge stocks, but alliances and networks can attain a competitive advantage through
knowledge-sharing capabilities (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000; Mesquita et al., 2008). However, the
presence of a sizeable internal knowledge stock and available external knowledge stock does not
guarantee knowledge application, especially when the new knowledge represents a departure
from the content of current knowledge stocks (Afuah, 2001). While there is some attention paid
to the potential negatives associated with network partners gaining knowledge via spillovers
(e.g., Mayer, 2006), this area of research is still relatively unexplored and represents a fruitful
area for future research.
Network / Social Capital Perspective
The second area of the literature to be examined is the social capital perspective, which
views relationships as providing more than just resources, as social relationships are developed
and provide their own form of capital. Social capital’s “effects flow from the information,
influence, and solidarity it makes available to the actor” (Adler & Kwon, 2002, p. 23). A core
proposition of this perspective is that relationships between actors, whether the actors are
individual or firms, contain a social element (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Granovetter, 1985). The
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social capital perspective examines the forms of capital found in networks based on the structure
of the network and the position of the actor. This section of the literature review will first provide
an overview of the theories developed within social capital, and then examine the literature
within these streams that is focused on knowledge and networks.
Strong ties and network closure. Coleman’s (1988) view of social capital focuses on
the benefits provided by networks with strong closure, such that actors are strongly
interconnected leading to a high number of ties between actors. This network structure leads to
social capital in the forms of “obligations and expectations, which depend on trustworthiness of
the social environment, information-flow capability of the social structure, and norms
accompanied by sanctions” (p. 119). The social capital found in a closed network contributes to
bonding of the actors, as the relationships “give the collectivity cohesiveness and thereby
facilitate the pursuit of collective goals “Adler & Kwon, 2002, p. 21). Thus, it is within a closed
network that these attributes can be cultivated, as the closure allows for information, both
positive and negative, to freely flow between network actors. Based on the social capital found in
closed networks, productive activity will be increased, as “a group within which there is
extensive trustworthiness and extensive trust is able to accomplish much more than a comparable
group without that trustworthiness and trust” (p. 101). Implicit in Coleman’s view of network
closure is that the relationships within this network structure are strong, meaning that they
repeated, reciprocated relationships that support the development of norms, trustworthiness, and
trust between actors and throughout the network.
Bridging of structural holes. In contrast to Coleman’s (1988) view of network closure
being necessary for social capital to be developed, Burt (1992, 2000, 2001) views the goal of
network actors should be to develop relationships that bridge structural holes as “social capital is
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created by a network in which people can broker connections between otherwise disconnected
segments” (Burt, 2001, p. 31). This perspective views social capital as arising from the
availability of nonredundant information, as actors develop strategic relationships that bridge
holes in the social network (Adler & Kwon, 2002). In comparison, network closure enables
norms and trust to be developed within the network structure, yet the knowledge provided via
relationships is frequently redundant as all actors with the network have the same information.
However, if an actor can develop a connection to an actor previously unconnected to the
network, their information, as well as their relationships’ information, is now available to the
focal actor. While increasing an actor’s network size may seem to provide an alternate path to
accessing additional information, if the new relationship only provides information available via
other relationships due to interconnections, then this new relationship does not provide
information that is not already accessible. Thus, network size only has an effect on the overall
volume of information when nonredundancy is considered. Ties that bridge structural holes will
not be strong, as “the spread of information on new ideas and opportunities must come through
the weak ties that connect people in separate clusters” (Burt, 1992, p. 72). Weak ties that bridge
from one network or segment to another allow for information to reach a larger population and
travel greater distances (Granovetter, 1973) than would occur if transmitted through a closed
network. Bridging structural holes creates a relationship between groups, allowing information to
flow between previously disconnected network segments.
Social Resource Theory. The final approach to be discussed under the heading of social
capital is Social Resource Theory (SRT) (Lin, 1999, 2002). SRT defines social capital as the
“resources embedded in social networks accessed and used by actors for actions” (Lin, 2002, p.
25). Network structure is viewed as hierarchical, “rank-ordered according to certain normatively
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valued resources such as class, authority, and status” (Lin, 2002, p. 56). Consequently, the theory
proposes that actors desire to enhance their position within their network, increasing their ability
to access and mobilize social resources (Lin, 1999). This theory provides predictions for new
relationships within networks as actors attempt to form relationships with higher-ranked actors in
order to improve their own ranking as well as increase their access to other higher-ranked actors
(Lin, 2002). This creates a tendency for relative homophily of resource levels found within
relationships. In essence, Lin suggests that actors have an upper limit in their ability to reach
actors with higher resource levels than their own. Actors with lower resource levels can only
reach those actors slightly higher in resource levels than themselves, and this effect holds true for
higher resource levels actors as well. Indeed, the result of this proposition is that higher-ranked
actors have a structural advantage over lower-ranked actors due to their starting position. As
actors with lower levels of resources will not be considered attractive to an actor with higher
level of resources; thus, both will form relationships with actors of similar resource levels,
resulting in relative homophily within relationships. Thus, SRT proposes that actors are mindful
of the maintenance of their current network position, as by doing so they assure their existing
level of resources, as well as searching for opportunities for developing relationships that may
lead to an increase in network position and thereby provide access to increased levels of
resources.
Network / Social Capital Literature including knowledge and networks. Due to the
presence of multiple perspectives within the social capital literature, this next section will utilize
the perspectives themselves as a method of categorizing the literature. Nine articles were coded
as including social capital. Five included arguments focused on strong ties or network closure,
two included the benefits of bridging or weak ties, and while none expressly included SRT, three
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articles included core elements of this perspective and thus are categorized within this
perspective.
Theme 1: Strong ties and Closure. The literature that includes arguments related to
Coleman’s (1988) strong tie perspective discuss contextual elements that affect the relationship
between organizational knowledge and networks. For example, while increased tie strength has
been linked to increased performance, this relationship is increased when connections are diverse
(Patel & Terjesen, 2011). Additionally, the presence of bridging ties in an alliance can support
strong ties when knowledge integration is the objective (Tiwana, 2008). While the presence of
strong ties seems somewhat necessary for positive outcomes, diversity of ties and bridging ties
can support these benefits. The positive outcomes from strong ties include knowledge transfer,
knowledge creation, and problem solving (Hardy et al., 2003). However, over time the benefits
from strong ties may diminish performance outcomes, especially if the environment demands
new and novel information (Goerzen, 2007). Interestingly, while diversity of ties and tie strength
is associated positively with performance, the relationship is altered when firm distinctiveness is
included. That is, firms with distinctive products generate positive outcomes as network closure
increases, while firms that are not distinctive in their offerings benefit more when their network
is not closed (Echols & Tsai, 2005). While this study did not determine causality, it could be
proposed that network closure was the impetus for a firm to develop distinctive products of
services with the objective of distinguishing itself within their tight-knit community.
Theme 2: Structural holes. The second perspective to be discussed includes how social
capital is developed via structural holes and bridging ties (Burt, 1992, 2001; Granovetter, 1973).
Structural holes indicate an absence of a tie between two segments of a network; when a tie does
appear to link these two segments, a bridge has been created. While bridging ties provide novel
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and nonredundant information, the benefits of this information is reduced when more proximal
and stronger relationships are rich in their own knowledge (Operti & Carnabuci, 2014). This may
indicate that a boundary condition exists for when firms should embark on developing bridging
ties; namely, only when strong ties cannot provide valuable information. As actors cannot always
predict or even ascertain levels of knowledge found in partners, a strategic alternative may be to
maintain both strong and weak ties in a network (Burt, 2000), allowing for both current and
future knowledge needs. A mix of strong and weak ties may also benefit intrafirm networks
when external information is sparse, as the lack of network closure allows for diversity to be
sustained internally (Funk, 2014). Thus, while theoretically the arguments for the benefits of
closure seem to be opposed to those supporting structural holes, research advocates that while
benefits are different, elements of both structures within a firm’s network can support positive
performance outcomes.
Theme 3: Social resource theory. SRT focuses on the resources available to network
actors as well as the benefits afforded to those actors occupying a higher rank within the network
structure (Lin, 1999, 2002). The benefits of rank can be realized in times of technological
change, as firms linked to other highly ranked firms are better able to drive new standards within
the network (Soh, 2010), indicating that this positional advantage not only provides greater
access to resources, but also increased ability to influence others within the network. Even when
the connection to a valued resource is indirect, the presence of a connection increases the
opportunity for access to the valued resource (Zhang, Soh, & Wong, 2010). Furthermore, if the
direct connections that create the indirect connection are strong ties, the possibility for resource
access increases further. Thus, benefits not only arise to those with a high ranking, but also to
those able to access highly ranked firms.
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Network / Social Capital Perspective Conclusion. The social capital perspective
examines the outcomes generated via network structures, including the outcomes of strong ties
and network closure (Coleman, 1988), weak ties and bridging structural holes (Burt, 1992;
Granovetter, 1973), and the outcomes produced by occupying a higher-ranked position within a
network hierarchy (Lin, 1999, 2002). The research examined in this section supports the benefits
of networks in regards to performance outcomes (Patel & Terjesen, 2011; Hardy et al., 2003),
including network size and centrality benefits towards knowledge outcomes (Soh, 2010).
However, this area of research has not yet examined how the firm’s level of knowledge asset
value may affect these relationships. For example, the research conducted by Soh (2010) focused
on firms that were competing to establish technological standards, necessitating knowledge
sharing to generate support for their standard. In a similar vein, the research by Hardy and
colleagues (2003) focused on a small non-profit organization with no benefit or motivation to
protect its knowledge, while Patel and Terjesen’s research (2011) examined entrepreneurs’ social
networks, including friends and mentors. Thus, a gap exists in our understanding of how firms
sensitive to potential knowledge spillovers may approach their networks. Nonetheless, these
studies indicate the potential value located in networks, even while leaving unanswered the
question of whether the presence of valuable knowledge assets may impact how firms manage
their network.
Organizational Learning (OL)
The third perspective to be explored in this literature is Organizational Learning (OL) (Levitt
& March, 1988; March, 1991). The focus for OL is primarily on the process of organizational
learning. Thus, OL seeks to explain how organizations learn, both from direct experiences as
well as learning from the experiences of others. From this perspective, organizations are viewed
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as interpretation systems (Daft & Weick, 1984), whereby the primary actions of firms are to scan
the environment for data, interpret the data, and indicate learning by taking action. OL proposes
that gathering and applying information should be the main focus of a firm as this is where firm
structure provides the greatest value (Levitt & March, 1988). However, the process by which
firms scan the environment may alter the outcomes from learning (March, 1991). Specifically, if
firms chose to exploit their current knowledge via proximal searches for new information, the
short-term benefits are more certain, yet over time, restricting search for exploitation can result
in a competency trap (Levitt & March, 1988) as firms become unwilling to leave behind their
expertise to develop new capabilities (March, 1991). In contrast, searching distal areas provides
for exploration which can result in a competitive advantage for a firm if successful, as it includes
the possibility for generating innovations (March, 1991). However, “returns from exploration are
systematically less certain, more remote in time, and organizationally more distant” (March,
1991, p. 73), increasing the risk for firms focused on exploratory activities. Indeed, OL is not
concerned with organizational knowledge per se, but rather focuses on the processes how
organizations gather, interpret, and apply information (Daft and Weick, 1984), including
balancing the scope of the learning (March, 1991).
Networks are not a focal interest in OL, though it is acknowledged that external firms
play a role in the learning process. For Levitt and March (1988), interfirm networks are a source
for firms to learn from the experiences of other firms; however, the prime focus of this
perspective is the internal processes associated with organizational learning. Additionally,
exploitation and exploration necessitate external sources of information, though the specific
sources for locating and accumulating knowledge are not identified.
Within OL, outcomes of interest will vary depending on the specific perspective of the

42
research area of interest. That is, from Levitt and March’s (1988) perspective, outcomes of
interest are linked to the process of learning; for example, internal and external conditions which
support organizational learning (e.g., Hardy, Phillips, & Lawrence, 2003; Lam, 2003). In
March’s (1991) focus on the scope of organizational learning, outcomes of interest include
impacts and outcomes of exploratory and exploitative searches (e.g., Coombs, Deeds, & Ireland,
2009; Schildt, Maula, & Keil, 2005). Nonetheless, OL is primarily focused on the process of
learning, indicating that OL is frequently an antecedent to an outcome of interest.
OL Literature including knowledge and networks. Of the literature located for this
review of research conducted on knowledge and networks, nine articles included organizational
learning as a focal perspective of interest. Interestingly, a large number of these included
knowledge spillovers, indicating that opportunistic learning is of interest to OL researchers. After
coding these articles, two major themes emerged. First, networks are a source of learning for
firms, though this can be viewed as both a positive and a negative outcome. Secondly, firms can
choose to either exploit or explore via their interfirm networks indicating that breadth and depth
can be included in network design. These two themes will be discussed further in the following
paragraphs.
Theme 1: Networks provide opportunity for learning. The first theme that emerged from
the segment of the literature was the role of networks in supporting organizational learning.
Firms have opportunities to learn directly from their network relationships (Lam, 2003),
indirectly via intermediaries (Wagner, Hoisl, & Thoma, 2014), as well as the opportunity to learn
via spillovers from other firms (Operti & Carnabuci, 2014; Yang, Phelps, & Steensma, 2010;
Zhang, Li, & Li, 2014). Direct learning from networks cannot be assumed, however, as firms
must be open to new information, allowing integration to occur (Lam, 2003). If firms have not
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learned how to learn (Levitt & March, 1988), the value of the knowledge located in interfirm
networks will not be internalized. Firms can adopt a strategic approach to establishing a network
that contains valuable and accessible knowledge, supporting its learning objectives (Operti &
Carnabuci, 2014). This network may contain relationships with firms who have benefited
themselves from spilled knowledge, indicating that learning, as well as knowledge development,
may be a circular process and iterative in nature.
The connections between actors are also a factor in supporting learning from networks.
For example, network actors who are involved in their network via frequent interactions and are
able to develop interpersonal (not only interfirm) relationships can increase their organizational
learning (Hardy et al., 2003), indicating that not only is the presence of a network necessary for
organizational learning to occur, but that relationships beyond the contract are required. The
involvement and interactions amongst network members “facilitates the transmission of this
knowledge beyond the boundaries of the collaborative relationship to distribute learning more
widely in the community” (Hardy et al., 2003, p. 340).
While six of the nine articles included core elements of OL, not all proposed that the
ability for networked firms to learn from their partners was a positive outcome. This opposing
line of research indicates that while interorganizational learning may be of interest for networked
firms, the originator of the knowledge may not be as willing to allow their knowledge to be
spread via the network (Hernandez et al., 2015). If potential leakage of proprietary and valuable
knowledge to rivals can occur via networks, a strategic approach to identifying and severing
those potential connections may be necessary. However, this view of networks which explores
the opportunity for knowledge to be lost, as well as gained, is still limited in volume and scope,
indicating a gap in our understanding of the positive and negative effect of networks.
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Theme 2: Firms can choose to explore or exploit via networks. The second theme
located in this segment of the literature follows March’s (1991) view of firms as having
opportunities to exploit and explore to increase and develop organizational learning. From this
perspective, and by including the focal construct of interfirm networks, firms can develop their
network to support both exploitation and exploration to further organizational learning (Coombs
et al., 2009; Schildt et al., 2005). This perspective includes the geographical distance of networks
as a contextual element (Coombs et al., 2009), as local searches may increase expertise and thus
exploit current knowledge, while international searches may provide increased exploration via
new and diverse knowledge.
The form of relationship also has an effect on organizational learning, as less integrated
forms of relationships (i.e., alliances or joint ventures as compared to acquisitions) increase
explorative learning (Schildt et al., 2005). While explorative learning is risky (March, 1991),
forming alliances and joint ventures involves reduced expenditures mitigating a degree of the
risk. Furthermore, a lack of formal integration of the relationship into the organization may
increase opportunities for the freedom necessary for explorative learning to occur (Lam, 2003).
Thus, these two articles indicate that learning on the fringes can increase exploratory learning,
both geographically and by relationship type.
Organizational Learning (OL) Conclusion. OL provides a view of organizations as
motivated to locate, interpret, and utilize knowledge (Levitt & March, 1988). While networks are
not a focal aspect of OL, this research has indicated that networks provide a valuable source of
information, via both direct and indirect contacts (Lam, 2003; Wagner et al., 2014). Though the
threat of network partners gaining knowledge spillovers is acknowledged within the OL
literature (e.g. Hernandez et al., 2015), OL is focused on the learning firm’s perspective, and thus
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spillovers are viewed in a positive light. This literature additionally addresses how firms may
strategically utilize networks in order to achieve the greatest learning outcomes. Specifically, a
line of research within OL literature has examined how firms may strategically develop a
network containing valuable knowledge (Operti & Carnabuci, 2014), as well as have the ability
to reabsorb previously spilled knowledge (Yang et al., 2010). While both these articles employ
the term ‘network’ conceptually, the network used is a patent network, not an interfirm network.
Thus, their focus is on accessing publicly available knowledge versus exploiting network
relationships to gain private knowledge. Nonetheless, this line of research acknowledges that
firms are strategically scanning the external environment to locate valuable external knowledge,
yet a gap still exists in our understanding of whether knowledge-originating firms may be aware
of this capability and seek to protect their knowledge. Another implicit assumption located in
this literature is the increased value of knowledge in high-technology industries (Operti &
Carnubuci, 2014; Schildt et al., 2005; Yang et al., 2010). However, our understanding of whether
knowledge is valued differently between industries and how this may affect firms’ network
safeguards is still lacking.
Absorptive Capacity (ACAP)
The fourth perspective to be examined is Absorptive Capacity (ACAP) (Cohen &
Levinthal, 1989, 1990). ACAP is the ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, external
information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends” (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990, p. 128).
As its name indicates, the focus for ACAP is whether firms are able to absorb new knowledge
and apply it, not just locate new knowledge. ACAP is viewed as a firm-level capability, and “is
largely a function of the firm's level of prior related knowledge” (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990, p.
128). Thus, it is proposed that as a firm’s level of internal, related knowledge increases, their
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ability to absorb new knowledge will increase.
Firms will choose to invest in increasing their level of ACAP when the availability of
related external knowledge is high and when knowledge protection is high, increasing the ability
of firms to appropriate value from the knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Cohen and
Levinthal (1989) view research and development (R&D) activities as the method of increasing
ACAP. In part, incentives to increase R&D spending “will be shaped by the quantity of
knowledge to be assimilated” (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989, p. 570). While R&D activities are
linked to new product development activities, R&D also “enhances the firm's ability to
assimilate and exploit existing information” (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989, p. 569). ACAP’s
emphasis is firmly on the process of absorbing and applying new knowledge in conditions where
the incentives for applying new knowledge are high (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989, 1990). Thus,
there are two primary conditions for firms to invest in ACAP; high availability of external
related information, and industry incentives for investing in ACAP.
As previously noted, the ability to absorb external information necessitates related
internal information, indicating a path dependency of knowledge. “By having already developed
some absorptive capacity in a particular area, a firm may more readily accumulate what
additional knowledge it needs in the subsequent periods in order to exploit any critical external
knowledge that may become available” (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990, p. 136). ACAP thereby
assists firms in identifying key external knowledge that can be absorbed and exploited. However,
ACAP does not expressly state where external information is sourced; that is, the external
information may be derived from external relationships via an interfirm network or via other
channels. It does indicate that the external knowledge gained may not be gathered via knowledge
transfer activities with other firms, but rather may be obtained via opportunistic means. “A key
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assumption in the model is that exploitation of competitors' research findings is realized through
the interaction of the firm's absorptive capacity with competitors' spillovers. This interaction
signifies that a firm is unable to assimilate externally available knowledge passively” (Cohen &
Levinthal, 1990, p. 141). Therefore, the necessity for networks is noted in regards to developing
the ability to identify sources of key knowledge, acknowledging the value of both internal and
external networks (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). A key element in predicting the need for and
development of ACAP is the availability of external information, indicating that a firm must be
aware of external firms’ knowledge activities.
Key outcomes for ACAP include innovation output via the application of external
knowledge, leading to increased performance (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & George, 2002)
as well as the development of ACAP itself (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989, 1990). Interestingly, firms
who invest in high ACAP in a specific area may be put at higher risk during periods of
technological change, as their ability to identify, absorb, and apply unrelated information may be
reduced if they do have a specific ACAP in that area (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Accordingly,
based on the necessity for measuring the relatedness of knowledge in order to correctly ascertain
levels or efficiencies of ACAP, relevant outcomes are difficult to measure at a network level
(Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). In regards to the key consequences of ACAP, the level of ACAP itself
is a key outcome, especially when contextual elements at the industry level are included, such as
knowledge protection mechanisms (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989, 1990). Thus, ACAP can be
considered both an antecedent to innovation and performance outcomes in addition to an
outcome in itself.
ACAP Literature including knowledge and networks. While there is an extensive
literature stream focused on ACAP (see Lane, Koka, & Pathak, 2006; Zahra & George, 2002 for
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reviews), the majority of extant literature does not specifically include networks. Thus, only nine
articles coded for this literature review contained ACAP as a focal perspective. While a small
absolute number, it represents over 15 percent of the articles returned for this literature review,
indicating its theoretical power in explaining relationships between knowledge and networks.
During coding, three themes emerged from this subset of ACAP literature; first, contextual
factors that support ACAP, secondly, contextual factors that diminish ACAP, and thirdly, ACAP
and knowledge spillovers.
Theme 1: Contextual factors that support ACAP outcomes. A prominent theme (three of
nine articles) located in the literature was how and when internal contextual factors impact a
firm’s ACAP. For example, the diversity of internal knowledge has the ability to increase outputs
via increased ACAP, indicating that “heterogeneity leads to the creation of more original and
valuable exploratory ideas” (Alexiev, Jansen, Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2010, p.1349). Thus,
while knowledge stocks can increase ACAP, the breadth of current knowledge has an additional
impact on ACAPs outcomes. The benefits of diversity also translate to network members, even
though external diversity can strain the limits of ACAP. In order to benefit from external
diversity, internal diversity must be supported in order to benefit from diverse external
knowledge (Wuyts & Dutta, 2014). Thus, when firms have diverse internal knowledge and have
access to diverse external information, an increase in positive outcomes is obtained as “past
internal knowledge creation is a source of experiences that contribute to a firm’s ability to
manage portfolio diversity and leverage extramural knowledge” (Wuyts & Dutta, 2014, p. 1669).
This advantage is found the network diversity is examined geographically; that is, diverse
geographic locations provide benefits as well as diverse network partners (Penner-Hahn &
Shaver, 2005).
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Theme 2: Contextual factors that diminish ACAP outcomes. A further theme emerging
from the literature focuses on the contextual factors that diminish ACAP. Interestingly, one study
contradicts previous research by finding that increased partner diversity decreases knowledge
utilization as it strains ACAP (Vasudeva & Anand, 2011). Specifically, while Wuyts and Dutta
(2014) found a U-shaped relationship between diversity and ACAP indicating the presence of
positive returns at high levels of diversity and ACAP, Vasudeva & Anana (2011) found an
inverted U-shaped relationship. However, as neither the industries nor outcomes utilized in the
two studies are directly comparable, it is unclear if this discrepancy is due to conflicting
implications of diversity on ACAP or due to differences in industry-level factors or measures.
While firms may have extensive ACAP, there still remains the option for firms to choose
to absorb newly available information (Fu, 2012). Thus, when new knowledge becomes
available, firms have agency in deciding whether to assimilate this knowledge internally. This
intriguing proposition may explain previous contradictory results regarding network diversity
and knowledge outcomes by indicating that certain industries may use more discretion in
absorbing new knowledge as compared to others. While it has been noted that there is a
requirement for the firm to already have related knowledge in order to absorb new knowledge
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1989, 1990), this research is unique in proposing that firms may actively
choose not to absorb new knowledge.
Theme 3: Knowledge spillovers. The final theme that surfaced from the literature coding
was the impact of knowledge spillovers on ACAP’s outcomes. From this perspective, network
members’ levels of ACAP increases the potential for identifying and internalizing knowledge
spillovers, as their ability to absorb knowledge is greater (Giarratana & Mariani, 2014; MartinezNoya, Garcia-Canal, & Guillen, 2013). Thus, while firms want to increase their own levels of
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ACAP in order to absorb greater amounts of external knowledge, this capability in network
partners may be viewed as a negative, as opportunistic behaviors may ensue. Nonetheless, if
spillovers do occur, firms still have available options to recover their loss of knowledge value.
First, firms can choose to form an alliance with the recipient of the knowledge spillover (Phene
& Tallman, 2014), as the spillover may indicate a similar knowledge base and thus opportunities
for both firms to gain in knowledge once an alliance is formed. Secondly, firms may retrieve
their spilled knowledge after the recipient has added to the knowledge, viewed as the reabsorption of knowledge (Alnuaimi & George, 2016). This point of view could result in
spillovers being regarded as ultimately positive, as the re-absorbed knowledge will have
additional new components that may further the originator’s knowledge base and knowledge
outcomes.
Absorptive Capacity (ACAP) Conclusion. ACAP focuses on a firm’s capability to
learn (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989, 1990), as compared to OL’s view of how firms learn (Levitt &
March, 1988; March, 1991). Thus, the focus is on when firms will want to invest in increasing
R&D spending, and thereby increase their ACAP based on the availability of external knowledge
and industry incentives for applying the knowledge. Key to ACAP is the necessity for external
information to be related to existing firm knowledge in order for assimilation to occur, indicating
that firms may strategically select specific areas in which to develop ACAP. Research has
supported that diversity of internal and external knowledge increases positive outcomes (Alexiev
et al., 2010; Wuyts & Dutta, 2014), potentially leading to the ability to identify specific areas of
ACAP. While a goal to internalize external knowledge is somewhat assumed in ACAP, research
has shown that firms can and do choose what knowledge to absorb (Fu, 2012). Finally, ACAP
research identifies that the threat of knowledge spillovers exists, identifying avenues for firms to

51
recoup lost knowledge value (Alnuaimi & George, 2016; Phene & Tallman, 2014).
Particularly relevant for this literature review is how the construct of spillover was
defined in the research examining spillovers (e.g. Alnuaimi & George, 2016; Phene & Tallman,
2014). The literature discussed in this section predominantly viewed spillovers occurring when
one firm used another firm’s publicly available knowledge (via patent citations). Thus, while the
knowledge recipient did not compensate the knowledge originator for the use of the knowledge,
the knowledge spilled was not private. The use of publicly available knowledge allows firms to
gain from spillovers without necessitating a direct relationship with the knowledge-generating
firm. Research has examined the use of safeguards in alliances to reduce spillovers (MartinezNoya et al., 2013), indicating an interest and awareness of the perils of spilling privately-held
information. Indeed, these lines of research leads to an interesting avenue for future research
examining how the threat of spillovers of privately-held knowledge may impact knowledgeoriginating firms’ networks.
Literature Review Conclusion
The four perspectives examined in this chapter each explain why and how firms will seek
knowledge from their interfirm networks. KBV provides an explanation for why knowledge is
critical to a firm’s success by arguing that firms have capabilities to develop knowledge
internally beyond what could be acquired through markets (Grant, 1996a, 1996b), enabling firms
to gain a competitive advantage via their knowledge resources. Thus, firms who focus on
knowledge development and creation and the processes that contribute to knowledge may gain
advantages due to the difficulties other firms will have in replicating their knowledge-based
resources. In contrast, OL is primarily focused on the internal processes involved with
organizational learning (Levitt & March, 1988), as well as understanding the benefits and pitfalls
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of focusing learning on proximal knowledge as compared to exploring (March, 1991). While OL
is concerned with the questions of ‘how’, ACAP asks ‘how much’. That is, ACAP views the
firm’s ability to recognize, assimilate and apply new knowledge as a capability that can be
extended and increased (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989, 1990), and the answer to ‘how much’ is
determined by the levels of prior related knowledge. As internal knowledge is increased, the firm
is more able to identify and utilize new knowledge. Therefore, these three perspectives view
interfirm networks simply as a method to access external knowledge, rather than networks being
a primary consideration.
It is the network and social capital perspectives that specifically address the value and
benefits of networks, including the availability of knowledge. However, in social capital research
the emphasis is not solely on how firms obtain resources via networks, but also how networks
can provide value via the structure of relationships. For example, closed networks include the
development of trust, norms, and sanctions between network members, indicating strong
relationships amongst network actors (Coleman, 1988). The benefits provided by this structure
include increased productivity, reliability, cooperation, as well as increased information sharing
(Baum et al., 212; Coleman, 1988; Patel & Terjesen, 2011). In contrast, networks that contain
multiple structural holes may not develop norms or obligations between members, but rather
afford members the opportunity to gather novel information not found in closed networks (Burt,
1992, 2000). Thus, the social capital perspective allows for both relational outcomes and
resource outcomes. In sum, this dissertation primarily concentrates on KBV and social capital
perspectives by viewing the strategic value of knowledge and how social capital resources
embedded within firm networks are utilized to obtain further knowledge resources.
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CHAPTER III: THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Based on the research questions posed in Chapter I and the literature review presented in
Chapter II, this chapter presents ten hypotheses organized into three broad sections in line with
the three research questions from Chapter I. In response to the first research question, “how does
the value of a firm’s knowledge assets relate to their subsequent network size, intensity,
structure, and position”, the first section presents hypotheses focused on how the presence of
knowledge assets is related to a firm’s network in terms of its size, structure, and firm position.
In line with the second research question, “how do industry and environmental characteristics
affect the relationship between a firm’s knowledge asset value and subsequent network size,
intensity, structure, and position”, the second section examines how environmental elements may
impact these relationships. Finally, regarding the third research question, “how do network
safeguards impact subsequent knowledge asset value”, the third and final section focuses on the
firm level outcomes of the afore-mentioned relationships. Figure 3.1 depicts the research model
discussed in this chapter, portraying a visual representation of the constructs and their
relationships.
-------------------Insert Figure 3.1 around here
-------------------Knowledge Asset Value and Network Size, Intensity, Structure, and Position
This section includes four hypotheses examining how a firm’s valuable knowledge assets
(i.e. firm knowledge asset value) may impact their network size, intensity, structure, and position
due to knowledge protection goals. As a firm’s level of knowledge increases, they may

54
strategically alter their network in order to safeguard their knowledge from unintended
knowledge spillovers. Four network safeguards are explored in this section; the size of the firm
network, the intensity of the relationships, the structure of the network, and the firm’s position
within their network. While the theoretical arguments may overlap across hypotheses, these are
distinct safeguards available to firms, and thus are hypothesized separately.
As will be noted in the arguments for each hypothesis, the network characteristics
discussed in this dissertation are each directly linked to knowledge accumulation. Consequently,
these network attributes are highly relevant for discussions regarding firms who may seek to
safeguard their knowledge asset value. Specifically, network size has been positively associated
with firm knowledge (Lipparini et al., 2014; Mahmood et al., 2011), while weak ties have been
shown to increase access to knowledge (Wagner et al, 2014). Furthermore, structural holes
provide benefits of nonredundant and diverse information to a firm (Koka & Prescott, 2008),
whereas central positions benefit knowledge accumulation, as breadth and range of knowledge
resources is increased (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004). Viewed from the opposing viewpoint,
these network features provide the potential to safeguard knowledge when firms are concerned
with the risks of spilling knowledge as compared to the benefits of gaining knowledge.

Knowledge Asset Value and Network Size
Firm networks afford learning opportunities for firms within the network, as both tacit
and explicit knowledge can be transferred via interfirm relationships (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000).
Relationships may be established with knowledge transfer as a prime objective (Hardy et al,
2003), indicating that the originator of the knowledge is compensated for and agrees to the
transfer. However, interfirm relationships also present opportunities for unintended knowledge
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transfer, or knowledge spillovers, between firms (Agarwal et al, 2010). In this situation, the
knowledge originator is not compensated for the knowledge exchange, and may have desired to
protect that knowledge from use by others. As assets erode over time (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Le
Breton-Miller & Miller, 2015), curtailing spillovers while the knowledge assets are still deemed
valuable can provide a competitive advantage. Furthermore, as knowledge development is
considered path dependent (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Grant, 1996a), protecting current levels of
knowledge asset value that will generate future value may allow for a competitive advantage to
be extended beyond the value of the current knowledge assets. Thus, firms with sizeable value in
their knowledge assets (i.e., firm knowledge asset value) may choose to restrict knowledge
spillovers (Giarratana & Mariani, 2014) in order to appropriate maximum rents from the asset.
One mechanism for protecting knowledge asset value is by reducing the number of
interfirm relationships, resulting in a smaller network. By reducing the count of relationships, the
number of direct network partners who could potentially gain from the originator’s knowledge is
restricted. Additionally, a smaller network can increase trust and trustworthiness between
partners as the relationship becomes stronger due to the increased time available for the
relationships (Coleman, 1988). With a smaller network the time spent on the relationships
increases, creating trust relationships whereby the opportunities for knowledge spillovers are
reduced and positive knowledge transfer may be increased (Ireland, Hitt, & Vaidyanath, 2002).
Indeed, a focus on a smaller number of relationships can allow trust to be a governance
mechanism (Uzzi, 1996), lessening the risk of knowledge spillovers to indirect network members
via direct partners. Furthermore, as a large network takes more time and energy to manage
(Ahuja, 2000; Burt, 2000), this may increase the potential for partners to engage in opportunistic
behaviors such as actively pursuing knowledge spillovers due to minimal oversight. While a firm
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may have achieved their strong knowledge asset value via a large network (Lipparini et al, 2014;
Mahmood et al, 2011; Wagner et al, 2014), once this competitive advantage is achieved the firm
may choose to strategically manage their network to limit opportunities for spillovers
(Hernandez et al, 2015). Therefore, a firm with high knowledge asset value is likely to have a
smaller network in order to protect its knowledge assets, by both reducing the absolute volume of
spillover opportunities and increasing the governance of network relationships due to the smaller
number of relationships. Hence,

H1: There is a negative relationship between firm knowledge asset value and subsequent
network size

Knowledge Asset Value and Intensity of Ties
Another aspect of firm networks is the strength of the ties present in the network, as a
firm network can consist of both strong and weak ties. As previously described in Chapter II,
strong ties are a result of repeated, frequent relationships that foster trust between partners
(Coleman, 1988). The presence of trust found in strong ties increases predictability of partner
actions and reduces opportunistic behaviors (Gulati, 1999). Strong ties increase opportunities for
resource acquisition and knowledge sharing between partners (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000; Patel &
Terjesen, 2011; Zhang et al, 2010). Contrastingly, weak ties are less intensive relationships, and
provide external ties outside the core of a firm’s network. Thus, weak ties allow for intermittent
relations between partners, and may include links to network segments that would otherwise not
be connected. Indeed, weak ties can provide linkages to information not otherwise present in the
network, though this form of tie reduces the expectation of trust and the ability to enforce

57
sanctions (Lazzarini, Claro, & Mesquita, 2008).
For firms with high levels of knowledge asset value, the desire to protect their knowledge
may lead to an increase in the strength of ties in their network. That is, a firm may seek stronger
tie relationships in order to take advantage of the informal governance structure that provides
safeguards including goodwill, mutual trust, and norms of reciprocity (Gulati, 1995, Uzzi, 1997).
The informal safeguards found with strong ties via repeated or long-term relationships may
reduce opportunistic behaviors (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000). Moreover, the combination of informal
and formal safeguards found in strong tie relationships may also mitigate the opportunity for
undesired knowledge spillovers (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004). In contrast, weak ties may
provide increased access to information (Burt, 2000, 2001), yet the lack of protection
mechanisms may reduce the attractiveness of these relationships for firms with high knowledge
asset value. Thus, the following relationship is hypothesized:

H2: There is a positive relationship between firm knowledge asset value and the
subsequent average strength of ties (i.e., network intensity) in the firm network

Knowledge Asset Value and Network Structure
Interfirm networks can seek to create a cohesive and closed network whereby most
relationships are in the form of strong ties (Coleman, 1988). Indeed, firms can choose to
associate with partners that are known to their other partners, creating a closed, cohesive network
whereby most firms in the network are interrelated. In contrast, firms can choose the alternative
and develop relationships with firms that do not have relationships with other firms in their
existing network, thereby gaining access to information not present in the existing network (Burt,
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2000, 2001). A relationship that links two networks or network segments is viewed as spanning a
structural hole, also termed a bridge (Burt, 2001). By bridging structural holes, a firm generates a
link to a network or network segment that was previously unconnected, opening up avenues to
new and novel information (Burt, 2000; Granovetter, 1973).
The benefits of a closed network include the generation of trust, whereby
“trustworthiness is taken for granted and trade can occur with ease” (Coleman, 1988, p. 99).
Norms of behavior provide rewards for positive dealings and sanctions to constrain
counterproductive actions (Coleman, 1988), reducing the concern for opportunistic behaviors
(Provan, 1993). Indeed, trust can provide a governance mechanism, facilitating “the exchange of
resources and information that are crucial for high performance but are difficult to value and
transfer via market ties” (Uzzi, 1996, p. 678). When firms within a network are completely (or
almost completely) intertwined via relationships, the awareness of firm behavior is known
throughout the network. As a result, an informal governance structure develops that limits the
chances for opportunistic behaviors. Closure leads to trustworthiness, as firms become socially
embedded in the relationships and trust is viewed “as an explicit and primary feature of their
embedded ties” (Uzzi, 1997, p. 43). As firms are increasingly embedded in the network of
relations, opportunistic behavior declines due to network interdependence (Provan, 1993). Thus,
in a closed network, firms develop behavioral expectations and norms, reducing motivation and
opportunities for engaging in deviant behavior.
However, while the benefits of a closed network are found in shared norms and increased
trust, the disadvantages are the redundancy of resources, knowledge, and information (Burt,
2000, 2001). In a closed network, information become redundant as it travels over the same paths
multiple times, with eventually all firms having similar access. However, if a firm develops a
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relationship with another firm external to the core network, in essence developing a bridge to a
new position (Burt, 1992), this affords the firm the opportunity to gain performance advantages
via heterogeneous resources, knowledge, or information. A bridging tie spans a structural hole,
as before the bridging tie there was no connection, either direct or indirect, between the two
firms. Bridging ties can lead to increased firm performance, as “competitive advantage comes
from information access and control; networks that span structural holes provide broad and early
access to, and entrepreneurial control over, information’ (Burt, 2000, p. 347). Thus, Burt (2000,
2001) argues that benefits accrue to actors that broker between otherwise disconnected networks
due to the ability to gain and link knowledge from disparate sources.
While Burt’s (2000, 2001) perspective of social capital proposes increased benefits when
firms actively seek new sources of information via linking to diverse networks, the ability to gain
knowledge via bridging structural holes may be viewed as increasing the potential threat of
knowledge spillovers to firms already in possession of significant knowledge asset value.
Specifically, weak ties enable knowledge to reach a larger number of actors and travel greater
distances (Granovetter, 1973). To firms with high value knowledge assets, the potential benefit
for accessing novel knowledge via spanning structural holes may be more than offset by the risk
that their knowledge may be spilled to those in other networks. Bridging structural holes
increases the potential for knowledge to be spread between networks, reducing the rarity of the
knowledge (Burt, 2001) and potentially the appropriability of the knowledge’s value. While a
closed network will facilitate knowledge transfer within the network structure, the norms of trust
limits opportunistic behaviors (Coleman, 1998). Specifically, a closed network “may help ensure
collaborative continuity via high levels of trust and reputational lock-ins, both of which can help
firms preserve their existing resources” (Tatarynowicz, Sytch, & Gulati, 2016, p. 55).
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Thus, relationships that span networks tend not to develop the informal governance and
norms that can reduce opportunistic behaviors due to the lack of interconnected ties amongst the
network participants. While networks that bridge structural holes may improve the potential for
increasing knowledge assets, the protective mechanisms to reduce knowledge spillovers are not
present, intensifying the opportunities for knowledge spillovers to unknowingly, and
undesirably, occur. For these reasons, firms already in possession of valuable knowledge assets
may select a network that limits the volume of structural holes in their network, resulting in a
more closed, cohesive network structure whereby firms develop norms and standards of behavior
(Baum, McEvily, & Rowley, 2012). Formally stated,

H3: There is a negative relationship between firm knowledge asset value and subsequent
volume of structural holes

Knowledge Asset Value and Network Position
A firm’s position in their network can be expressed by their centrality, viewed as their
prominence, and contributing to their control, visibility, and power (Borgatti et al, 2013). A
central position benefits knowledge accumulation (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004), due to the
breadth and range of knowledge resources located in the connections. Nonetheless, from the
perspective of firms with valuable knowledge assets, the more central the position that a firm
occupies, the greater the risk of knowledge being transmitted throughout the network (Soh,
2010). Both direct and indirect ties provide conduits for knowledge and information to flow
through the network (Vanhaverbeke et al., 2002), indicating that a direct connection is not
required for firms to gain access to valuable resources.
While there are many forms of centrality, ranging from a simple count of relationships
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(degree) to the measurements of the shortest paths between all firms in the network (betweenness
centrality), this study will focus on a measure known as beta centrality (Bonacich, 1987). This
measure is well suited to the study of knowledge transfer and spillover, as beta centrality can be
conceptualized as a measure of relative influence among actors in a social network (Borgatti et
al, 2013). Beta centrality is “a measure of global centrality that considers the focal actor’s
centrality, its connected actors’ centralities, their connected actors’ centralities, and so on”
(Pollock, Lee, Jin & Lashley, 2015, p. 493). Power and influence are associated with beta
centrality, though these benefits will weaken as the firms are more distant. That is, a high beta
central firm may have significant power and influence over its direct relationships, but less so
over their indirect relationships, and at a decreasing scale as the relationship become more distal.
Since firms with high beta centrality are connected to other firms that have high beta centrality,
the volume of distant connections increases. In this situation, the focal firm has many direct
connections to firms that also have many direct connections, which exponentially increases the
volume of distant indirect relationships. However, if the focal firm forms relationships with less
beta central firms, decreasing their own beta centrality, their power and influence may be able to
reach more distal relationships, thereby decreasing spillover opportunities. Furthermore, by
associating with less central firms, the disparity in power and influence provides a further
disincentive for the less beta central firm to engage in behaviors that may threaten the
relationship (Castellucci & Ertug, 2010). Indeed, when viewing this concept in regards to
knowledge spillovers, the beta centrality of the firm will indicate both the visibility of a firm’s
knowledge and how quickly knowledge can be transmitted to multiple firms (Borgatti, 2005).
Thus, for firms with high levels of knowledge asset value, two mechanisms are present
for safeguarding knowledge assets via reduced network beta centrality. First, a less beta central
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position will reduce the number of relationships a firm must manage, which enables the firm to
focus on exercising increased power and influence over its partners, while simultaneously
increasing effort by their partners in order to maintain the relationship (Castellucci & Ertug,
2010). Secondly, firms with reduced beta centrality will have fewer potential knowledge
spillover recipients and reduced visibility of its knowledge due to the decreased number of
indirect and distant relationships. Indeed, a firm with high knowledge asset value may choose to
be less beta central in their network, as high beta centrality not only increases the visibility of the
knowledge, but also increases the volume of potential knowledge spillover recipients. Not only
may firms select a smaller network as discussed in H1, but they may also select direct partners
that are themselves less beta central, reducing the focal firm’s beta centrality. For these reasons,
a firm with high knowledge asset value may adopt a less beta central network position to both
reduce visibility of their knowledge and reduce spillover opportunities via indirect relationships.
Stated more formally:

H4: There is a negative relationship between firm knowledge asset value and their
subsequent beta centrality

The Impact of Industry and Environmental Characteristics
Industry and environmental characteristics are frequently included in management
research yet typically as control variables (i.e., Batjargal et al, 2013; Baum et al, 2012; Sarkar et
al, 2009). However, industry and environmental characteristics may impact how firms respond to
spillover threats to their knowledge, and are, therefore, considered to be of theoretical interest.
First, knowledge as an asset does not have the same value across industries, as industries with
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fewer technological changes may see reduced value in their knowledge as compared to industries
where technological change is rapid and frequent (Alnuaimi & George, 2016; Appleyard, 1996;
Mayer, 2006). Secondly, environmental characteristics such as dynamism and munificence (Dess
& Beard, 1984) impact the level of uncertainty that firms face which may impact their network
safeguards. Dynamism refers to “change that is hard to predict and that heightens uncertainty”
(Dess & Beard, 1984, p. 56) potentially increasing the need to safeguard knowledge assets.
Conversely, munificence indicates the environmental capacity for growth and stability (Dess &
Beard, 1984); when munificence is high, uncertainty and competition will be reduced and may
subsequently reduce the need to protect knowledge asset value.
The emphasis in this section of the dissertation is on three specific industry and
environmental characteristics; 1) the value placed on knowledge assets by differing industries, 2)
the level of dynamism, and 3) the level of munificence faced by firms. The next sections will
examine these three characteristics in detail, exploring the theoretical relationships between these
characteristics and the focal relationships, and hypothesizing how these factors will affect the
direct relationships examined in the previous section (depicted in Figure 3.1).

Industry Characteristics
Schmalansee’s (1985) early research brought to the forefront the relevance of industry,
finding support for his proposition that at least 75% of the variance of firm outcomes was due to
industry effects. The subsequent work that examined the relationship between industry and firm
outcomes produced varying results, supporting the impact of industry to varying degrees (i.e.,
Karniouchina et al, 2013; McGahan & Porter, 1997; Rumelt, 1991; Short, Ketchen Jr, Bennett, &
du Toit, 2006). For example, research conducted on industries such as semiconductors (i.e.
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Alnuaimi & George, 2016; Appleyard, 1996; Jiang, Tan & Thursby, 2010) and steel (i.e., Koka
& Prescott, 2008; Madhavan, Koka, & Prescott, 1998) provides a suggestion that the speed of
technological change is different between the two industries, inviting a comparison of their
network safeguards, as well as comparisons including other industries. The semiconductor
industry was (and is) characterized by rapid technological change, increasing uncertainty as
“uncertainty surrounds the pay-off to a particular piece of knowledge due to difficulties in
predicting: its useful life; the breadth of its applicability across the industry; the ease with which
it [c]an be incorporated into another company's process flow; and whether it can be reverse
engineered” (Appleyard, 1996, p. 140). In contrast, the slower moving steel industry has a slower
rate of technological change, and with that, reduced uncertainty (Koka & Prescott, 2008). In the
semiconductor industry, firms protected their knowledge to the extent possible, while in the steel
industry knowledge was shared between firms more frequently. While this study only examined
two industries, it indicates that industries will place dissimilar values on their knowledge. In
regard to this dissertation, the findings indicate that industries may uniquely value knowledge
and therefore network safeguards may not be similar across industries. In industries
characterized by rapid technological change, all knowledge may be deemed valuable, as it is
unclear which knowledge will contribute to future positive outcomes (Coff, 1999).
Thus, the value of knowledge between industries may differ based on the pace of
technological change. Indeed, in situations where firms are in possession of valuable knowledge
assets, the determination of the value of these assets may be, in part, driven by the industry’s
value of knowledge. While firms with high knowledge asset value may have different network
size, intensity, structure, and position in order to safeguard knowledge, the pressure to do so is
expected to be stronger in industries where knowledge is deemed valuable, as compared to
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industries where knowledge is not viewed as a key resource (Tatarynowicz et al., 2016).
Formally stated;

H5: In industries where knowledge is perceived as more valuable (i.e., high technology),
the relationships between firm knowledge asset value and subsequent network size (H5a),
network intensity (H5b), network closure (H5c), and beta centrality (H5d) will be
stronger.

Environmental Characteristics
Dynamism and munificence can affect the uncertainty in the environment surrounding
firms, and therefore may impact how they value their knowledge asset and thus their network
size, intensity, structure, and position. Dynamism indicates a rapidly changing environment
indicated by the frequency, intensity, and unpredictability of changes (Castrogiovanni, 2002;
Child, 1972), increasing the uncertainty felt by firms in a highly dynamic environment. Firms in
a dynamic environment will not be able to predict which knowledge assets will be valuable in the
future (Coff, 1999), potentially leading to firms guarding all knowledge. Firms may seek to
protect any present or potential competitive advantage gained by their knowledge assets by
safeguarding their knowledge, as knowledge assets cannot be quickly or easily replicated due to
time requirements and the path dependent nature of knowledge creation (Alexy, George, &
Salter, 2013; Boland et al., 2007; Ireland et al., 2002). Dynamic environments may increase the
potential for knowledge to become a key resource (Fang, 2011; Wang & Chen, 2010) and lead
firms to intensify their knowledge protection efforts. Conversely, in environments characterized
by low dynamism, the uncertainty is low. While firms may still seek to protect their knowledge
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asset value, the pressure to protect all knowledge will be reduced, as the slower-paced
environment allows firms to clearly view future possibilities for competitive advantage. Again,
the need to protect knowledge can still be present but will be reduced as all firms are able to
identify future possibilities for competitive advantage. While knowledge will be protected, the
efforts can be focused, and thereby reduced in comparison to environments characterized by high
dynamism. Thus, firms may seek to protect their knowledge asset value through network
safeguards (i.e., network size, network intensity, network closure, and beta centrality) in order to
hedge when faced with an unpredictable future. Formally stated,

H6: The level of dynamism in the industry will moderate the relationships between firm
knowledge asset value and subsequent network size (H6a), network intensity (H6b),
network closure (H6b), and beta centrality (H6d), such that the strength of the
relationships will increase with the level of dynamism.

In a similar fashion, munificent environments affect firms as munificence influences “the
survival and growth of firms sharing that environment” (Castrogiovanni, 1991, p. 543) and
thereby, the level of uncertainty. Highly munificent environments are characterized by high
availability of resources, and indicate the ability of the environment to support growth (Boyd &
Gove, 2006; Dess & Beard, 1984), in essence, the environment’s ‘carrying capacity’
(Castrogiovanni, 2002). In a highly munificent environment, competition for resources will be
reduced as the availability is not restricted. Indeed, a highly munificent environment may be
characterized by low knowledge protection efforts as firms do not feel pressures to safeguard
their resources due to the high availability. While munificence is a broad concept referring to all
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resources and not knowledge resources specifically, it is argued that highly munificent
environments have reduced competitive forces (Schoonhoven et al, 1990) which will influence
network safeguards. In environments characterized by high munificence and thereby reduced
competition, firms will not implement knowledge protection efforts as would be found in low
munificence environments. When resources are not freely available and competition is high,
network safeguards (i.e., network size, network intensity, network closure, and beta centrality)
will be increased in order to protect the value of the knowledge (indicated by the shaded box in
Figure 3.1). Formally stated;

H7: The level of munificence in the industry will moderate the relationships between firm
knowledge asset value and subsequent network size (H7a), network intensity (H7b),
network closure (H7b), and beta centrality (H7d), such that the strength of the
relationships will decrease with the level of munificence.

Network Safeguards and Future Knowledge Asset Value
Firms derive multiple benefits from their interfirm network, and specifically in regards to
knowledge assets (Ahuja, Polidoro Jr, & Mitchell, 2009). Knowledge benefits may be obtained
as a result of direct and indirect ties (Ahuja, 2000b; Tiwana, 2008), providing firms with the
ability to create value and gain a knowledge-based advantage over their competitors (DeCarolis
& Deeds, 1999). As a firm’s knowledge base increases, their ability to absorb knowledge is
amplified (Grant 1996a, 1996b; Cohen & Levinthal, 1989, 1990; Yang et al., 2010). Indeed,
participation in interfirm networks can increase firm learning as firms realize the benefits
accrued to those who increase knowledge at a faster rate than competitors (Dyer & Nobeoka,
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2000). Thus, as firms’ access to knowledge resources are increased via network size, structural
holes, and beta centrality, their knowledge assets will be subsequently increased via the breadth
and depth of available knowledge to the firm.
Nonetheless, this positive relationship may have its limits. First, as firms increase their
breadth and depth of connections, their capacity to internalize and utilize the available
knowledge will at some point be saturated, reducing the benefits (Laursen & Salter, 2006). With
extensive knowledge resources available, firms are challenged to select which knowledge to
explore, to provide the necessary attention to absorb knowledge and to utilize knowledge when it
is most relevant (Koput, 1997). As knowledge levels increase, these capabilities will be under
excessive demand, leading to diminishing returns beyond an optimal point. At the same time, the
firm’s knowledge will be widely available via interfirm networks, allowing greater numbers of
external firms to build upon the knowledge (Alcacer & Oxley, 2014). Firms seeking the benefits
of knowledge spillovers will pursue both direct and indirect connections to firms with valuable
knowledge assets in search of spillover opportunities (Ahuja, 2000; Appleyard, 1996). When
knowledge is spilled to external firms, this allows them to gain value that otherwise would have
been appropriated by the knowledge-originating firm, reducing the value of present and future
firm knowledge assets. In combination, these two mechanisms will constrain firms’ abilities to
increase their knowledge asset value beyond an optimal point, thereby producing a curvilinear
relationship between network safeguards (i.e., network size, intensity, structural holes, and beta
centrality) and knowledge assets. Formally stated:

H8: Network size (H8a), network intensity (H8b), structural holes (H8c), and beta
centrality (H8d) have a curvilinear (inverted-U) relationship with subsequent knowledge
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asset value.
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CHAPTER IV: METHODS
Sample
To test the hypotheses in Chapter III, data was collected to form a sample of publicly
traded firms having at least one interfirm relationship, indicating the presence of a firm network.
The necessity for the use of publicly traded firms is due to the availability of data regarding
interfirm networks, as well as the availability of financial data. The sample includes all
manufacturing firms, as “technology competition and patenting are more prevalent in
manufacturing than in service firms” (Wang & Chen, 2010, p. 145). As this dissertation is
focused on the perceived effect of knowledge asset value on network size, intensity, structure,
and position, selecting manufacturing firms focuses the analysis on industries where knowledge
can play a role in achieving or maintaining competitive advantage.
Data were collected from multiple sources. First, data regarding firm networks were
gathered from the SDC Platinum Worldwide Mergers, Acquisitions, and Alliances Database
(SDC), and covered the years 1985 – 2010, as prior to 1985 there was negligible alliance activity
found in the SDC database. Secondly, data providing information on firm knowledge asset value
were utilized from two separate sources: The National Bureau of Economic Research’s (NBER)
Patent Data Project (https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home) (Hall et al, 2001), and
a dataset also using NBER data (https://iu.app.box.com/v/patents) from Kogan and colleagues
(2017). Finally, financial information was gathered from Compustat, which provides extensive
information on publicly-traded companies.
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Dependent Variables
Firm Networks
For hypotheses 1 through 7, the dependent variables are derived from firm networks. As
the focus of this research is the perceived need for network safeguards, firm networks were
defined by the presence of strategic alliances between firms. While firms may have multiple
networks, such as customer networks and networks based on board interlocks, interfirm alliances
generate a network rich in knowledge (Kale, Singh, & Perlmutter, 2000; Koka & Prescott, 2008;
Oliver, 1990; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2002). A criterion for the boundary of the network was
adopted whereby each included firm had formed at least one alliance during the period of study
(Koka & Prescott, 2002). Furthermore, each firm network was classified by the Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) code used for the alliance. While firms use SIC codes to
categorize their lines of business, SIC codes are also used to categorize the focus of the alliance.
By using the alliance SIC versus the business SIC, firms engaged in similar alliance business
were considered to be in the same network, as firms frequently engage in diversifying product
lines. Therefore, each firm in the network has the ability to engage in a relationship with any
other firm in the network. Additionally, using the alliance SIC as the delineation of each network
provides a reasonable network boundary, necessary for network research (Borgatti et al, 2013). A
moving window of 5 years was utilized based on prior research (i.e., Bae & Gargiulo, 2003;
Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Stuart, 2000; Sytch & Tatarynowicz, 2014),
as alliance terminations are rarely reported (Bae & Gargiulo, 2003), and prior research indicates
that the normal duration of most alliances is no more than 5 years (Sytch & Tatarynowicz, 2014).
Therefore, even though data were collected from 1985, analysis began in 1989 to address leftcensoring issues, as each network includes alliances from the previous five years.
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Network size. Network size (also termed degree centrality) was measured as a firm’s
total count of network partners at time t (Mahmood et al, 2011).
Volume of structural holes. Structural holes indicate that firms in the network are
relatively unconnected to others in the network, increasing access to different and potentially
novel information (Burt, 2001). The common method for computing structural holes is to use the
inverse of Burt’s (1992) constraint measure which measures the level of closure found in an
actor’s network. “Because the pursuit of closed ego networks involves forming ties to partners
that are connected to one another, firms that exhibit this behavior should have higher levels of
constraint” (Tatarynowicz, Sytch, & Gulati, 2016, p. 58). As constraint indicates a dense
network, the inverse of constraint indicates a sparsely connected network (Koka & Prescott,
2008). Thus, the measure for structural holes was the inverse of the constraint measure calculated
using UCINET software.
Structural Holesit = 1 – 𝒞𝒞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 .

(1)

Network intensity. Nohria and Garcia-Pont’s (1991) 9-point scale for measuring the
“strength of strategic linkage” (p. 117) was used, whereby “[h]igher scores indicate higher levels
of intensity of cooperation and interdependence, indicating a potential for a greater amount and a
higher quality of information flow than alliances with lower scores.” (Koka & Prescott, 2008, p.
648). The scale rates alliances from 1-9 based on the level of commitment required between
alliance partners as follows: 1. Distribution agreements. 2. Know-how and patent licensing
agreements. 3. Component sourcing agreements. 4. Second source agreements. 5. Broad R&D
Agreements. 6. Minority Equity. 7. Limited Cross Equity Ownership. 8. Independent Joint
Ventures. 9. Mergers and acquisitions. Each alliance was separately coded based on the above
scale. The information provided by SDC includes indicators for the items (e.g., Distribution =
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yes/no), allowing for coding. In situations where indicators cannot be utilized, the text
description of the alliance was used. The average intensity of all of each firm’s alliances at time
t was used as the measure of network intensity.
Beta (Bonacich) centrality. Beta centrality is a variation of degree centrality, whereby a
firm will have a higher score to the extent it is connected to many firms who themselves are
highly connected (Bonacich, 1987; Borgatti et al, 2013; Podolny, 1993). Beta centrality can be
viewed as a measure of “the total amount of potential influence a [firm] can have on all others
via direct and indirect channels” (Borgatti et al, 2013, p. 171), appropriate for these hypotheses.
The following formula was used to calculate the beta centrality measure (Bonacich, 1987):
∞

𝒸𝒸(𝛼𝛼, 𝛽𝛽) = 𝛼𝛼 �𝓀𝓀=1 ℬ 𝓀𝓀 ℛ 𝓀𝓀+1

(2)

where 𝒸𝒸(𝛼𝛼, 𝛽𝛽) is a vector of centrality scores for the firms, α is an arbitrary scaling factor, β is a
weight, and 1 denotes a column-vector of ones. Where β is 0, this measure provides degree

centrality, as only those firms directly connected to the focal firm are included in the measure.
Where β is greater than 0, the measure accounts for the centrality of the firm’s connections. For
these analyses, β was set to be equal to three-quarters of the reciprocal of the largest eigenvalue
of X, as is the norm in the networks literature (Podolny, 1993; Pollock et al, 2015).
Knowledge Asset Value
For hypothesis 8, the dependent variable is subsequent knowledge asset value. This
measure is also an independent variable for hypotheses 1 through 7. Patent data was the base for
knowledge measures as a patent, “by definition, represents a unique and novel element of
knowledge” (Ahuja & Katila, 2001, p. 201), and therefore can provide indications of knowledge
asset levels (Chung & Yeaple, 2008; Coombs et al, 2009; DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999).

74
First, a measure of each firm’s patent originality level was utilized as in indication of firm
knowledge asset value. Patents including citations from a wide range of fields are considered
more original (Hall et al, 2001) and more diverse (Wuyts & Dutta, 2014). The originality
measure has been used extensively in research as predictors (e.g., Hoetker & Agarwal, 2007) and
outcomes of interest (e.g., Guerzoni, Aldridge, Audretsch, & Desai, 2014), as originality is
viewed as “the synthesis of divergent ideas defined by technological sourcing from a broad
spectrum of technology domains” (Corradini & De Propris, 2017).
The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) supported research by Hall and
colleagues (2001) to track patent citations and their level of originality, resulting in the Patent
and Patent Citations Data Set. The originality measure uses the following equation:
2
,
𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 = 1 − Σ𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

where sij indicates the percentage of citations made by patent i that belong to patent class
j, out of ni patent classes (the sum is the Herfindahl concentration index). Therefore, a patent that
uses a wide range of fields in its citations will result in a high value, while a patent with citations
that are concentrated in a limited number of fields will have a lower value.
Second, a measure totaling the economic importance of each firm’s patents was included
(Kogan, Papanikolauo, Seru, & Stoffman, 2017) as an indicator of a firm’s knowledge asset
value. This measure is based on stock market reactions to patent grants, indicating the market’s
perception of the future commercialization potential of the patent. While this measure is
strongly related to the scientific value of patents (as measured by forward citations), it provides a
clearer view of knowledge performance via its use of an economic outcome (Kogan et al, 2017).
The measure first analyzes the stock market reactions when a patent is granted. The cumulative
abnormal returns (CAR) are measured using a three-day announcement window, adjusting for
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market returns. Thus, the first step is to gather the firm’s idiosyncratic return, calculated as the
firm’s return based on the patent issuance minus the return on the market portfolio. The second
step is to calculate the economic value of the patent as the estimate of the stock return due to the
value of the patent multiplied by the market capitalization of the firm on the day prior to the
announcement. If multiple patents are awarded to one firm on the same day, each patent is
assigned a fraction of the total value accumulated. The measure is the additive value of each
firm’s patent value at time t. This measure is relatively new and has not been cited yet in
management literature, although it is a subject of interest based on the accumulation of 66 cites
in working papers in other disciplines (Google Scholar, November 3rd, 2017).
Independent Variables
Knowledge Asset Value
As noted above, the measure developed for the dependent variable in Hypothesis 8 is also
used for the independent variable utilized in hypotheses 1 through 8.
Industry characteristics
High Technology Industry. Hypothesis 5 includes a measure indicating whether an
industry is considered high-technology or not. Based on extant strategic research (e.g., Certo,
Covin, Daily, & Dalton, 2001; Moore, Bell, & Filatotchev, 2010; Moore, Bell, Filatotchev, &
Rasheed, 2012), the following 2-digit SIC codes were classified as high-technology:
biotechnology, pharmaceuticals & specialty chemicals (SIC 28), computer hardware (SIC 35),
semiconductors and printed circuits (SIC 36), aerospace (SIC 37), telecommunications (SIC 48),
and computer software (SIC 73). The measure was operationalized as a dichotomous variable,
assigning a score of 1 if the firm was in a high-technology industry, and 0 if otherwise.
Environmental characteristics
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Hypotheses 6 and 7 include moderating variables that reflect the environmental
characteristics of the industries included in this research. The environmental characteristics of
dynamism and munificence (Dess & Beard, 1984) was measured using the following basic
equation (Bergh & Lawless, 1998: Lin et al, 2009):
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏1 𝑡𝑡 + 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡

(3)

where Y = industry sales, t = year, and a = residual. As recommended by Boyd and Gove (2006),
a 5-year time window was utilized (e.g., industry sales from 1995 through 1999 was used in the
regression equation leading to dynamism and munificence for 1999). Dynamism was measured
as the standard error of the regression slope coefficient divided by the mean of sales to create a
standardized index of industry dynamism using the above regression equation (Lin et al, 2009).
Environmental munificence was measured as the regression slope coefficient divided by mean
sales from the above regression equation.

Control Variables.
Control variables are necessary in order to rule out alternative explanations as well as to
reduce error terms (Becker, 2005). The following controls are deemed necessary due to their
potential effect on the dependent variables and also based on their inclusion in previous research.
Firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets normalized to the
industry median (Gulati, 1999), was included as a control variable as the size of the manufacturer
may have an impact on knowledge asset volume and value.
Firm age, measured as the natural logarithm of the number of years from founding
(Alexiev et al., 2010), was included as a control, as previous research has acknowledged that
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incumbent manufacturers have fewer information asymmetries, potentially impacting the
necessity and efficacy of signals (Etzion & Pe'er, 2014).
Firm patenting volume, a count of all patents assigned to each firm by year was
measured, including those patents applied for but not yet granted to include all knowledge in
development (Coombs et al, 2009).
Patenting age, measured as the number of years from the firm’s first patent application,
was included as a proxy for patenting experience (e.g., Bhas & Hedge, 2014), as greater
experience may improve the firm’s ability to generate knowledge asset value.
Firm performance measured as return on assets normalized to the industry median
(Gulati, 1999) was included as a control as strong performance may affect both the perceived
need to protect knowledge as well as firm alliance behavior (Ahuja et al., 2009).
Firm slack was measured using a firm’s current ratio, calculated as current assets over
current liabilities (Yang et al, 2010). The availability of slack may allow for increased expenses
on R&D, thereby increasing knowledge asset values, and may also decrease pressures to
safeguard knowledge, influencing the variables of interest.
Firm Research & Development (R&D) expenses were included as these are considered
investments in knowledge creation (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989) and contribute to the ability of
firms to absorb external knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). The natural logarithm of the
R&D expenditure was used as the measure.
Network size was included as a control variable, as the number of firms present in the
network indicates the number of relationship opportunities. Furthermore, as network statistics are
generated by the network, this control variable partitions out the variance introduced by nonequal network sizes.
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Analysis
In this dataset, the cases are hierarchically nested, as firms are present across multiple
years, and multiple firms are present in each industry. In this situation, there is a lack of
independence of errors within the dataset, as firm-level effects impact analyses as well as
industry-level effects (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Thus, to accommodate the multilevel nature
of this data, a mixed effects regression model was employed that includes random effects for
repeated firm and industry segments. This model is conceptually similar to regression models
while including additional variance terms to account for the nested structure of the data (Bliese
& Ployhart, 2002). Even though this research is focused on first-level variables, acknowledging
the multilevel nature of the data avoids issues with both Type I and Type II errors (Bliese &
Hanges, 2004). The mixed effects regression model used in this research simultaneously
estimates within and between firm and industry effects, while controlling for auto-correlation
across time by using an auto-regressive error covariance structure.
While a multilevel model has been proposed, the data are not strictly hierarchical. There
are multiple observations for each firm over time, yet firms are not strictly nested in an industry
hierarchy. This is an artifact of using alliance industry to define networks, as firms appear in
multiple alliance industries. Firms are present in an average of approximately 9 industries, with a
range from 1 to 17 (the maximum number possible is 20). Therefore, to analyze the data, a crossclassified model was employed (Leckie, 2013). A cross-classified model allows for a nonhierarchical dataset (firms are not strictly nested in industries). A three-level model was
formulated whereby firm-years (Level 1) are nested within firms (Level 2) nested within a single
artificial super industry cluster (Level 3). It may improve understanding to view this super
cluster as being the complete manufacturing industry, within which the 20 2-digit manufacturing
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SIC codes are nested.
Thus, the model, formulated as a constrained three-level model, is written as follows:
𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑣𝑣1𝑘𝑘 + 𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 𝑣𝑣2𝑘𝑘 + ⋯ + 𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑣𝑣20𝑘𝑘 + 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

Where 𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the observed network characteristic value of firm-year i in firm j

in the single artificial super cluster (manufacturing industry) k, 𝛽𝛽0 is the mean score across all

firms and all industries, 𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , … , 𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are the specific industry indicator variables, one
for each industry, 𝑣𝑣1𝑘𝑘 , 𝑣𝑣2𝑘𝑘 , … 𝑣𝑣20𝑘𝑘 are the level 3 random coefficients which give the industry
effects, 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 is the effect of firm j and 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the firm-year level residual error term. Thus, the

cross-classified model employed in this dissertation allows for the non-hierarchical nature of the
data.
A hierarchical modeling approach was utilized, allowing for comparisons of nested
models. The first model contained only control variables, while subsequent models added one
theoretical variable of interest. As each model was compared, “evidence of incremental
prediction beyond all recognized controls is strong evidence that an IV has utility” (Carlson &
Wu, 2012, p. 418). Model fit was compared using a Likelihood Ratio test, which indicates if the
nested model provides a significant improvement over the previous model. This structure of
modeling also allows for multicollinearity to be observed, as if an added variable is not
significant, yet there is a significant improvement in the model, there may be evidence of
multicollinearity (Rowley et al., 2005). This approach was applied to all models necessary for
the testing of the hypotheses. That is, for each unique dependent variable, a baseline model
containing only control variables was first run and then compared to subsequent models which
added variables of interest.
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CHAPTER V: RESULTS

The purpose of this chapter is to provide results of the analyses. First, the descriptive
statistics and correlations are provided. Subsequently, the results for each hypothesis are
reported, along with a short interpretation of results. For reference purposes, a summary of all
hypothesis tests can be found in Table 5.9. The discussion chapter (Chapter VI) discusses the
general findings in more detail.
The descriptive statistics and correlations for the overall sample of firms are presented in
Table 5.1. It is worth noting that all 25 years of data were utilized in Table 5.1, thus it presents
the descriptive statistics and meaningful correlations for all data analyzed. Within the data, there
were multiple correlations above 0.70, indicating potential issues with multicollinearity. Four
correlations were greater than 0.98, indicating almost a perfect correlation. The four sets of
highly correlated variables were as follows: 1) between the firm network size (t+5) and firm
network beta centrality (t+5) (r = 0.995), 2) between firm patent volume and firm knowledge
asset value (patent originality) (r = 0.991), 3) between firm patent age and firm age (r = 0.988),
and 4) between firm network size (t1) and firm network beta centrality (t1) (r = 0.993). The high
correlation between firm network size and firm network beta centrality is not an issue for
analysis, as these two dependent variables are not present in the same models. Two other sets of
variables were also highly correlated: 1) Firm size and R&D expenses (r = 0.825) and 2)
knowledge asset value (patent originality) and the future value of knowledge asset value (patent
originality, t+5) (r = 0.881).
Consequently, variance inflation factors (VIFs) for these variables were obtained to
ascertain if multicollinearity was an issue. Firm network size and firm network beta centrality
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resulted in a VIF of 33.55, exceeding 10.0 and indicating collinearity (Hair et al., 2010). The
result for the collinearity tests of firm patent volume and knowledge asset value (patent
originality) was a VIF equal to 60.33, again outside of the boundaries. The result for the
collinearity tests of firm patent age and firm age also indicated an issue with multicollinearity
(VIF = 31.97). VIFs were tested with each dependent variable used in the first section (network
degree, intensity, structural holes, and beta centrality) with similar results. Furthermore, it was
noted that firm performance was collinear with the intercept term. This is indicating that the
intercept is capturing the variance found in firm performance. Since running the models with
either effect omitted returned the same pattern of results, the intercept was included and firm
performance was dropped from all models. There were two correlations that were highly
significant (r >0.80), yet results from collinearity tests revealed that both VIF values were within
guidelines. First, the variables Firm size & Firm R&D resulted in a VIF value of 4.40, while
analysis on the variables of patent originality and patent originality (t +5, used in H8) resulting in
a VIF value of 4.78. Therefore, these variables were included in all models. In summary, it was
determined that the four variables of firm network beta centrality, firm patenting volume, firm
performance, and firm age would be omitted from models.
As discussed in the Methods chapter, a multilevel model is proposed due to the nested
nature of the data. To confirm that a multilevel model is appropriate, inter-class correlations
(ICCs) were calculated for all dependent variables (Table 5.2). ICCs for both levels combined
(industry and firm) range from 17% to 65%, indicating that a significant portion of the variance
is accounted by the group levels. ICCs at each level ranged from 0% to 63%. The low level of
the variance reported at the industry level may due to biases in reporting ICCs in cross-classified
models, which can result in underestimation of this higher level, and “substantial overestimation

82
of the variance component at the lower level” (Im et al, 2016, p. 12). Thus, as significant
variance is explained by both levels, the three-level model was employed for all hypotheses.
Results for Knowledge Asset Value—Network Safeguard Relationships
The first section of the dissertation assessed the relationships between firm knowledge
asset value and network safeguards. As discussed previously in the methods chapter, four (4)
different network measures were utilized as dependent variables; network size, relationship
intensity, structural holes, and beta-centrality. As such, multiple tables are included (Tables 5.3 –
5.6), each depicting results for a separate dependent variable. The independent variables of
interest are the two measures of firm knowledge asset value; the first measuring the patent
originality, and the second measuring the patent market value 6.
Hypothesis 1 stated that there is a negative relationship between firm knowledge asset
value and subsequent network size. As discussed in the methods section, this is a 2-level model,
with industry at Level-1, firm at Level-2, and the firm-year observations as fixed effects. Model
1 (Table 5.3) included all control variables, and indicates significant relationships between firm
network size (t=0) (β = 0.324, p < 0.001), and firm network structural holes (t=0) (β = 2.045, p <
0.001), on subsequent firm network size (t+5). Furthermore, the number of firms present in the
whole network (all firms in alliances within the SIC code) has a significant relationship with
subsequent firm network size (β = 0.003, p < 0.001). For Hypothesis 1 (Table 5.3, Model 2),
results indicate the presence of a significant negative relationship between firm knowledge asset
value and network size for patent originality (β = -0.01050, p < 0.001) as well as patent market

6

From this point forward, the knowledge asset value variable using a measure of patent originality will be referred
to as ‘patent originality’, while the knowledge asset value variable using a measure of patent market value will be
referred to as ‘patent market value’.
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value (β = -0.00017, p < 0.001), indicating support for Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 2 hypothesized a negative relationship between firm knowledge asset value
and subsequent network intensity, indicating that the network will be comprised of higherintensity relationships. Model 1 (Table 5.4) included all control variables, applying the same 3level model as utilized in Hypothesis 1, and indicates multiple significant relationships between
the control variables and subsequent firm network intensity. Interestingly, as compared to the
Model 1 in Table 5.3 (subsequent firm network size), many firm-level variables were significant
with the dependent variable, including firm R&D expenses (β = -0.329, p < 0.001), firm size (β
= 0.236, p < 0.01), and firm slack (β = -0.442, p < 0.01). The network intensity measure uses the
mean intensity of all relationships for firm j in year t and industry i. Thus, the interpretation
requires that the beta coefficient will be positive in order to support the hypotheses, indicating an
increase in the intensity of relationships. Results provided in Model 2 indicate that neither
independent variable is significantly related to subsequent firm network intensity, and thus,
hypothesis 2 is not supported.
Hypothesis 3 stated that there is a negative relationship between firm knowledge asset
value and subsequent volume of structural holes, measured as the level of constraint in the
network. Model 1 (Table 5.5) included all control variables, applying the same 3-level model as
previous hypotheses. Multiple significant relationships are present in the control model. Of
interest are significant relationships between firm network size (t=0) (β = 0.011, p < 0.001), and
firm network structural holes (t=0) (β = 0.171, p < 0.001), on subsequent firm network structural
holes (t+5), indicating the role of path dependence on network structure. Results depicted in
Model 2 indicate that neither firm knowledge asset value measure is significantly related to
subsequent firm network structural holes, indicating no support for Hypothesis 3.
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Hypothesis 4 stated that there is a negative relationship between firm knowledge asset
value and subsequent network beta centrality. Model 1 (Table 5.6) included all control variables,
applying the same 3-level model as previous hypotheses, and shows a similar pattern of network
characteristics impacting subsequent firm network beta centrality (network size β = 0.391, p <
0.001, network structural holes β = 2.586, p < 0.001). Results in Model 2 suggest a significant
negative relationship between patent originality and network beta centrality (β = -0.01273, p <
0.001), as well as a significant negative relationship with patent market value (β = -0.00009, p <
0.05), resulting in full support for Hypothesis 4.
Summary and Interpretation
In summary of the results of the direct hypotheses, both Hypothesis 1 and 4 were fully
supported. Hypothesis 1 stated that a negative relationship is present between firm knowledge
asset value and subsequent network size, which was supported by both knowledge asset value
measures. For this hypothesis, the results indicate that a one-unit increase in patent originality
will decrease subsequent firm network intensity by -0.01050 units. The measure of patent
originality is not easily interpretable, as it measures the range of fields referenced in patent
citations. Thus, a patent that cites a wide set of technologies will have a higher originality score.
The measure used in this analysis is the total firm originality score (sum of all patents’ originality
scores), as it endeavors to capture the full originality present in the firm’s knowledge. The range
of values was from 0 to 1067 (before centering) with an average of 44, and a standard deviation
of 107, indicating most firms had a lower patent originality value. The outcome is that firms
having a patent originality value one standard deviation higher than average would have a
network size approximately one member smaller than average, suggesting a practically
significant outcome.
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Hypothesis 1 was also supported by the measure of patent market value, which is
measured in dollars. Thus, the outcomes propose that for each dollar increase in firm knowledge
asset value, firm network size will decrease by 0.00017. While the coefficient is small, the patent
market value measure has a standard deviation of approximate 3,300. Thus, for a firm with an
overall knowledge asset value of $5,300 above average, the subsequent network size will be
reduced by ½ a member. As the range of possible values is over $100 million, higher values of
patent market value could negatively impact network size to a significant level.
Hypothesis 4 stated that a negative relationship is present between firm knowledge asset
value and subsequent firm beta centrality, which was supported by both knowledge asset
measures. The relationship between patent originality and subsequent firm beta centrality results
in a 1.3-unit decrease in subsequent firm beta centrality for a firm one standard deviation above
the mean in patent originality (subsequent firm beta centrality mean= 5, s.d.=6.74). The practical
significance is more difficult to ascertain, as firm beta centrality is a relative value, however, this
indicates that firms with higher than average patent originality value will have less densely
connected networks. The relationship between patent market value and subsequent firm beta
centrality is not as strong, as only a 0.3-unit decrease is found if a firm’s patent market value is
one standard deviation above average. Thus, a strong increase in patent market value is
necessary to practically impact a firm’s subsequent beta centrality.

Results for Industry Moderating Effects
High-technology industries
Hypothesis 5 proposes a moderating relationship, such that in industries where
knowledge is perceived as more valuable (i.e., high technology industries), the relationships
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between firm knowledge asset value and subsequent network size (H5a), network intensity
(H5b), network closure (H5c), and beta centrality (H5d) will be stronger. As the measure for
high-tech industry is coded as 1 for high-technology industries and 0 for non-high-technology
industries, a negative interaction term will indicate support, except for H5b where higher values
of network intensity indicate an increase in network safeguards. For example, if the regression
coefficient for an interaction term is -0.87 and we assumed all observed values were equal except
high- vs low-tech industry. Then, the predicted value for a network safeguard measure (e.g.,
network size) would 0.87 smaller for firms in high-tech industries compared to low-tech
industries (industries were coded as 1 for high tech and 0 for low-tech).
Results for H5a (Model 3, Table 5.3) indicates high tech industry has a significant
positive moderating effect on the patent originality—firm network size relationship (β = 0.00627,
p < 0.001), and thus in the opposite direction hypothesized. Furthermore, there was not a
significant relationship present with the patent market value x high-technology measure. Thus,
H5a is not supported.
Results for H5b (Model 3, Table 5.4) indicates that high tech industry significantly
moderates the relationship between firm knowledge asset value variables and subsequent firm
network intensity (patent originality x high-technology industry β = 0.00226, p < 0.001; patent
market value x high-technology industry β = -0.00006, p < 0.01), though the relationship with
patent originality value is in the opposite direction of what was hypothesized. Thus, Hypothesis
5b is partially supported by the patent originality IV.
Results for H5c (Model 3, Table 5.5) indicates that high-tech industry does not
significantly moderate the relationship between patent originality and subsequent firm network
structural holes, while high-tech industry did significantly moderate the relationship between
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patent market value and subsequent firm network structural holes (β = 0.00001, p < 0.01),
though in the opposite direction of what was hypothesized. The figure (Figure 5.1, third row)
indicates that the variance is located in firms that are in industries not considered hightechnology industries, counter to the relationship hypothesized. Therefore, H5c is not supported.
Results for H5d (Model 3, Table 5.6) indicates a significant relationship between patent
originality and subsequent firm network centrality when moderated by high-tech industry (patent
originality β = 0.00760, p < 0.001), though the relationship is in the opposite direction of what
was hypothesized. Therefore, H5d is not supported.
Summary and Interpretation. Overall, there is limited support for Hypothesis 5a-d, with only
one hypothesis supported by one measure. All significant relationships are shown in Figure 5.1,
including those not in support of the hypotheses. The outcome for the supported hypothesis is
that firms in high-technology industries have a positive relationship between patent originality
and subsequent network intensity (as shown in Figure 5.1, second row and column), indicating
that overall, firms in high-technology industries do not have a stronger relationship between
knowledge asset value and network safeguards than firms in non-high-technology industries.
Figure 5.1 depicts significant relationships that did not support the hypothesized
relationships, yet still tell an interesting story. For example, while firms in high-technology
industries do not have a significantly stronger negative relationship between knowledge asset
value and subsequent firm network size than firms in non-high-technology industries. The
coefficient for the high-tech industry variable indicates that high-technology firms have, on
average, 3.5 fewer relationships than their non-high-technology counterparts (β = -3.510, p <
0.001). Another interesting result is found for non-high-technology industries is the relationship
between patent market value and network intensity. As Figure 5.1 (second row & column)
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indicates, firms not in low-technology industries show an increase in network intensity as patent
market value increases. Thus, counter to expectations, low-technology firms have stronger
network relationships as their knowledge value increases. Also, the volume of structural holes
decreases as patent market value increases for low-technology firms, but not for high-technology
firms. These results will be discussed further in the discussion chapter.

Industry dynamism
Hypothesis 6 proposes that the level of industry dynamism will moderate the
relationships between firm knowledge asset value and subsequent network size (H6a), network
intensity (H6b), network closure (H6c), and beta centrality (H6d), such that the strength of the
relationships will increase with the level of dynamism. Results for H6a (Model 6, Table 5.3)
indicates a significant relationship between the patent originality–dynamism interaction term and
subsequent firm network size (β = 0.00295, p < 0.01), though not in the proposed direction. H6a
is not supported.
Results for H6b (Model 4, Table 5.4) indicates no significant relationships between the
variables of interest, and is therefore not supported. Results for H6c (Model 4, Table 5.5)
indicates that dynamism has a positive significant relationship on the relationship between patent
originality and subsequent network structural holes (β = 0.00021, p < 0.001), though again not in
the hypothesized direction. Furthermore, dynamism did not significantly impact the relationship
between patent market value and subsequent network structural holes. The graph in the third row
of Figure 5.2 indicates that firms in industries with low dynamism have a stronger relationship
between firm knowledge asset value and subsequent structural holes compared to firms in
industries with high levels of dynamism, a relationship that will be discussed further in the next
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chapter. Results for H6d (Model 4, Table 5.6) indicates a significant relationship with the
moderated patent originality and subsequent network structural holes (β =0.00405, p < 0.01),
though again not in the hypothesized direction, and no significant relationship with patent market
value. Thus, Hypothesis H6d is not supported.
Summary and Interpretation. Overall, there is no support for Hypotheses 6a-d. Figure 5.2
depicts all significant relationships and indicates that while the high levels of dynamism do not
impact the relationship between knowledge asset value and subsequent network safeguards as
hypothesized, there is a significant difference in intercept for network safeguards (except
network intensity). This indicates that firms in more dynamic industries have significantly
smaller subsequent firm network size (t(10664)=-2.37, p>0.05), structural holes (t(10662)=-2.55,
p>0.05) and beta centrality (t(10636)=-2.13, p>0.05). Furthermore, as Figure 5.2 depicts, dynamism
moderates the relationship between knowledge asset value and structural holes predominantly for
firms located in industries depicting low dynamism, counter to the hypothesized relationship.
This may indicate that firms in industries characterized by lower dynamism may be able to gain
value from their knowledge over a longer time and thus can reduce their structural holes with the
goal of protecting their knowledge.

Industry munificence.
Hypothesis 7 proposes that the level of industry munificence will moderate the
relationships between firm knowledge asset value and subsequent network safeguards (size
(H7a), network intensity (H7b), network closure (H7b), and beta centrality (H7d)), such that the
strength of the relationships will decrease with the level of industry munificence. That is,
munificent environments will lead to a reduction in network safeguards, as all firms can benefit
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under conditions of munificence (Schoonhoven et al, 1990). Thus, a positive coefficient (except
for network intensity) is hypothesized. Results for H7a (Model 5, Table 5.3) indicates that
munificence significantly moderates the relationship between patent originality and subsequent
firm network size (β = 0.00022, p< 0.05). However, a slope difference test indicates that the
slopes are not significantly different (t=1.71, p>0.05) leading to the hypothesis being rejected.
Additionally, including munificence as a moderator does not significantly affect the relationship
between patent market value and subsequent firm network size. Thus, H7a is not supported.
Results for H7b (Model 6, Table 5.4) and H7c (Model 5, Table 5.5) indicate that
munificence does not have a significant effect on the relationship between either knowledge
asset value measure and the subsequent network safeguards of interest, and therefore these
hypotheses are not supported.
Results for H7d (Model 5, Table 5.6) indicates that munificence has a significant effect
on the relationship between patent originality and subsequent beta centrality (β = 0.00025, p <
0.05). Figure 5.3 depicts the relationships found in H7d for the patent originality measure, yet a
slope difference test indicates that there is no significant difference between slopes (t=0.003,
p>0.05). However, results for H7d utilizing the patent market value measure do indicate a
significant relationship in the opposite direction hypothesized (β = -0.00002, p < 0.001), with a
significant difference in slopes (t=3.93, p>0.001). Thus, counter to expectations, it is firms
occupying industries characterized by low munificence (and thus, increased competition) who
illustrate a stronger relationship between knowledge asset value and subsequent beta centrality as
compared to firms in highly munificent industries.
The intercept for firms in highly munificent environments is lower than firms in
environments characterized by low munificence, specifically for subsequent network size (β = -
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0.22, p>0.01), structural holes (β = -0.03, p>0.05), and beta centrality (β = -1.79, p>0.01). While
intercept differences were not hypothesized, the argument in this dissertation focused on the lack
of knowledge protection necessary in highly munificent environments, leading to a weaker
relationship between knowledge asset value and subsequent network beta centrality for firms in
highly munificent environments. However, this result was not supported by in the data, but
rather an overall increase in multiple network safeguards for firms in highly munificent
environments as compared to firms in less munificent environments. This finding may indicate
that firms in highly munificent environment may not rely on interfirm networks to gain
knowledge due to the lack of competitive pressure. These findings will be discussed further in
the discussion chapter.
Summary and Interpretation. Overall, there is little to no support for Hypothesis 7, with only
H7d having a significant relationship in the hypothesized direction, yet post hoc analysis did not
find a significant difference between the slopes of firms in highly munificent environments as
compared to those characterized by low munificence. These findings will be discussed further
in the next chapter.

Results for Relationships between Firm Network Characteristics and Future Knowledge
Asset Value
Hypothesis 8 states that network size (H8a), network intensity (H8b), structural holes
(H8c), and beta centrality (H8d) have a curvilinear (inverted-U) relationship with subsequent
knowledge asset value. For Hypothesis 8, a separate dataset was created to allow for analysis of
how network characteristics that may safeguard knowledge can impact future knowledge asset
value (See Chapter IV - Methods for details). Models were run for each knowledge asset value
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(patent originality & patent market value) independently. As these variables are not highly
correlated (r=0.086), it was not possible to create a factor variable. Furthermore, multivariate
analysis is not possible due to the cross-classified structure of the data.
Table 5.7 (Models 1 – 5) provides results for the relationships for the dependent variable
of subsequent knowledge asset value based on patent originality. Only two network
characteristics produced significant results; network size (network size squared β = -0.025, p <
0.01) and network beta centrality (network beta centrality squared β = -0.015, p < 0.01).
Applying Aiken & West’s (1991) equation allows for the determination of the maximum point
(𝑋𝑋 = −𝑏𝑏1 /2𝑏𝑏2 ) to determine the maximum point results in a value of 36.3 for network size. For
network size, the inflection point is 36.3, within the meaningful range (range = 1 – 108), while

for network beta centrality, the inflection point is 48.4, which is also within the meaningful range
(range = 1 – 124).
Table 5.8 provides results for the relationships that used the dependent variable of
subsequent knowledge asset value based on patent market value. Only one subsequent network
characteristic, structural holes, had significant relationships (network intensity squared β = 4753,
p < 0.05). However, this relationship is in the opposite direction of what was hypothesized, as is
illustrated in Figure 5.4 (third row). The figure illustrates that while there is a reduction in
subsequent knowledge asset value at low numbers of structural holes, there is a strong increase in
a firm’s subsequent knowledge asset value as structural holes are added to a firm’s network. This
finding will be examined further in the discussion chapter.
Summary and interpretation. Figure 5.4 (first row and last row) provide graphs that illustrate
the relationship. As proposed in H8a, there is a curvilinear relationship present whereby neither
small nor large network sizes provide the optimal results regarding future knowledge asset value.
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These charts indicate that firms with very large interfirm networks (low protection) have a
reduced future firm knowledge asset value while smaller interfirm networks (high protection)
have higher levels of future knowledge. However, as hypothesized, there is a tail whereby an
interfirm network that is too restricted reduces future firm knowledge asset value, possibly due to
limiting the availability of external knowledge. This finding, and the opposite finding for the
relationship between structural holes and subsequent firm knowledge asset value, will be
discussed further in the next chapter.
Results of Post Hoc Tests
Based on the inconsistent and predominantly non-significant findings for the network
intensity safeguard, two post hoc tests were conducted. The first post hoc test dichotomized the
Nohria & Garcia-Pont (1991) scale to categorize equity vs non-equity investments. Therefore,
distribution agreements, know-how and patent licensing agreements, component sourcing
agreements and broad R&D agreements (items 1-5) were all categorized as 0, while minority
equity, limited cross-equity ownership, and independent joint ventures (items 6- 8) were
categorized as 1 (item 9 is mergers and acquisitions, not included in this research). This measure
resulting in two significant results. For Hypothesis 2 (Table 5.10, Model 2), results indicate the
presence of a significant positive relationship between firm knowledge asset value (patent
originality) and network intensity (β = 0.00024, p < 0.05). The only other significant result was
not in the hypothesized direction.
The second post hoc test used a different measure of network intensity, which indicated
whether the relationship was a joint venture or an alliance. The SDC dataset includes flags for
whether the relationship is categorized as a strategic alliance or a joint venture. These flags are
mutually exclusive in the data included in this research. Thus, a dichotomous measure was
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created that was 0 if the relationship was a strategic alliance, and 1 if the relationship was a joint
venture. Results using this measure were somewhat more consistent, with three significant
relationships, two of which are supporting the hypotheses. For Hypothesis 2 (Table 5.11, Model
2), results indicate the presence of a significant positive relationship between firm knowledge
asset value (patent originality) and network intensity, based (β = 0.02755, p < 0.05).
Additionally, results indicate that the high technology industry measure significantly moderates
the relationship between firm knowledge asset value and subsequent levels of equity
relationships (patent originality x high-technology industry β = 0.04099, p < 0.05), indicating the
firms operating in high-technology industries significantly increase their levels of equity
relationships as their knowledge asset value increases. Finally, results indicate that the
munificence significantly moderates the relationship between firm knowledge asset value and
subsequent levels of equity relationships (market value x munificence β = 0.00008, p < 0.05).
As most significant results in this research that included the moderator of munificence were in
the opposite direction of what had been hypothesized, the presence of this relationship does not
indicate an issue with the measure, but rather the theoretical explanation provided in this
dissertation.
Summary. The post hoc tests indicate that the measure developed using the SDC information
regarding whether the relationship was considered a joint venture or not provided an increased
volume of significant results. However, as found with all the network safeguards included in this
research, there is still extensive research necessary to understand the nature of these
relationships. Future research may improve our understanding of network intensity by
measuring the intensity level of interfirm networks using primary or case study data.
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CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Networks provide access to knowledge, supporting knowledge acquisition and generation
via relationships intended to exchange knowledge. Conversely, knowledge can be shared
unintentionally with network partners through knowledge spillovers. Knowledge spillovers are
generally considered as a positive outcome for the recipient of the knowledge, and a broad
stream of research has examined both the firm and the geographical levels of analysis (e.g.,
Agarwal et al, 2007, 2010; Audretsch & Keilbach, 2007; Delmar et al, 2011). However, this
dissertation seeks to examine gaps in extant research regarding possible negative outcomes from
the perspective that networks may provide the potential for firms to lose knowledge, whereby the
knowledge originator is un- or under-compensated (Agarwal et al, 2010). As firms learn and gain
knowledge from each other, the knowledge transfer that occurs may be unintended, resulting in a
loss of both knowledge and the rents resulting from the knowledge assets (Peteraf, 1993) for the
knowledge-originating firm. While firms seeking knowledge may strategically broaden their
interfirm network, those firms already in possession of valuable knowledge may aim to protect
their knowledge asset and restrict opportunities for knowledge spillovers by utilizing network
safeguards. Indeed, while knowledge spillovers generate benefits for the recipients (Agarwal et
al, 2007, 2010; Audretsch & Keilbach, 2007; Delmar et al, 2011), research has been relatively
silent on the negative effects on the knowledge originating firms.
In this chapter, the first section discusses the findings and potential contributions of this
research. Next, the limitations of the study are considered, followed by the implications for both
research and practice. Finally, the conclusion of this dissertation is provided.
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Network Safeguards: Direct Effects
After testing the direct relationships between firm knowledge asset value and networks
safeguards, results indicated two significant relationships. Specifically, the results indicate that
both measures of firm knowledge asset value (i.e., patent originality and patent market value)
were negatively related to network size and beta centrality. These findings suggest that firms
seek to protect their knowledge by restricting the volume of interfirm relationships as well as
limiting their indirect contact to external firms. Thus, firms with higher levels of knowledge
asset value had smaller network size and reduced beta centrality, protecting their knowledge via
reducing the risk of knowledge spillovers. An examination of how network safeguards (or the
lack thereof) impact future knowledge asset value is discussed further in this chapter.
There was no significant relationship found between knowledge asset value and network
intensity. A general explanation may be explained by the significant relationships between
knowledge asset value and network size and beta centrality. That is, firms may choose the
option of reducing their network size to produce the same outcomes as increased intensity though
via a different mechanism. Indeed, a smaller network can increase the monitoring capability of
the firm, in essence utilizing monitoring of a restricted number of partners versus employing
relational governance mechanisms based on strong-tie relationships that promote trust and
reciprocity between partners. Future research may support this suggestion that decreasing
network size diminishes the necessity to increase relationship intensity.
There was also no significant relationship found between knowledge asset value and
structural holes, though there may also be an explanation found in the significant relationship
between firm knowledge asset value and beta centrality. A reduction in beta centrality indicates
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that the number of indirect relationships has been decreased, which would also occur with a
reduction in the number of structural holes. While a reduction in structural holes would signify
that firms are aware of the potential for knowledge spreading to other networks and not only
other firms, a reduction in beta centrality suggests that indirect relationships are a concern for
firms, regardless of their location within the complete network.

Network Safeguards: Moderated Effects
The first hypothesis examining industry characteristics hypothesized the relationship
between knowledge asset value and network safeguards would be stronger in high-tech industries
compared to non-high-tech industries. Only one supported relationship was found (high
technology industry moderated the relationship between patent originality and network
intensity). However, the results supporting the hypothesis are somewhat problematic, as the
results for the patent market value measure are opposite of what was found with the patent
originality measure. The graph depicting the supported relationship (Figure 5.1, second row)
indicates that firms in high technology industries had a stronger relationship between patent
originality and future network intensity as compared to firms in non-high-technology industries,
while the opposite relationship was found with the patent market value measure. The divergence
in results produced by the two knowledge asset value measures is potentially worthy of future
research and is discussed further in the limitations section.
Except for the network intensity dependent variable, there were multiple significant
relationships found with the high-technology moderator. Hypotheses stated that firms in hightechnology industries would have a stronger relationship between firm knowledge asset value
and network safeguards. This may indicate that firms in high-technology industries value
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knowledge higher than firms in non-high technology industries (Tatarynowicz et al., 2016). By
protecting their knowledge, firms would have the ability to increase and extend their competitive
advantage, as knowledge generation is a long, slow process due to its path-dependent nature and
the time involved in generating knowledge. However, results indicate a stronger relationship
between firm knowledge asset value and the network safeguards of network size, structural
holes, and beta centrality in non-high-technology industries. These results seem to indicate that
it is firms in non-high-technology industries that seek to protect their knowledge as their
knowledge value increases. While this is counter to the hypotheses, the picture becomes
somewhat clearer when it is noted that the intercept for firms in high-technology industries is
significantly lower than for firms in non-high-technology industries. These results suggest that
firms in high-technology industries may be aware of the risk of knowledge spillovers via their
interfirm network and therefore employ network safeguards due to the competitive environments
typically found in high-technology industries (Appleyard, 1996). In contrast, firms in non-hightechnology industries become increasingly aware of the need for network safeguards as their
knowledge value increases. As this finding was not hypothesized, it may be worthy of further
research.
There were no supported hypotheses when industry dynamism was included as a
moderator, though there were three significant relationships with network safeguards (i.e.,
network size, beta centrality, and structural holes). While dynamism significantly affects the
relationship between knowledge asset value and firm network size and beta centrality, there were
no significant slope differences present. For the network safeguard of structural holes, the
inclusion of industry dynamism did significantly moderate the relationship, though not in the
predicted direction. Indeed, there was a stronger negative relationship between knowledge asset
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value and structural holes for firms in industries characterized by low dynamism (Figure 5.2).
This is counter to the hypothesized relationship which proposed that higher levels of industry
dynamism would strengthen the relationships between knowledge asset value and network
safeguards. Based on these findings, it is firms in less dynamic industries that have a stronger
relationship between knowledge asset value and network safeguards (i.e., reduced structural
holes) in contrast to the firms in highly dynamic industries. Firms in highly dynamic industries
may be aware of the risk and the negative effects of knowledge spillovers regardless of their
knowledge asset value, which is indicated by the significant difference in the intercept. As
dynamism indicates a rapidly changing environment as illustrated by the frequency, intensity,
and unpredictability of changes (Castrogiovanni, 2002; Child, 1972), all firms in highly dynamic
industries may be responding to the uncertainty by increasing their protection of their
knowledge. In contrast, the risk of losing knowledge may only become important to firms in less
dynamic industries as they are amassing higher levels of knowledge asset value. Thus, firms in
less dynamic industries with low levels of knowledge asset value may not be concerned with
knowledge spillovers and can explore new knowledge sources via structural holes, yet once they
accumulate higher levels of knowledge asset value, the threat of knowledge spillovers leads to
stronger network safeguards. Similar to the results for the high-technology moderator,
differences in the intercepts were not hypothesized but may be worthy of future attention.
The hypotheses regarding industry munificence stated that industry munificence would
weaken the negative relationship between knowledge asset value and network safeguards, as
highly munificent environments would reduce the need to implement network safeguards and
protect knowledge. While the results indicated the presence of three significant relationships,
tests revealed that two had no significant difference between the slopes of the highly munificent
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industries as compared to the less munificent industries (network size and beta centrality using
patent originality measure). The third significant relationship was in the opposite direction of
what had been hypothesized (the patent market value—beta centrality relationship), indicating
that industry munificence significantly affected the relationship between knowledge asset value
and beta centrality, yet the relationship did not weaken for firms in highly munificent industries.
In contrast, it was firms in less munificent environments that increased their beta centrality as
their knowledge asset value increased. Firms in high munificent environments maintain their
focus on the risk of knowledge spillovers, maintaining the negative relationship between
knowledge asset value and beta centrality. An explanation may be that the munificence measure
is more reflective of another industry characteristic, specifically industry age. Munificence is
negatively related to the age of an industry (Castrogiovanni, 2002), suggesting that industries
with high munificence may also be young industries. As firms are highly protective of their
knowledge in a new industry due to the advantages of establishing prominence (Argyres,
Bigelow, & Nickerson, 2015; Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988), the munificence measure may
be operating as a proxy for industry age. In partial support of this argument, there is a negative
correlation between munificence and firm age (r=-0.183, p<0.001), indicating that younger firms
are in more munificent environments. Further research examining the impact of industry age on
network safeguards may provide clearer answers to the impact of munificence on the relationship
between knowledge asset value and network safeguards. Firms may also be entering into new
markets due to their munificent environments (Zachary, Gianiodis, Payne, & Markman, 2014),
which may be confounding results.
Overall, findings on the moderated relationships suggest, counter to the hypotheses, that
the relationship between firm knowledge asset value and network safeguards is impacted by
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industry characteristics in environments typically regarded as less concerned with the risk of
knowledge spillovers (Tatarynowicz et al., 2016). For example, firms in non-high-technology
industries indicate a stronger negative relationship between knowledge asset value and structural
holes, while firms in high-technology industries had a positive relationship between knowledge
asset value and network structural holes. Moreover, dynamism increased the strength of the
negative relationship between knowledge asset value and structural holes for firms in less
dynamic environments as compared to firms in highly dynamic environments. And finally,
munificence moderated the relationship between knowledge asset value and beta centrality such
that for firms in less munificent environments there was a positive relationship, while firms in
highly munificent environments had a negative relationship between knowledge asset value and
beta centrality. These findings may lead to avenues for future research whereby the impact of
increased knowledge value on network safeguards can be explored for firms in low-technology,
less dynamic, and highly munificent environments.

Network Safeguards: Future Knowledge Asset Value
The final section of this discussion focuses on the question of whether network
safeguards impact future knowledge asset value. As research indicates that interfirm networks
support knowledge creation (Patel & Terjesen, 2011; Soh, 2010), network safeguards could
negatively impact future knowledge asset value due to restricted networks, and thus, reduced
access to knowledge and information. The results support the hypotheses with the presence of a
curvilinear effect (inverted U-shape with local maxima) of network size and of beta centrality.
Graphs illustrating these relationships (Figure 5.4) suggests patent originality is maximized at
intermediate levels of network safeguards that prevent knowledge spillovers. Thus, when
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network protection is low (network size is high) or when network protection is high (network
size is low), future patent originality will be reduced as compared to the inflection point. For
both network safeguards (network size and beta centrality), the inflection point is closer to the
high protection (low network size) end of the curve, potentially indicating the knowledge
protection can play a significant role in safeguarding future knowledge asset value. That is, while
research has supported the effect of interfirm networks on knowledge creation and innovation
(e.g., Hardy et al, 2003; Soh, 2010), my findings suggest firms find that maintaining key
relationships while simultaneously confining network size and firm beta-centrality within the
network may provide optimum results. Thus, this research supports both findings; interfirm
networks can facilitate knowledge creation, yet large networks may also negatively impact future
knowledge creation due to knowledge spillovers. While there are other factors that impact
knowledge creation which have not been addressed in this study, such as a firm’s absorptive
capacity (Penner-Hahn & Shaver, 2005; Wuyts & Dutta, 2014), these early results may provide
future avenues for research.
Another opportunity for future research would be the inclusion of environmental
moderators while examining the curvilinear relationship. As results from the moderated results
indicate that the industry characteristics and environment play a role in the relationship between
firm knowledge asset value and network safeguards, this finding could be examined in more
detail to potentially explain the results counter to those hypothesized. That is, would both highand non-high-technology industries illustrate this same curvilinear relationship? For example,
firms in high-technology and highly dynamic industries may not have this curvilinear
relationship (or a weaker tail) as the need to develop new knowledge pushes firms to develop
networks capable of generating new knowledge, regardless of the potential for negative
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knowledge spillovers.
Interestingly, the curvilinear relationship between structural holes and future knowledge
asset value is the opposite of what had been hypothesized for the patent market value measure of
knowledge asset value, with a U-shaped outcome, versus an inverted U-shape as hypothesized.
With structural holes as the predictor, the balanced approach results in the lowest future value of
knowledge assets. Figure 5. 4 (second column) indicates that firms produce the highest levels of
patent market value when structural holes are at their greatest (low protection) and that lower
volume of structural holes (higher protection) produce higher values of patent market value as
compared to the inflection point. While these findings support theory that proposes a positive
relationship between structural holes and innovation levels (Burt, 2000, 2001), the findings
additionally support that infirm networks with highly limited structural holes may gain more
future knowledge asset value as compared to the balanced approach, perhaps due to the
protection mechanism. Again, this analysis was conducted with the full dataset, leaving
unanswered the question of whether this relationship will be sustained under various
environmental conditions. This finding is worthy of future research in order to understand the
drivers behind this unexpected curvilinear relationship.

Limitations
This dissertation does have limitations that could be addressed by future research. The
goal of the dissertation was to delve into the relationships between a firm’s knowledge asset
value and network safeguards. While initial results are promising, this stream of research
provides many opportunities for future research. By acknowledging the limitations present in this
study, future research may lead to a more precise finding. Four primary limitations are
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addressed in this section.
The first limitation is the intensity measure utilized in this research (Nohria & GarciaPont, 1991). The intensity scale was originally developed for use within the auto manufacturing
industry (scale provided in Table 6.1), though this measure has been used in management
research in other industries (e.g., Gnyawali, He & Madhavan, 2006; Koka & Prescott, 2008).
However, the categorization of low to high alliance intensities may be somewhat specific to the
automotive industry and could be argued to not apply directly to other industries, specifically
high-technology industries that are often removed from discrete manufacturing processes.
Specifically, the categorizations of ‘component sourcing agreements’ and ‘second source
agreements’ do not apply to all industries, leading to gaps in the rankings. Furthermore, the
higher levels of intensity relate to whether equity is involved, rather than the scope of the
alliance; this may be a separate measure of intensity. For future research, it is proposed that this
one measure may be capturing two separate constructs; the primary objective of the relationship
and the level of integration. Hence, separating this scale into two measures could provide one
measure that indicates the type of alliance (e.g., distribution or co-development), and a separate
measure providing the level of integration (e.g. non-equity or joint-venture). The conflating of
these two elements of intensity into one measure may have contributed to the lack of coherence
in the results. Recent research has examined the impact of non-equity relationship vs equity
relationships on the relationship between knowledge protection and knowledge spillovers (Shu et
al, 2014), yet did not include the purpose or type of the relationships (distribution, licensing,
etc.). The inclusion of industry measures in the analysis could clarify the relationships between
the key constructs of interest.
The second limitation may be considered an avenue for future research, more than a
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limitation, and was the decision to only examine a subset of potential network safeguards. While
these characteristics were included due to their theoretical relevance, there are other network
safeguards that may also be explained by the presence of firm knowledge asset value. For
example, betweenness centrality is a measure that has been included in strategic management
research (e.g. Baum, Cowan & Jonard, 2014; Wincent, Anokhin, Ortqvist, & Autio, 2010), and
which may provide further understanding of network safeguards due to their nuanced view of
actor centrality. Betweenness centrality measures how often an actor occupies a position along
the shortest path between two other actors (Borgatti et al, 2013; Freeman, 1979). With
betweenness comes the ability to have some control over the relationship between the other
actors (Wasserman & Faust, 2009). This measure can indicate the level of access an actor has to
information as well as indicate the degree of control over other actors, both of which are key for
discussions focusing on the transfer of knowledge between firms. If overall firm networks were
examined, the diversity of the network members (Bruyaka & Durand, 2012) may provide
avenues for future research, as the diversity of relationships can increase access to new and novel
information. Furthermore, the inclusion of acquisitions by network members may be relevant to
this research, as though acquisitions may impact firm performance negatively (Zorn, Sexton,
Bhussar, Lamant, forthcoming), acquisition increase firm knowledge. Thus, acquisitions may be
an attempt for the focal firm to gain knowledge without the risk of knowledge spillovers, or
acquisitions may increase the attractiveness of a potential interfirm relationship due to the
increase in the partner’s knowledge breadth.
A further network safeguard that could be examined would be the presence of clusters
within networks. Clusters could be compared to one another based on the members of the
clusters and their attributes, with predicted outcomes. For example, it is intuitive to expect actors
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within a cluster would share relational characteristics in their interfirm network; either viewed as
a source of new knowledge or as a potential for knowledge spillovers. However, empirical
research has yet to be undertaken. As this dissertation suggests a balanced approach to interfirm
networks is best to gain the future knowledge asset value, variation within and between clusters
may benefit from different relational characteristics or network safeguards. While these are
avenues for future research, they can also be acknowledged as limitations of this dissertation.
A third limitation is that the two measures of firm knowledge asset value produced
different, albeit thought-provoking results. As the correlation between the two measures is low (r
= 0.13, p < 0.001), it is not unexpected that the results diverge. What is surprising is the low
correlation between these two measures, which at face value captured the same construct. The
knowledge asset value measure based on patent originality is based on the range of patent
citations, measuring the breadth and range of knowledge utilized in the patent. However, its high
correlation with patent volume may indicate that it is a proxy for the count of patents a firm
produces in a given year rather than actually measuring patent innovativeness. If the patent
originality measure indicates firm patent volume, it may not be measuring the quality of
knowledge produced by a firm as desired, but rather the quantity. Nonetheless, this measure may
still be valid, yet indicating the volume, not value, of a firm’s knowledge asset. Grant (1985)
proposed that there is a relationship between volume of knowledge and a firm’s competitive
advantage, though the arguments of this dissertation have been primarily viewed from the lens of
firms seeking to protect the value of their knowledge, versus the volume. The second knowledge
asset value measure used the patent market value of patents, capturing the patent market value
added to a firm when the granting of a patent is announced. However, while shareholders may be
positive regarding a firm’s announcement of a patent granting, the firm itself may not put the
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same value on the patent. Thus, this measure captures the external value of a firm’s’ knowledge
asset, not an internal measure. While both these knowledge measures have limitations, the
inclusion of both measures has provided interesting initial results and avenues for future research
to further explore the relationship between these two measures.
Finally, while the dissertation implicitly suggests that firms may choose to alter their
network configurations based on their knowledge asset value as a means to safeguard their
knowledge, neither change in knowledge or network change was included. While control
variables of network safeguards at a previous time period were included to partially respond to
this issue, it does not address the implicit goal of firms adapting their networks due to increases
in knowledge asset value. Knowledge asset value change was not measured, prohibiting the
conclusion that firms change their networks due to increases in firm knowledge asset value.
The implicit objective of this area of research is to discover whether firms modify their
interfirm networks as their interfirm knowledge increases. To achieve this objective, the
researcher would have to measure both knowledge asset value change as well as network
safeguard change. If this was achieved, firms’ interfirm networks at t1 (e.g., from low knowledge
asset value) could be analyzed, as well as along their path to t2 (e.g., to high knowledge asset
value). This dissertation provides an initial step by examining the relationships between different
levels of knowledge asset value and interfirm networks of differing characteristics.

Implications for research
This dissertation sought to examine the relationship between firm knowledge asset value
and the subsequent structure of their interfirm network. Specifically, this dissertation was driven
by the under-researched question of whether firms in possession of high knowledge asset value
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may have network structures motivated by knowledge protection goals. This section of the
chapter will discuss the theoretical and methodological implications for research in greater detail.
Theoretical implications
The Knowledge Based View of the Firm (KBV) (Grant, 1996a, 1996b; Kogut & Zander,
1996) proposes that knowledge is the preeminent resource of the firm, and further suggests that
interfirm networks “may be well suited to the transfer and integration of … knowledge” (p. 383,
Grant, 1996b). However, while Grant’s (1996b) view of KBV extolls the benefits of networks
for quickly accessing external knowledge, it views this relationship solely from the perspective
of the knowledge spillover recipient, and does not address the potential loss of knowledge due to
knowledge spillovers from the perceptive of the knowledge-originating firm. This afforded an
opportunity to draw insights from network perspectives to complement KBV. Interfirm
networks allow for knowledge transfer between all firms present in the network and support both
intentional and unintentional knowledge transfer. Due to the nature of knowledge, knowledge
value may not be appropriated solely by the knowledge originating firm, as value may be gained
by other firms from knowledge spillovers due to interfirm relationships. Indeed, firms with high
knowledge asset value may seek to implement network safeguards in order to protect their
knowledge assets. While this dissertation did not specifically address network change, the
results indicate that firms with high knowledge asset value have networks that are smaller and
that these firms occupy a less central position, indicative of network safeguards. Thus, this
dissertation has provided an indication that while firms use networks to gather and develop
knowledge, firms in possession of high knowledge asset value may be seeking to protect their
knowledge, realizing the potential for knowledge spillovers. While recent research has
supported that firms are aware of the risk of knowledge spillovers (e.g., Phene & Tallman, 2014),
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research examining knowledge protection has been more focused on the choice between internal
and external resources (e.g. Hernandez et al, 2015, Mayer, 2006) as compared to the application
of relational and structural network safeguards.
This dissertation also informs network perspectives as it explores conditions under which
firms may exhibit different network structures, specifically the possession of high knowledge
asset value. This research suggests that network structures are not consistent between firms, but
rather that firms may be using their network structure to acquire key firm assets and to
subsequently employ network safeguards when protection is a motivator. Network perspectives
tend to adopt a static viewpoint regarding network structures. That is, network perspectives seek
to explain why actors choose to be part of a dense network along with the commensurate benefits
and restrictions, or why actors will choose to have a network that includes multiple structural
holes, again with the corresponding rewards and drawbacks. However, these explanations seem
to imply that this choice is not revisited over time, but rather is stable once chosen. This
dissertation suggests that firms may, and in many cases, should revisit their network structure as
this dissertation illustrates different knowledge outcomes of firms with varying levels of network
safeguards. Extant research has supported that a firm seeking to increase its knowledge asset
value may benefit from an increased network size by providing more options for knowledge
acquisition. In contrast, this dissertation’s findings suggest firms seeking to protect their
knowledge implement network safeguards such as having a smaller network and a less central
position in order to protect their knowledge. While recent research has found that firms modify
their board networks to protect knowledge from rivals (Hernandez et al, 2015), this research
examined the presence of network safeguards to protect their knowledge from their interfirm
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relationships. While our understanding of the benefits of networks is relatively strong 7, scant
attention has been paid to the dark side of interfirm networks. This implies that networks might
serve different purposes dependent upon firm’s goals of either knowledge acquisition or
knowledge protection. Future research may seek to examine network configurations,
acknowledging that while certain network configurations increase knowledge outcomes, there
may be suboptimal equifinality situation that exists (Payne, 2006) when network safeguards are
examined over a long-term period.
Finally, this research includes both KBV and network theoretical perspectives, suggesting
that while firms continuously strive to maintain or improve upon their competitive advantage,
they are also aware of how other firms may seek to gain an advantage via knowledge spillovers
generated in interfirm relationships. By acknowledging that firms may be driven to protect their
competitive advantage via their interfirm network, this research combines the economic-focused
KBV with the socialized network perspectives, indicating that firms are aware of how network
structures may impact their ability to both gain and protect their valuable assets. Attention to the
potential for negative outcomes from interfirm networks has increased recently (e.g., Hernandez
et al, 2015; Mayer, 2006). This research is an initial attempt to discover if a firm’s possession of
significant assets is related to their network structure. Future research might also investigate if
firms alter their networks as their knowledge assets accumulate, providing a stronger indication
of network safeguards at work. This line of research may uncover a wave pattern of network
safeguards, as firms may begin by reducing network safeguards as knowledge accumulation and
development are the primary drivers, then once knowledge asset value has been increased, firms
may implement network safeguards to protect knowledge. However, if the balance of

7

See the literature review by Phelps et al., 2012, and examples of empirical research Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000;
Kogut, 2000; Laursen and Salter, 2006 as well as Chapter II)
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knowledge accumulation and knowledge protection is not maintained, knowledge asset value
may be reduced, indicating a necessity for a reduction of network safeguards once again.
Methodological Implications
Regarding methodological implications, there are three main areas that are important to
mention. First, this dissertation included two different measures of knowledge asset value.
Measuring firm knowledge is problematic (Ketchen et al, 2013), as knowledge is embedded in
both the individuals with the firm and the firm itself can hold valuable information (Spender,
1996), creating challenges to capturing firm knowledge. Furthermore, as knowledge can be in
both tacit and explicit forms, measuring the full breadth of knowledge value located within a
firm is not feasible beyond the case-study level. Indeed, the goal of this dissertation was not to
hypothesize how a firm’s ability to generate knowledge would differentiate their network
structure, but rather whether a firm’s knowledge asset value would be related to their network
structure. To address these issues, two different measures of knowledge asset value were
included in this research, with the patent originality measure examining the range of knowledge
sourced, and the market value measure capturing the potential future value of knowledge as
established by the market. The inclusion of two knowledge asset measures allowed for
comparisons of findings, but also provided stronger support for the hypotheses when the two
measures both indicated significant relationships with the dependent variables. Also relevant is
when the two measures diverged in their predictive outcomes, such as the counter-intuitive
finding in the relationship between structural holes and subsequent knowledge asset value in the
form of the market value measure. While examining validity and reliability of these two
measures was outside the scope of this dissertation, the inclusion of multiple knowledge asset
value measures has provided intriguing results that may be further explained by future research.
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The challenges in measuring firm knowledge have been well documented (i.e., Ketchen et al,
2013) and this research attempted to partially mitigate these concerns by the inclusion of two
measures, as well as providing an initial examination of the use of the patent market value
measure.
Secondly, the use of the intensity measure in the dissertation and the post hoc tests has
implications for future research. As noted in the limitations section, the lack of consistent results
found with the Nohria & Garcia-Post (1991) intensity measure may indicate that the measure is
capturing both the goal and the structure of the relationship. The majority of issues with this
measure were not resolved with the first post hoc test (dichotomizing relationships into equity or
non-equity relationships, averaged by firm-year). However, the second post hoc test provided
more consistent results, utilizing a dichotomous measure indicating whether each interfirm
relationship was a strategic alliance or a joint venture (averaged by firm-year), resulting in
multiple significant relationships. These results were in the hypothesized direction, indicating
that this measure has a stronger relationship with previous knowledge asset value, the theoretical
groundings of this relationship requires further examination. Thus, the use of the Nohria &
Garcia-Pont (1991) measure did not seem applicable to multiple industry analysis, as across
industries it did not capture network intensity. However, the second post hoc test’s network
intensity measure did support that firms with high knowledge asset value have higher levels of
equity relationships, perhaps to reduce the potential for opportunistic behaviors (e.g., Kale et al,
2000; Lipparini et al, 2014. The use of alliances in interfirm networks as compared to joint
ventures in an attempt to protect knowledge may be a fruitful avenue for future research, both
qualitative and quantitative, increasing our understanding of how firms view their ability to
protect (and gain) knowledge via these two relationship structures.
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Finally, the use of the cross-classified dataset may increase the opportunities for
researchers to theorize and examine multiple firm networks. By acknowledging that firms have
more than one network, this research examines firm relationships focused in specific industry
areas, analyzing whole networks whose members can be logically considered as able to engage
in relationships with other network members. Specifically, the cross-classified structure
acknowledges that firm relationships may reach across internal boundaries, such as diversified
business lines, and are not always strictly hierarchical in nature. By analyzing alliance networks,
the network included only firm relationships that were focused on the same industry. This
necessitated a cross-classified dataset, as firms could be present in multiple industries. Indeed,
while the majority of firms were present in only one alliance network (88%), the remainder of
firms ranged from two to nineteen alliance networks. The cross-classified dataset allowed for
acknowledging the ability for firms to be present in multiple alliance networks, and this
dissertation may increase the practice of this methodological approach.

Conclusion
In conclusion, network research is a relatively recent phenomenon of interest, garnering
increasing attention in recent years (Phelps et al, 2012). This dissertation sought to expand our
understanding of the ‘dark side’ of interfirm networks by acknowledging the risk of losing
knowledge value via knowledge spillovers, whereby firm knowledge is transferred without
compensation (or with little compensation) to the knowledge originating firm. By viewing
networks as both a positive and negative source of knowledge for firms, future research may
uncover additional conditions under which firms expand (restrict) their interfirm networks in
order to acquire (protect) knowledge. Methodologically, this dissertation broadened the use of

114
multiple network safeguard measures, allowing for comparisons of effects between
characteristics.
This dissertation examined the degree to which firms with high levels of knowledge
assets implement network safeguards indicative of knowledge protection. Furthermore, it
acknowledged the potential effect of industry characteristics on the above-noted relationships,
and also examined the long-term effect of network safeguards on future knowledge asset value.
A key finding of this dissertation suggests that firms with high knowledge asset value implement
network safeguards, suggesting that these firms are protecting their knowledge by reducing the
potential for knowledge spillovers. In particular, knowledge asset value had a significant,
negative relationship with network size and network beta centrality. This is a central contribution
of this dissertation as it acknowledges the awareness of firms that networks can produce negative
outcomes in addition to the known, published positive outcomes (e.g., Echols & Tsai, 2005,
Hardy et al, 2003, Patel & Terjesen, 2011, Wagner et al., 2014). Indeed, while knowledge
spillovers are certainly positive for recipient firms and the regional development of geographic
locations (Agarwal et al, 2007, 2010; Alcacer & Chung, 2014; Audretsch & Keilbach, 2007;
Delmar et al, 2011), to date, research has been relatively silent on the negative effects of
knowledge spillovers for the knowledge originating firms.
While industry characteristics did not impact the relationship between a firm’s
knowledge asset and network safeguards as hypothesized, the findings do indicate potentially
interesting relationships worthy of future research. Finally, a contribution has been made towards
uncovering the presence of a curvilinear relationship between network safeguards and future firm
knowledge asset value. The goal of these hypotheses was to uncover a situation whereby firms
must balance their network safeguards with the goals of gaining and protecting knowledge.
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Results suggest that there is an optimum level of network safeguards that allow for interfirm
networks to be used as a knowledge resource, while still providing protection for valuable
knowledge assets.
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Table 2.1. Knowledge and Network Research in Major Management Journals

Academy of Management Journal (AMJ)
Afuah, 2001
Bae, Wezel, and Koo, 2011
Carpenter and Westphal, 2001
Funk, 2014
Hernandez, Sanders, and Tuschke, 2015
Hoetker and Agarwal, 2007
Mayer, 2006
Vasudeva and Anand, 2011
Yang, Phelps, and Steensma, 2010
Zhang, Li, and Li, 2014
Organization Science (OS)
Baum, McEvily, and Rowley, 2012
Boland, Lyytinen, and Yoo, 2007
Fang, 2011
Furr and Snow, 2015
Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004
Vanhaverbeke, Duysters, and Noorderhaven,
2002
Strategic Management Journal (SMJ)
Alnuaimi and George, 2016
Appleyard, 1996
Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000
Echols and Tsai, 2005
Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1993
Giarratana and Mariani, 2014
Goerzen, 2007
Jiang, Tan, and Thursby, 2011
Kale, Singh and Permutter, 2000
Koka and Prescott, 2008
Lipparini, Lorenzoni, and Ferriani, 2014
Mahmood, Zhu, and Zajac, 2011
Mesquita, Anand, and Brush, 2008
Penner-Hahn and Shaver, 2005
Soh, 2010
Tiwana, 2008
Uzzi and Gillespie, 2002
Wagner, Hoisl, and Thoma, 2014

Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice (ET&P)
Kirchhoff, Newbert, Hasan, and Armington,
2007
Mosey and Wright, 2007
Schildt, Maula, and Keil, 2005
Journal of Management (JOM)
Operti and Carnabuci, 2014
Wuyts and Dutta, 2014
Zhang, Soh, and Wong, 2010
Journal of Management Studies (JOMS)
Alexiev, Jansen, Van den Bosch, and Volberda,
2010
De Clercq and Dimov, 2008
Figueiredo, 2011
Fjeldstad and Sasson, 2010
Fu, 2012
Hardy, Phillips, and Lawrence, 2003
Lam, 2003
Lazzarini, Claro, and Mesquita, 2008
Martinez-Noya, Garcia-Canal and Guillen, 2013
Phene and Tallman, 2014
Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal (SEJ)
Coombs, Deeds, and Duane Ireland, 2009
Ko and Liu, 2015
Kotha, 2010
Parker, 2010
Patel and Terjesen, 2011
Plummer and Gilbert, 2015
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Table 2.2. Terms and Definitions

Term
Knowledge Asset

Network Safeguard
Knowledge Spillover

Network

Network ties
Direct ties

Indirect ties

Network structure
Strong ties
Weak ties

Network closure

Structural holes

Network position
Beta centrality

Key Definitions

Knowledge resident within a firm that creates value
due to its characteristics of transferability, capacity
for aggregation, and appropriability
Relational or structural mechanisms that limit
opportunism among an actor's set of relations
unintended, un- or under-compensated transfers of
knowledge
“represent external benefits gained from the creation of
knowledge that accrue to parties other than the creator”
“A network consists of a set of actors or nodes along
with a set of ties of a specified type (such as friendship)
that link them.”
“consists of a finite set or sets of actors and the relation
or relations defined on them”

Cite
Grant, 1996a, 1996b
Kogut & Zander,
1992, 1996
Dyer & Singh, 1998,
Lavie, 2006
Agarwal et al., 2010
Kotha, 2010, p. 284
Borgatti and Halgin,
2011, p. 2
Wasserman and
Faust, 1994, p. 20

Direct ties indicate a relationship formed between two
actors: for example, Firm A has a formal relationship
with Firm B
Indirect relationships are those that have (at least) 1
intermediary between the actors. Firm A has a formal
relationship with Firm B and Firm C, therefore, Firm B
and Firm C have an indirect relationship via Firm A

Wasserman and
Faust, 1994

Strong ties are considered long-lasting, repeated
relationships that develop trust and norms of behavior
“essential to the flow of information that integrates
otherwise disconnected social clusters into a broader
society”
A network comprised of a multitude of ties between
actors via repeated, reciprocal relationships developing
obligations and expectations, information flow, and
norms accompanied by sanctions
A single connection that provides a linkage between two
groups (not individual actors)
“Structural holes separate nonredundant sources of
information, sources that are more additive than
overlapping.”

Coleman, 1988

“In a power hierarchy, one's power is a positive function
of the powers of those one has power over”
“A measure of the total amount of potential influence a
node can have on all others via direct and indirect
channels”

Bonacich, 1987, p.
1171
Borgatti et al.,
2013, p. 171

Wasserman and
Faust, 1994

Burt, 1992, p. 73

Coleman, 1988

Burt, 2000
Burt, 2000, p. 353
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Table 2.3. Knowledge and Network Literature and Core Perspectives

Perspective
Organizational
Learning

Key Research
Coombs et al., 2009
Hardy et al., 2003
Hernandez et al., 2015
Lam, 2003
Operti and Carnabuci, 2014
Schildt et al., 2005
Wagner et al., 2014
Yang et al., 2010
Zhang et al., 2014

Absorptive
Capacity (ACAP)

Alexiev et al., 2010
Alnuaimi and George, 2016
Fu, 2012
Giarratana and Mariani,
2014
Martinez-Noya et al., 2013
Penner-Hahn and Shaver,
2005
Phene and Tallman, 2014
Vasudeva and Anand, 2011

Focal Outcomes
A firm’s geographical context can impact success of search strategies
The form of network relationship (involvement and embeddedness) increases learning
Modifying board membership to prevent knowledge spillovers to indirectly linked rivals
Increased autonomy of international R&D facilities increases firm learning via extending
the learning systems across institutional boundaries
Firms can learn from other firms’ public knowledge, strategically developing a spillover
pool
Decreased integration of firm alliances and technological relatedness increases explorative
learning
Organizational learning may occur via indirect linkages
Firms can regain knowledge benefits after knowledge has been spilled
Foreign direct investment can lead to knowledge spillovers to domestic firms
Heterogeneous TMTs may have larger ACAP, increasing exploratory innovation
ACAP increases knowledge retrieval capabilities (regaining knowledge after a spillover has
occurred)
Firms are selective in which knowledge they choose to absorb, even when knowledge
spillovers are available
Firms select internal resources over external resources in locations high in ACAP
Suppliers have a relative ACAP level for each client, depending on firm similarity and
previous knowledge transfer. As ACAP increases, so do appropriability hazards.
Firms who internationalize R&D will generate increased innovation output when they have
internal research capabilities (ACAP)
Firms form alliances subsequent to knowledge spillovers when firms have similar
specialization, and therefore, absorptive capacity
Diverse knowledge found in alliances increases demand on firms’ ACAP
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Wuyts and Dutta, 2014
Network / Social
Capital

Echols and Tsai, 2005
Funk, 2014
Goerzen, 2007
Hardy et al., 2003
Operti and Carnabuci, 2014

Knowledge-Based
View

Patel and Terjesen, 2011
Soh, 2010
Tiwana, 2008
Zhang et al., 2010
Afuah, 2001
DeClerq and Dimov, 2008
Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000
Mayer, 2006
Mesquita et al., 2008

ACAP impacts the relationship between a firm’s alliance portfolio’s diversity and
innovation
Firms with distinct products or services perform better when network embeddedness is high
When knowledge spillovers are not available, inefficient internal networks increase
innovation output
Repeated relationships decrease performance, increasingly in environments of greater
technological uncertainty
Levels of embeddedness and involvement in an interfirm relationship leads to knowledge
transfer and new knowledge creation
Firms’ innovative performance tends to be higher when their spillover network is either
munificent or rich in structural holes
Network range and tie strength increase firm performance
Firms that are highly central and have large networks increase innovation outputs
Strong ties as well as bridging ties increase knowledge integration
Indirect ties increase likelihood of resource acquisition
Firms will adapt to new technology more efficiently when new technology knowledge (but
not old) is found within firm boundaries
Firms’ existing knowledge impacts ability to internalize external knowledge
Examines Toyota’s ability to create and manage knowledge-sharing processes
The threat of knowledge spillovers may lead to selecting internal vs external resources
Knowledge gained at the alliance level can be applied to other relationships
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Table 2.4. Comparisons of Core Perspectives

Perspective
Knowledge-Based View
(Grant, 1996a, 1996b; Spender,
1996)

View of Knowledge
Knowledge as a key resource that provide
firms with competitive advantages

Organizational Learning
(Levitt and March, 1988;
March, 1991)

Firms learn from direct experience as well
as from the experiences of other firms.
Learning can include exploring for new
knowledge or exploiting existing knowledge
Absorptive capacity is the ability for firms
to locate, assimilate and commercialize
external knowledge
Networks are social structures that provide
actors with resources, including knowledge

Absorptive Capacity
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1989,
1990)
Social Capital perspective
(Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1988;
Granovetter, 1973; Lin, 1999)

View of interfirm networks
“Firm networks based upon relational
contracts are an efficient and effective
basis for accessing knowledge” (Grant,
1996a, p. 385)
Networks as a source of knowledge

Key Firm-level
Outcomes
Firm performance
(competitive advantage)

Innovation
Firm performance

External sources of knowledge via
networks and spillovers

Innovation

Network as antecedent to outcome of
interest or network as outcome

Firm performance,
innovation, and
partnering choices
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Figure 3.1. Research Model
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Table 5.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations.
Variables

N

Mean

S.D.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1. Subsequent Firm
Network Size (t+5)
2. Subsequent Average
Firm Network Intensity
(t+5)
3. Subsequent Firm
Network Structural Holes
(t+5)
4. Subsequent Firm
Network Beta Centrality
(t+5)
5. Subsequent Knowledge
Asset Value (patent
originality, t+5) (H8 DV)
6. Subsequent Knowledge
Asset Value (market
value, t+5) (H8 DV)
7. Knowledge Asset Value
(patent originality)
8. Knowledge Asset Value
(patent market value)
9. Firm Network Beta
Centrality
10. Firm Network Size

2815

5.220

8.420

2750

5.837

1.906

-0.064

2814

1.425

0.369

0.585

***

-0.069

*

2815

7.534

10.254

0.995

***

-0.066

*

0.585

***

986

155.174

224.171

0.258

***

-0.085

**

0.087

**

0.297

***

986

3133.06

7730.37

0.176

***

-0.125

***

0.139

***

0.182

***

0.086

**

2815

11.275

166.277

0.215

***

-0.034

0.059

0.248

***

0.881

***

0.032

2815

-156.551

5248.93

0.001

0.001

0.131

***

0.303

***

0.128

***

2805

8.906

10.976

0.465

2815

6.391

9.089

11. Firm Average Network
Intensity
12. Firm Network
Structural Holes
13. Firm Performance

2815

6.152

2813

1.510

2815

14. Firm patenting volume

2815

15. Firm patenting age

2815

16. Firm age

2815

17. Firm R&D expenses

9

*

-0.086

**

0.033

***

-0.153

***

0.327

***

0.472

***

0.403

***

0.328

***

0.400

***

0.243

***

0.456

***

-0.161

***

0.328

***

0.460

***

0.368

***

0.344

***

0.369

***

0.253

***

0.993

***

1.726

-0.103

**

0.248

***

-0.047

-0.105

**

-0.121

***

-0.092

**

-0.115

***

-0.105

***

-0.161

***

0.366

0.340

***

-0.158

***

0.326

0.338

***

0.193

***

0.209

***

0.169

***

0.168

***

0.576

***

10.161

0.000

-0.022

-0.101

**

0.018

***

-0.111

***

0.240

***

0.047

208.916

371.321

0.229

***

-0.045

0.991

***

0.115

***

0.383

31.929

14.603

-0.098

**

0.154

31.663

14.710

-0.096

**

0.146

2815

5.402

1.705

0.341

***

-0.071

18. Firm size

2815

8.422

1.776

0.186

***

19. Firm slack

2815

1.035

0.341

0.012

20. Network count

2815

1734.81

1121.70

0.357

21. Dynamism

2815

.62203

0.532

0.148

22. Munificence

2815

14.321

70.567

0.017

23. High-technology
industry

2815

0.803

0.398

0.169

***

*

0.292

0.069

*

-0.027
0.265

***

0.897

***

0.027

***

-0.090

**

-0.106

***

-0.087

**

0.097

**

0.029

0.135

***

0.011

***

-0.080

*

-0.104

**

-0.080

*

0.101

**

0.033

0.137

***

0.009

0.607

***

0.266

***

0.641

***

0.265

***

0.451

***

***

***

0.319

***

*

0.231

***

0.361

***

**

0.211

***

0.117

***

0.084

-0.220

***

0.010

***

-0.072

*

0.334

***

0.324

***

-0.289

***

0.084

**

0.157

-0.244

***

0.029

-0.099

***

0.209

***

-0.069

0.536

***

0.176

-0.091

**

0.019

***

-0.121

***

-0.016

***

0.269

***

0.104

**

0.257

***

0.120

***

0.004

0.013
***

0.129

***

-0.022

0.017

0.599

***

0.206

-0.164

***

0.016

-0.142

***

-0.134

0.191

***

0.047

0.204

***

0.146

-0.0240

*

-0.004

***

-0.044
***

***

0.051
0.222

***

0.305

***

0.191

***
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Variables

10

11

12

11. Average Firm
Network Intensity
12. Lagged Firm
Network Structural
Holes (control)
13. Firm
Performance
14. Firm patenting
volume
15. Firm patenting
age
16. Firm age

-0.165

***

0.581

***

-0.252

***

0.064

*

-0.076

*

0.049

0.349

***

-0.129

***

0.161

0.016

0.163

***

0.014

0.175

17. Firm R&D
expenses
18. Firm size

0.437

***

-0.110

0.302

***

0.041

19. Firm slack

-0.036

20. Network count

0.072

*

-0.061

21. Dynamism

0.227

***

-0.193

22. Munificence

0.324

***

23. High-tech
industry

0.220

***

-0.218

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<.001
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-0.114

***

-0.042

0.136

***

-0.013

***

-0.050

0.132

***

-0.008

***

0.309

***

0.133

***

0.637

0.182

***

0.099

**

***

***

14

0.021

0.036
*

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

0.988

***

***

0.155

***

0.151

***

0.589

***

0.313

***

0.306

***

0.825

***

-0.146

***

-0.496

***

-0.505

***

-0.268

***

-0.466

***

-0.118

***

-0.226

***

-0.228

***

-0.123

***

-0.300

***

0.216

***

0.213

***

-0.281

***

-0.284

***

0.117

***

-0.114

***

0.200

***

0.250

***

***

-0.003

0.100

***

0.285

***

0.489

***

0.120

***

0.657

***

0.290

***

0.134

***

-0.065

***

0.155

***

0.020

-0.193

***

0.320

***

0.101

**

0.218

***

-0.172

***

-0.183

***

0.218

-0.140

***

0.236

***

-0.086

***

-0.022

*

-0.151

***

-0.153

***

-0.016

-0.122

***

0.378

***
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Table 5.2. Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC) results
Firm Network Size
Industry level
0.038
Firm level
0.134
Both levels
0.172
Average Firm Network Intensity
Industry level
Firm level
Both levels

0.050
0.504
0.553

Firm Network Structural Holes
Industry level
Firm level
Both levels

0.097
0.241
0.338

Firm Network Beta Centrality
Industry level
Firm level
Both levels

0.029
0.138
0.167

Knowledge Asset Value (patent
originality) *
Industry level
Firm level
Both levels

0.021
0.629
0.650

Knowledge Asset Value
(market value) *
Industry level
Firm level
Both levels

0.000
0.375
0.375

* Analyses were conducted without the industry level present, without substantive differences
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Table 5.3 Relationship between Firm Knowledge Asset Value with Moderators and Subsequent Firm Network Size
Group Variables:
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Industry segment, Firm
(H1)
(H5a)
(H6a)
(H7a)
Intercept
0.326
-3.273
-2.577
-3.231
-3.020
Firm network size
0.324***
0.324***
0.313***
0.318***
0.326***
Average network intensity
0.015
-0.003
-0.009
-0.002
0.006
Firm network structural holes
2.045***
1.998***
2.079***
1.989***
1.975***
Firm patenting age
-0.020
-0.012
-0.016
-0.014
-0.016
Firm R&D expenses
0.168
0.612**
0.763***
0.722**
0.805***
Firm size
0.386
0.409
0.295
0.332
0.296
Firm slack
0.393
0.637
0.559
0.601
0.829
Network size
0.003***
0.003***
0.003***
0.003***
0.003***
Year
1990
-2.220**
-2.195**
-2.374**
-2.015**
-1.787*
1991
-5.061***
-4.890***
-5.032***
-4.711***
-4.014***
1992
-6.592***
-6.373***
-6.509***
-6.451***
-5.286***
1993
-7.885***
-7.654***
-7.673***
-7.933***
-6.497***
1994
-8.971***
-8.796***
-8.641***
-8.435***
-7.720***
1995
-9.308***
-9.209***
-8.864***
-8.506***
-7.841***
1996
-9.341***
-9.174***
-8.801***
-8.493***
-7.442***
1997
-9.505***
-9.314***
-8.814***
-9.052***
-7.182***
1998
-9.521***
-8.952***
-8.348***
-8.961***
-6.503***
1999
-8.895***
-8.211***
-7.500***
-8.177***
-5.945***
2000
-8.658***
-7.338***
-6.558***
-6.945***
-5.718***
2001
-8.185***
-7.319***
-6.511***
-6.813***
-5.810***
2002
-8.433***
-7.714***
-6.867***
-7.177***
-6.535***
2003
-8.058***
-7.451***
-6.610***
-6.853***
-6.677***
2004
-7.800***
-7.261***
-6.500***
-7.140***
-6.866***
2005
-7.343***
-6.939***
-6.146***
-6.749***
-6.724***
Knowledge Asset Value (patent
originality)
Knowledge Asset Value (market
value of knowledge)
High-tech industry
Dynamism
Munificence
H-T Industry x Patent Orig.
H-T Industry x Market Value
Dyn x Patent Orig.
Dyn x Market Value
Mun x Pat. Orig.
Mun x Market Value
Random Effects
Industry
Firm
Residual
N
Wald χ2
Log likelihood
LR-test (χ2) *
AIC
***p<.001, ** p<.01, *p<.05
***p<.001, ** p<.01, *p<.05
***p<.001, ** p<.01, *p<.05
*

-0.01050***

-0.01530***

-0.01369***

-0.01412***

-0.00017***

-0.00020*

-0.00016**

-0.00005

-3.50968***
-1.53295***
-0.22118***
0.00627***
0.00003
0.00295**
-0.00002
0.00022*
-0.00001
2.359
3.329
34.400
2,813
1566.05***
(24)
-9063.96
18183.92

Models 2 – 5 use Model 1 as the comparison model

1.827
5.494
32.500
2,813
1628.33***
(26)
-9019.32
89.27***
18098.64

0.692
5.424
32.264
2,813
1690.36***
(29)
-9003.95
120.01***
18073.91

1.410
5.592
32.094
2,813
1680.33***
(29)
-9002.55
122.82***
18071.09

0.878
5.393
31.843
2,813
1738.26***
(29)
-8987.15
153.62***
18040.29
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Table
Asset Value
Value with
with Moderators
Moderators and
and Subsequent
Subsequent Firm
Structural
Holes
Table 5.5
5.4 Relationship
Relationship between
between Firm
Firm Knowledge
Knowledge Asset
Average
Firm Network
Group
Variables:
Model
1
Model
2
Model
3
Model
4
Model
5
Intensity
Industry
segment,
Firm
(H3)
(H5c)
(H6c)
(H7c)
Group Variables:
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Intercept
1.266***
1.236***
1.227
1.223***
1.225
***
Industry segment, Firm
(H2)
(H5b)***
(H6b)
(H7b)
Network
size
0.011
***
0.011
***
0.010
***
0.010
***
0.011
Intercept
6.227***
6.203***
6.395***
6.171***
6.241***
***
Average
network
intensity
-0.001
-0.001
-0.001
-0.001
-0.001
Network size
-0.002
-0.002
-0.005
-0.003
-0.003
Network
structuralintensity
holes
0.171***
0.170***
0.169***
0.172***
0.173***
Average network
-0.004
-0.004
-0.009
-0.005
-0.005
Firm
patenting
age
-0.002
*
-0.002
*
-0.002
*
-0.002
*
-0.002
Network structural holes
0.397***
0.396***
0.431***
0.402***
0.411****
Firm
R&D
expenses
0.032
**
0.037
***
0.043
***
0.043
***
0.041
Firm patenting age
0.011
0.011
0.010
0.011
0.011***
Firm
size
0.005
0.005
0.000
0.001
0.002
Firm R&D expenses
-0.329***
-0.325***
-0.326***
-0.303***
-0.325***
Firm
-0.039
-0.038
-0.038**
-0.038**
-0.034
Firm slack
size
0.236**
0.235
**
0.232
0.222
0.227**
Firm
network count
0.000***
0.000
0.000**
**
0.000**
***
0.000***
Firm slack
-0.442
**
-0.439
** ***
-0.475
-0.442
-0.455
**
Year
Network size
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
1990
-0.072*
-0.073*
-0.075*
-0.071*
-0.070
Year
1991
-0.153
***
-0.153
***
-0.154
***
-0.150
***
-0.143
1990
0.144
0.145
0.144
0.140
0.106***
1992
-0.219
***
-0.218
***
-0.218
***
-0.221
***
-0.205
1991
-0.042
-0.041
-0.032
-0.041
-0.116***
1993
-0.254
***
-0.253
***
-0.251
***
-0.257
***
-0.238
1992
-0.002
-0.001
0.013
0.005
-0.096***
1994
-0.345
***
-0.345
***
-0.339
***
-0.331
***
-0.327
1993
-0.150
-0.149
-0.133
-0.128
-0.239***
1995
-0.359
***
-0.359
***
-0.349
***
-0.335
***
-0.334
1994
-0.471**
-0.471*
-0.455*
-0.452*
-0.547***
**
1996
-0.399
***
-0.398
***
-0.388
***
-0.375
***
-0.368
1995
-0.840***
-0.839***
-0.820***
-0.826***
-0.936***
***
1997
-0.463
-0.462
-0.446***
***
-0.446***
***
-0.424
1996
-0.957***
***
-0.956
******
-0.945
-0.941
-1.086***
***
1998
-0.506
-0.501
-0.482***
***
-0.488***
***
-0.459
1997
-1.178***
***
-1.177
******
-1.177
-1.147
-1.341***
***
1999
-0.502
-0.497
-0.475***
***
-0.482***
***
-0.455
1998
-1.147***
***
-1.143
******
-1.155
-1.090
-1.341***
***
2000
-0.496
-0.487
-0.462***
***
-0.467***
***
-0.452
1999
-1.079***
***
-1.072
******
-1.107
-1.018
-1.246***
***
2001
-0.478
-0.472
-0.452***
***
-0.452***
***
-0.438
2000
-1.019***
***
-1.003
******
-1.058
-0.969
-1.120***
***
2002
-0.478
-0.470
-0.451***
***
-0.455***
***
-0.442
2001
-0.936***
***
-0.927
******
-0.954
-0.910
-1.045***
***
2003
-0.447
-0.440
-0.423**
***
-0.423**
***
-0.416
2002
-0.915***
***
-0.910
** ***
-0.929
-0.916
-1.002***
***
2004
-0.415
-0.409
-0.394**
***
-0.392**
***
-0.389
2003
-0.760***
**
-0.758
** ***
-0.758
-0.762
-0.798***
**
2005
-0.409
-0.404
-0.388***
***
-0.387**
***
-0.386
2004
-0.937***
***
-0.936
******
-0.939
-0.885
-0.926***
***
2005
Knowledge Asset Value (patent
originality)
Knowledge Asset Value (patent
Knowledge
originality) Asset Value (market
value
of knowledge)
Knowledge
Asset Value (market
High-tech
industry
value of knowledge)
Dynamism
High-tech industry
Munificence
Dynamism
H-T
Ind x Patent Orig.
Munificence
H-T
MarketOrig.
Value
H-T Ind
Ind x
x Patent
Dyn
x
Patent
Orig.
H-T Ind x Market Value
Dyn
Value
Dyn x
x Market
Patent Orig.
Mun
x
Patent
Orig.
Dyn x Market Value
Mun
Value
Mun xx Market
Patent Orig.
Random
Effects
Mun x Market Value
Industry
Random Effects
Firm
Industry
Residual
Firm
Residual
N
Wald
χ2
N
Wald χ2
Log likelihood
LR-test
(χ2) †
Log likelihood
AIC
LR-test (χ2) *
AIC

*
†

-0.996***

-0.996***
-0.00011

-1.020***
-0.00020*

-0.00001
0.00000

-0.00180***
-0.00001**

0.00000

0.00005*
-0.00962
-0.14880
0.00013
0.00001***
**
0.00226
-0.00006**

0.002
0.016
0.351
0.068
1.707

0.002
0.3520.015
1.7080.068

1.920
2,812
1360.26
2,748***
(24)***
143.77
-365.91
(24)

0.003
0.015
0.333
0.068
1.772

-0.955***
-0.00034***

-0.966***
-0.00020*

-0.00058
0.00000

-0.00030
0.00000

-0.00001

0.00000

-0.03243**
0.04269

-0.00282*
0.01824

0.00021***
0.00000
0.00050
0.00001

0.00001
0.00000
0.00002

0.001
0.015
0.363
0.068
1.731

0.00000
0.001
0.015
0.423
0.068
1.708

-5096.45
787.82

1.920
2,812
1369.94
2,748 ***
143.91(26)
***
-364.47
(26)
-5096.382.89
788.93
0.14

1.888
2,812
1384.96
2,748 ***
(29)***
178.56
-357.64
(29)
16.54**
-5079.71
781.28
33.34**

1.913
2,812
1431.33
2,748 ***
(29)***
148.84
-352.95
(29)
25.92***
-5093.87
771.89
5.16

1.914
2,812
1399.42
2,748***
(29) ***
149.14
-361.19
(29)
9.44
-5093.76
788.39
5.38

10248.89

10252.75

10225.43

10253.73

10253.51

Models 2 – 5 use Model 1 as the comparison model
Models 2 – 5 use Model 1 as the comparison model
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Table 5.6. Relationship between Firm Knowledge Asset Value with Moderators and Subsequent Network Beta Centrality
Group Variables:
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Industry segment, Firm
(H4)
(H5d)
(H6d)
(H7d)
Intercept
1.668
-1.777
-0.916
-1.699
-1.218
Network size
0.391***
0.391***
0.375***
0.382***
0.395***
Average network intensity
-0.016
-0.029
-0.030
-0.025
-0.006
Network structural holes
2.586***
2.557***
2.620***
2.553***
2.480***
Firm patenting age
-0.034*
-0.026
-0.030
-0.030
-0.030
Firm R&D expenses
0.247
0.671*
0.889**
0.737**
0.837**
Firm size
0.536*
0.555*
0.400
0.513
0.471
Firm slack
0.610
0.779
0.699
0.757
1.021
Firm network count
0.003***
0.003***
0.004***
0.003***
0.003***
Year
1990
-2.838**
-2.861**
-3.079**
-2.618**
-2.246*
1991
-6.296***
-6.168***
-6.328***
-5.920***
-4.957***
1992
-7.941***
-7.767***
-7.908***
-7.803***
-6.275***
1993
-9.412***
-9.226***
-9.222***
-9.509***
-7.717***
1994
-10.799***
-10.660***
-10.436***
-10.267***
-9.376***
1995
-11.107***
-11.045***
-10.581***
-10.311***
-9.516***
1996
-11.060***
-10.924***
-10.426***
-10.229***
-8.966***
1997
-11.382***
-11.261***
-10.578***
-11.092***
-8.863***
1998
-11.447***
-10.946***
-10.123***
-11.148***
-8.193***
1999
-10.487***
-9.952***
-8.987***
-10.164***
-7.490***
2000
-10.181***
-9.279***
-8.226***
-9.085***
-7.801***
2001
-9.466***
-8.796***
-7.752***
-8.474***
-7.482***
2002
-10.258***
-9.561***
-8.471***
-9.226***
-8.643***
2003
-9.890***
-9.179***
-8.119***
-8.758***
-8.741***
2004
-9.660***
-9.041***
-8.086***
-9.111***
-9.056***
2005
-9.053***
-8.578***
-7.577***
-8.610***
-8.850***
Knowledge Asset Value
(patent originality)
Knowledge Asset Value
(market value)
High-tech industry
Dynamism
Munificence
H-T Ind x Patent Orig.
H-T Ind x Market Value
Dyn x Patent Orig.
Dyn x Market Value
Mun x Patent Orig.
Mun x Market Value
Random Effects
Industry
Firm
Residual
N
Wald χ2
Log likelihood
LR-test (χ2) *
AIC
***p<.001, ** p<.01, *p<.05

*

-0.01273***

-0.01859***

-0.00009*

-0.00022*

-0.01706***
0.00000

-0.01865***
0.00025**

-5.13913***
-1.79205***
-0.29242***
0.00760***
0.00014
0.00405**
-0.00009
0.00035**
-0.00002***
5.764
5.443
51.204
2,813
1466.89***
(24)
-9631.99
19319.97

Models 2 – 5 use Model 1 as the comparison model

4.894
8.266
49.147

1.830
8.249
48.755

3.378
8.539
48.548

1.895
8.406
47.814

2,813
1483.79***
(26)
-9604.06
55.84***
19268.13

2,813
1530.17***
(29)
-9587.67
88.62***
19241.35

2,813
1526.20***
(29)
-9587.95
88.06***
19241.90

2,813
1601.97***
(29)
-9563.42
137.14***
19192.83
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Table 5.7. Relationship between Firm Network Characteristics and Subsequent Knowledge Asset Value (Patent Originality)
Group Variables:
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Industry segment, Firm
(Controls)
(Degree)
(Intensity)
(Structural Holes)
(Beta Centrality)
Intercept
-2262.170 *
-112.902 *
-178.518 **
-118.539
-116.349
Patent Originality
0.637 ***
0.656 ***
0.632 ***
0.638 ***
0.652 ***
Market Value of Knowledge
0.002 ***
0.002 ***
0.002 ***
0.002 ***
0.002 ***
Firm patenting age
1.077 *
-1.044 *
-1.130 *
-1.058 *
-1.061 *
Firm R&D expenses
15.693 *
13.001
16.547 *
15.510 *
13.176
Firm size
7.048
7.247
5.771
6.801
7.298
Firm slack
19.216
21.438
19.963
19.154
21.707
Network size
0.013 *
0.015 *
0.015 **
0.013 *
0.015 *
Year
1990
-5.141
-6.560
-6.531
-4.509
-6.683
1991
0.837
-3.603
1.074
1.851
-3.074
1992
-6.571
-11.380
-3.674
-4.745
-11.553
1993
21.674 *
16.637
27.195 *
24.282 *
16.931
1994
26.761 *
22.416
34.598 **
30.132 **
22.865 *
1995
42.022 ***
39.059 **
50.932 ***
46.298 ***
39.586 **
1996
33.880 **
31.298 *
43.902 **
39.141 **
32.029 *
1997
52.434 ***
50.827 ***
64.485 ***
58.703 ***
51.585 ***
1998
46.506 **
44.429 **
61.614 ***
53.632 **
45.979 **
1999
38.053 **
39.407 *
56.877 **
46.619 **
41.025 *
2000
-11.290
-7.024
10.653
-1.624
-5.154
Firm Network Size
Firm Network Size^2
Average network intensity
Average network intensity ^2
Firm Network SH
Firm Network SH^2
Firm Network centrality
Firm Network centrality^2
Random Effects
Industry
Firm
Residual
N
Wald χ2
Log Likelihood
LR-test (χ2) *
AIC
***p<.001, ** p<.01, *p<.05

*

1.815 **
-0.025 **
12.915
-0.505
-1.273
2.198
1.451 **
-0.015 **
463.928
5767.253
4402.884
980
511.74 ***
(22)
-5644.036
11332.07

Models 2 – 5 use Model 1 as the comparison model

639.852
5581.274
4299.427
990
692.81 ***
(24)
-5690.490
-92.9
11428.98

502.772
5857.073
4298.102
986
681.91 ***
(24)
-5668.877
-49.682
11385.75

470.332
5716.968
4356.959
990
669.44 ***
(24)
-5696.394
-104.716
11440.79

650.668
5595.461
4358.138
980
682.97 ***
(24)
-5639.307
9.458 *
11326.61
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Table 5.8. Relationship between Firm Network Characteristics and Subsequent Knowledge Asset Value (Patent Market Value)
Group Variables:
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Industry segment, Firm
(Controls)
(Degree)
(Intensity)
(Structural Holes) (Beta Centrality)
Intercept
21069.157 *
-8134.315 *
-9552.06 **
-146000
-8565.968 **
Patent Originality
-0.819
-3.543
-0.828
-0.346
-3.481
Market Value of Knowledge
-0.048
-0.067
-0.048
-0.054
-0.064
Firm patenting age
-15.767
20.005
18.305
17.124
20.298
Firm R&D expenses
1472.249 **
1285.868 **
1367.895 **
1306.797 **
1320.548 **
Firm size
196.021
144.217
284.337
211.827
142.847
Firm slack
761.433
1160.305
622.914
886.689
1148.076
Network size
0.042
-0.406
-0.012
-0.146
-0.340
Year
1990
476.729
381.716
525.998
493.845
434.850
1991
788.789
333.787
795.971
618.243
506.528
1992
1885.969
1167.397
1783.544 *
1602.954 *
1326.639
1993
2601.249 **
1467.530 *
2370.533 **
2097.537 *
1729.290 *
1994
4021.251 ***
2379.115 **
3738.767 ***
3390.400 ***
2757.981 **
1995
6932.156 ***
4794.303 ***
6622.998 ***
6150.746 ***
5310.508 ***
1996
3574.870 ***
1374.924
3249.532 ***
2773.808 **
1967.292 *
1997
2527.270
125.284
2149.551 *
1653.129
715.133
1998
1314.820
-1117.272
862.091
333.086
-444.762
1999
1415.177
-610.772
863.530
466.515
-40.676
2000
1369.750
-128.313
757.200
495.392
248.479
Firm Network Size
Firm Network Size^2
Average network intensity
Average network intensity ^2
Firm Network SH
Firm Network SH^2
Firm Network centrality
Firm Network centrality^2
Random Effects
Industry
Firm
Residual
N
Wald χ2
Log Likelihood
LR-test (χ2) *
AIC
***p<.001, ** p<.01, *p<.05

*

105.067 **
0.276
173.133
-38.700
-12900.000 *
4753.706 *
75.998 **
0.252
0.000
1.5e+07
2.7e+07
980
165.40 ***
(22)
-9872.593
19789.19

Models 2 – 5 use Model 1 as the comparison model

0.000
1.4e+06
2.6e+07
990
206.84 *
(24)
-9951.735
-158.284
19951.47

0.000
1.5e+07
2.7e+07
986
170.27 *
-9928.328
-111.47
19904.66

0.000
1.5e+07
2.7e+07
990
174.12 *
-9965.411
-185.636
19978.82

0.000
1.4e+07
2.7e+07
980
199.07 *
-9858.43
28.326 ***
19764.86
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Table 5.9. Hypotheses Results
Hypothesis Statement
Independent Variable
Level of Support
H1: There is a negative relationship between firm knowledge asset value and subsequent network size
Patent originality
Supported
Market value
Supported

-0.01050
-0.00017

H2: There is a positive relationship between firm knowledge asset value and the subsequent average
strength of ties (i.e., network intensity) in the firm network
Patent originality
Not supported
Market value
Not supported

-0.00001
0.00000

H3: There is a negative relationship between firm knowledge asset value and subsequent volume of
structural holes
Patent originality
Not supported
Market value
Not supported

-0.00011
-0.00000

H4: There is a negative relationship between firm knowledge asset value and their subsequent beta
centrality
Patent originality
Supported
Market value
Supported

-0.01273
-0.00009

***
*

0.00627
0.00003

***

0.00226
-0.00006

***
**

0.00013
0.00001

**

H5: In industries where knowledge is perceived as more valuable (i.e., high technology), the
relationships between firm knowledge asset value and subsequent network characteristics will be
stronger.
H5a: subsequent network size
Patent originality
Not supported
Market value
Not supported
H5b: subsequent average network intensity
Patent originality
Supported
Market value
Not supported
H5c: subsequent volume of structural holes
Patent originality
Not supported
Market value
Not supported
H5d: subsequent beta centrality
Patent originality
Not supported
Market value
Not supported
H6: The level of dynamism in the industry will moderate the relationships between firm knowledge
asset value and subsequent network characteristics, such that the strength of the relationships will
increase with the level of dynamism.
H6a: subsequent network size
Patent originality
Not supported
Market value
Not supported
H6b: subsequent average network intensity
Patent originality
Not supported
Market value
Not supported
H6c: subsequent volume of structural holes
Patent originality
Not supported
Market value
Not supported
H6d: subsequent beta centrality
Patent originality
Not supported
Market value
Not supported

𝛽𝛽

***
***

0.00760
0.00014

***

0.00295
-0.00002

***

0.00050
0.00001
0.00021
0.00000

**

0.00405
-0.00009

**
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H7: The level of munificence in the industry will moderate the relationships between firm knowledge
asset value and subsequent network characteristics, such that the strength of the relationships will
decrease with the level of munificence.
H7a: subsequent network size
Patent originality
Not supported
Market value
Not supported
H7b: subsequent average network intensity
Patent originality
Not supported
Market value
Not supported
H7c: subsequent volume of structural holes
Patent originality
Not supported
Market value
Not supported
H7d: subsequent beta centrality
Patent originality
Not supported
Market value
Not supported
Dependent Variable

Patent Originality

𝛽𝛽

Market Value

0.00022
-0.00001

*

0.00002
0.00000
0.00001
0.00000
0.00035
-0.00002

**
***

𝛽𝛽

H8: Network safeguards will have a curvilinear (inverted-U) relationship with subsequent knowledge asset value.
H8a: network size
Supported
-0.025 **
Not supported
0.276
H8b: average network
Not supported
-0.505
Not supported
-38.700
intensity
H8c: network closure
Not supported
2.198
Not supported
4753.706
H8d: beta centrality
Supported
-0.015 **
Not supported
0.252
*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

*
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Table 5.10 Post Hoc #1: Firm Knowledge Asset Value with Moderators and Subsequent Firm Network Intensity
Group Variables:
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Industry segment, Firm
(H2)
(H5b)
(H6b)
(H7b)
Intercept
0.231
0.281
0.314***
0.265
0.259***
Network size
-0.001
-0.001
-0.002
-0.001
-0.001
Average network intensity
0.023**
0.022**
0.020*
0.023**
0.022*
Network structural holes
0.053
0.057*
0.054
0.056
0.056
Firm patenting age
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.000
Firm R&D expenses
-0.119***
-0.126***
-0.117***
-0.116***
-0.123***
Firm size
0.100***
0.100**
0.095***
0.094***
0.100***
Firm slack
-0.087
-0.090
-0.098*
-0.093
-0.091
Network size
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Year
1990
0.030
0.031
0.028
0.036
0.032
1991
-0.020
-0.018
-0.022
-0.010
-0.014
1992
-0.006
-0.005
-0.004
-0.008
0.000
1993
0.009
0.009
0.012
0.003
0.016
1994
-0.014
-0.013
-0.007
0.000
-0.004
1995
-0.064
-0.063
-0.048
-0.043
-0.052
1996
-0.063
-0.062
-0.049
-0.044
-0.048
1997
-0.098
-0.097
-0.083
-0.088
-0.079
1998
-0.058
-0.068
-0.054
-0.052
-0.046
1999
-0.036
-0.041
-0.028
-0.025
-0.022
2000
-0.097
-0.107
-0.080
-0.084
-0.075
2001
-0.086
-0.093
-0.068
-0.066
-0.061
2002
-0.089
-0.105
-0.088
-0.088
-0.078
2003
0.050
0.021
0.034
0.040
0.033
2004
-0.012
-0.031
-0.016
-0.011
-0.012
2005
0.036
0.005
0.017
0.019
0.016
Knowledge Asset Value (patent
0.00024*
-0.00021
0.00010
0.00032*
originality)
Knowledge Asset Value (market
0.00000
0.00000
-0.00001
-0.00001
value of knowledge)
High-tech industry
-0.05181
Dynamism
-0.03493
Munificence
-0.00025
H-T Ind x Patent Orig.
0.00050**
H-T Ind x Market Value
0.00000
Dyn x Patent Orig.
0.00011
Dyn x Market Value
0.00000
Mun x Patent Orig.
-0.00001
Mun x Market Value
0.00000
Random Effects
Industry
0.017
0.017
0.016
0.013
0.017
Firm
0.034
0.033
0.035
0.033
0.033
Residual
0.073
0.073
0.072
0.073
0.073
N
Wald χ2
Log likelihood
LR-test (χ2) *
AIC
***p<.001, ** p<.01, *p<.05

863
92.52***
(24)
-203.956
463.91

863
98.58***
(26)
-201.57
4.77
463.13

863
107.11***
(29)
-197.04
13.83*
460.09

863
106.91***
(29)
-198.63
10.65
463.26

863
101.20***
(29)
-200.06
7.79
466.11

Table 5.11 Post Hoc #2: Firm Knowledge Asset Value with Moderators and Subsequent Firm Network Intensity
*

Models 2 – 5 use Model 1 as the comparison model
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Group Variables:
Industry segment, Firm
Intercept
Network size
Average network intensity
Network structural holes
Firm patenting age
Firm R&D expenses
Firm size
Firm slack
Network size
Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Knowledge Asset Value (patent
originality)
Knowledge Asset Value (market
value of knowledge)
High-tech industry
Dynamism
Munificence
H-T Ind x Patent Orig.
H-T Ind x Market Value
Dyn x Patent Orig.
Dyn x Market Value
Mun x Patent Orig.
Mun x Market Value
Random Effects
Industry
Firm
Residual
N
Wald χ2
Log likelihood
LR-test (χ2) *
AIC
***p<.001, ** p<.01, *p<.05

*

Model 1
12.338
-0.039
2.244**
2.081
0.126
-12.770***
11.177***
-7.009
-0.007**
7.066
2.187
4.952
6.969
6.085
1.429
1.690
-2.195
1.714
0.170
-8.949
-3.531
-5.516
7.963
5.015
8.419

Model 2
(H2)
18.867
-0.088
2.154**
2.562*
0.104
-13.675***
11.252**
-7.463
-0.008**
7.158
2.310
5.020
6.924
6.220
1.444
1.687
-2.236
0.359
-0.759
-10.747
-4.816
-7.741
4.411
2.627
4.847
0.02755*
-0.00003

Model 3
(H5b)
19.040
-0.153
1.946*
2.157
0.092
-12.798***
10.840***
-8.097
-0.007*

Model 4
(H6b)
17.102
-0.091
2.190**
2.448
0.127
-12.615***
10.597***
-7.748
-0.007**

Model 5
(H7b)
15.949
-0.096
2.080**
2.580
0.102
-13.334***
11.130***
-8.052
-0.007**

7.255
2.361
5.517
7.501
6.824
2.847
2.771
-1.062
1.197
-0.262
-8.475
-2.981
-7.189
4.620
3.103
5.248

7.408
2.809
4.727
6.556
7.172
2.971
3.108
-1.312
2.258
1.208
-8.517
-1.908
-6.252
6.110
4.755
6.371

6.835
1.844
4.410
6.678
6.194
1.625
1.724
-2.221
0.107
-1.036
-7.990
-2.154
-5.975
5.232
4.749
6.280

-0.00838

0.01513

0.03756*

-0.00065

-0.00070

-0.00168*

2.53072
-2.34640
0.20695
0.04099*
0.00060
0.00931
0.00049
-0.00072
0.00008*
115.5
442.1
688.3

160.9
434.6
684.4

153.1
447.5
674.0

137.2
439.2
679.2

174.3
445.1
674.2

863
115.51***
(24)
-4170.87

863
122.69***
(26)
-4167.79
6.15
8395.58

863
130.46***
(29)
-4163.88
13.97*
8393.76

863
129.82***
(29)
-4164.93
11.87*
8395.86

863
128.71***
(29)
-4164.33
13.07*
8394.67

8397.73

Models 2 – 5 use Model 1 as the comparison model

147
Figure 5.1: Graphs of Interaction of Firm Knowledge Asset Value and Industry with Network Safeguards
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Figure 5.2: Graph of Interaction of Firm Knowledge Asset Value and Dynamism with Network Safeguards
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Figure 5.3 Graph of Interaction of Firm Knowledge Asset Value and Munificence with Network Safeguards
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Figure 5.4: Graphs of Curvilinear Effects of Network Safeguards and future Firm Knowledge Asset Value
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Table 6.1. Nohria and Garcia-Pont’s (1991) scale of relationship intensity
Mergers and Acquisitions
9
Independent Joint Ventures
8
Limited Cross Equity Ownership
7
Minority Equity
6
Broad R&D Agreements
5
Second source agreements
4
Component sourcing agreements
3
Know-how and patent licensing agreements
2
Distribution agreements
1

